From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 02/12] xen/x86: split the setup of Dom0 permissions to a function
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 18:28:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1469809747-11176-3-git-send-email-roger.pau@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1469809747-11176-1-git-send-email-roger.pau@citrix.com>
So that it can also be used by the PVH-specific domain builder. This is just
code motion, it should not introduce any functional change.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
---
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 164 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index d7d4afc..09d79be 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -869,6 +869,89 @@ static __init void setup_pv_physmap(struct domain *d, unsigned long pgtbl_pfn,
     unmap_domain_page(l4start);
 }
 
+static int __init setup_permissions(struct domain *d)
+{
+    unsigned long mfn;
+    int i, rc = 0;
+
+    /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
+    rc |= ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF);
+    rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
+    rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
+
+    /*
+     * Modify I/O port access permissions.
+     */
+    /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x20, 0x21);
+    /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xA0, 0xA1);
+    /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
+    /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
+    /* ACPI PM Timer. */
+    if ( pmtmr_ioport )
+        rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
+    /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
+    /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
+    process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);
+
+    /*
+     * Modify I/O memory access permissions.
+     */
+    /* Local APIC. */
+    if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
+    {
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
+        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+    }
+    /* I/O APICs. */
+    for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
+    {
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
+        if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+    }
+    /* MSI range. */
+    rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
+                            paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
+                                         MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
+    /* HyperTransport range. */
+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
+        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
+                                paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
+
+    /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
+    for ( i = 0; i < e820.nr_map; i++ )
+    {
+        unsigned long sfn, efn;
+        sfn = max_t(unsigned long, paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr), 0x100ul);
+        efn = paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr + e820.map[i].size - 1);
+        if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
+             (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
+             (sfn <= efn) )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, sfn, efn);
+    }
+
+    /* Prevent access to HPET */
+    if ( hpet_address )
+    {
+        u8 prot_flags = hpet_flags & ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT_MASK;
+
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(hpet_address);
+        if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT4 )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+        else if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT64 )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + 15);
+        else if ( ro_hpet )
+            rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
 int __init construct_dom0(
     struct domain *d,
     const module_t *image, unsigned long image_headroom,
@@ -1529,84 +1612,9 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
     if ( test_bit(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel, parms.f_required) )
         panic("Dom0 requires supervisor-mode execution");
 
-    rc = 0;
-
-    /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
-    rc |= ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF);
-    rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
-    rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
-
-    /*
-     * Modify I/O port access permissions.
-     */
-    /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x20, 0x21);
-    /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xA0, 0xA1);
-    /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
-    /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
-    /* ACPI PM Timer. */
-    if ( pmtmr_ioport )
-        rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
-    /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
-    /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
-    process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);
-
-    /*
-     * Modify I/O memory access permissions.
-     */
-    /* Local APIC. */
-    if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
-    {
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
-        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-    }
-    /* I/O APICs. */
-    for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
-    {
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
-        if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-    }
-    /* MSI range. */
-    rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
-                            paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
-                                         MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
-    /* HyperTransport range. */
-    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
-        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
-                                paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
-
-    /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
-    for ( i = 0; i < e820.nr_map; i++ )
-    {
-        unsigned long sfn, efn;
-        sfn = max_t(unsigned long, paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr), 0x100ul);
-        efn = paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr + e820.map[i].size - 1);
-        if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
-             (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
-             (sfn <= efn) )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, sfn, efn);
-    }
-
-    /* Prevent access to HPET */
-    if ( hpet_address )
-    {
-        u8 prot_flags = hpet_flags & ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT_MASK;
-
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(hpet_address);
-        if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT4 )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-        else if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT64 )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + 15);
-        else if ( ro_hpet )
-            rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn);
-    }
-
-    BUG_ON(rc != 0);
+    rc = setup_permissions(d);
+    if ( rc != 0 )
+        panic("Failed to setup Dom0 permissions");
 
     if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
         printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
-- 
2.7.4 (Apple Git-66)
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next prev parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-29 16:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-29 16:28 [PATCH RFC 01/12] PVHv2 Dom0 Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:28 ` [PATCH RFC 01/12] x86/paging: introduce paging_set_allocation Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:47   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-08-02  9:47     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-02 15:49       ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-02 16:12         ` Jan Beulich
2016-08-03 15:11           ` George Dunlap
2016-08-03 15:25             ` Jan Beulich
2016-08-03 15:28               ` George Dunlap
2016-08-03 15:37                 ` Jan Beulich
2016-08-03 15:59                   ` George Dunlap
2016-08-03 16:00                   ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-03 16:15                     ` Jan Beulich
2016-08-03 16:24                       ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-04  6:19                         ` Jan Beulich
2016-08-01  8:57   ` Tim Deegan
2016-07-29 16:28 ` Roger Pau Monne [this message]
2016-07-29 16:28 ` [PATCH RFC 03/12] xen/x86: allow the emulated APICs to be enbled for the hardware domain Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 17:50   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-08-01 11:23     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:28 ` [PATCH RFC 04/12] xen/x86: split Dom0 build into PV and PVHv2 Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 17:57   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-08-01 11:36     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-04 18:28       ` Andrew Cooper
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 05/12] xen/x86: make print_e820_memory_map global Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 17:57   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 06/12] xen/x86: populate PVHv2 Dom0 physical memory map Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 19:04   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-08-02  9:19     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-04 18:43       ` Andrew Cooper
2016-08-05  9:40         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-08-11 18:28           ` Andrew Cooper
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 07/12] xen/x86: parse Dom0 kernel for PVHv2 Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-26 16:16   ` Jan Beulich
2016-09-26 17:11     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 08/12] xen/x86: setup PVHv2 Dom0 CPUs Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-26 16:19   ` Jan Beulich
2016-09-26 17:05     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-27  8:10       ` Jan Beulich
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 09/12] xen/x86: setup PVHv2 Dom0 ACPI tables Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-26 16:21   ` Jan Beulich
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 10/12] xen/dcpi: add a dpci passthrough handler for hardware domain Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 11/12] xen/x86: allow a PVHv2 Dom0 to register PCI devices with Xen Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:29 ` [PATCH RFC 12/12] xen/x86: route legacy PCI interrupts to Dom0 Roger Pau Monne
2016-07-29 16:38 ` [PATCH RFC 01/12] PVHv2 Dom0 Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-26 16:25 ` Jan Beulich
2016-09-26 17:12   ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-09-26 17:55     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-09-27  8:11     ` Jan Beulich
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