[PATCH 1/3] x86/levelling: Restrict non-architectural OSXSAVE handling to emulated CPUID

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>]

There is no need to extend the workaround to the faulted CPUID view, as
Linux's dependence on the workaround is stricly via the emulated view.

This causes a guest kernel faulted CPUID to observe architectural behaviour
with respect to its CR4.OSXSAVE setting.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 3df0295..c95fadb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1003,6 +1003,8 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
              *
              * Therefore, the leaking of Xen's OSXSAVE setting has become a
              * defacto part of the PV ABI and can't reasonably be corrected.
+             * It can however be restricted to only the enlightened CPUID
+             * view, as seen by the guest kernel.
              *
              * The following situations and logic now applies:
              *
@@ -1016,14 +1018,18 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
              *
              * - Enlightened CPUID or CPUID faulting available:
              *    Xen can fully control what is seen here.  Guest kernels need
-             *    to see the leaked OSXSAVE, but guest userspace is given
-             *    architectural behaviour, to reflect the guest kernels
-             *    intentions.
+             *    to see the leaked OSXSAVE via the enlightened path, but
+             *    guest userspace and the native is given architectural
+             *    behaviour.
+             *
+             *    Emulated vs Faulted CPUID is distinguised based on whether a
+             *    #UD or #GP is currently being serviced.
              */
             /* OSXSAVE cleared by pv_featureset.  Fast-forward CR4 back in. */
-            if ( (guest_kernel_mode(curr, regs) &&
-                  (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) ||
-                 (curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ctrlreg[4] & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) )
+            if ( (curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ctrlreg[4] & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE) ||
+                 (regs->entry_vector == TRAP_invalid_op &&
+                  guest_kernel_mode(curr, regs) &&
+                  (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) )
                 c |= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE);
 
             /*
-- 
2.1.4


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