From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH] xen/x86: Fix build with clang following c/s 4fa0105
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 19:21:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1473358896-20408-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
https://travis-ci.org/xen-project/xen/jobs/158494027#L2344
Clang complains:
emulate.c:2016:14: error: comparison of unsigned enum expression < 0
is always false [-Werror,-Wtautological-compare]
if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
~~~ ^ ~
Clang is wrong to raise a warning like this. The signed-ness of an enum is
implementation defined in C, and robust code must not assume the choices made
by the compiler.
In this case, dropping the < 0 check creates a latent bug which would result
in an array underflow when compiled with a compiler which chooses a signed
enum.
Work around the bug by explicitly pulling seg into an unsigned integer, and
only perform the upper bounds check.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 9 +++++----
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
index e3bfda5..cc25676 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -1447,13 +1447,14 @@ static int hvmemul_write_segment(
{
struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt =
container_of(ctxt, struct hvm_emulate_ctxt, ctxt);
+ unsigned int idx = seg;
- if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
+ if ( idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
- hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[seg] = *reg;
- __set_bit(seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_accessed);
- __set_bit(seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_dirty);
+ hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[idx] = *reg;
+ __set_bit(idx, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_accessed);
+ __set_bit(idx, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_dirty);
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
}
@@ -2012,12 +2013,14 @@ struct segment_register *hvmemul_get_seg_reg(
enum x86_segment seg,
struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt)
{
- if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
+ unsigned int idx = seg;
+
+ if ( idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg) )
return ERR_PTR(-X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE);
- if ( !__test_and_set_bit(seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_accessed) )
- hvm_get_segment_register(current, seg, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[seg]);
- return &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[seg];
+ if ( !__test_and_set_bit(idx, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg_accessed) )
+ hvm_get_segment_register(current, idx, &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[idx]);
+ return &hvmemul_ctxt->seg_reg[idx];
}
static const char *guest_x86_mode_to_str(int mode)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index 8d6661c..21607bf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -130,14 +130,15 @@ __initcall(shadow_audit_key_init);
static struct segment_register *hvm_get_seg_reg(
enum x86_segment seg, struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt)
{
+ unsigned int idx = seg;
struct segment_register *seg_reg;
- if ( seg < 0 || seg >= ARRAY_SIZE(sh_ctxt->seg_reg) )
+ if ( idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(sh_ctxt->seg_reg) )
return ERR_PTR(-X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE);
- seg_reg = &sh_ctxt->seg_reg[seg];
- if ( !__test_and_set_bit(seg, &sh_ctxt->valid_seg_regs) )
- hvm_get_segment_register(current, seg, seg_reg);
+ seg_reg = &sh_ctxt->seg_reg[idx];
+ if ( !__test_and_set_bit(idx, &sh_ctxt->valid_seg_regs) )
+ hvm_get_segment_register(current, idx, seg_reg);
return seg_reg;
}
--
2.1.4
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next reply other threads:[~2016-09-08 18:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-08 18:21 Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-09-09 8:38 ` [PATCH] xen/x86: Fix build with clang following c/s 4fa0105 Jan Beulich
2016-09-09 10:28 ` George Dunlap
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