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From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3.1 06/15] xen/x86: split the setup of Dom0 permissions to a function
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2016 10:59:52 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1477731601-10926-7-git-send-email-roger.pau@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1477731601-10926-1-git-send-email-roger.pau@citrix.com>

So that it can also be used by the PVH-specific domain builder. This is just
code motion, it should not introduce any functional change.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
---
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
Changes since v2:
 - Fix comment style.
 - Convert i to unsigned int.
 - Restore previous BUG_ON in case of failure (instead of panic).
 - Remove unneeded rc initializer.
---
 xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index 17f8e91..1e557b9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -869,6 +869,88 @@ static __init void setup_pv_physmap(struct domain *d, unsigned long pgtbl_pfn,
     unmap_domain_page(l4start);
 }
 
+static int __init setup_permissions(struct domain *d)
+{
+    unsigned long mfn;
+    unsigned int i;
+    int rc;
+
+    /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
+    rc = ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF);
+    rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
+    rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
+
+    /* Modify I/O port access permissions. */
+
+    /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x20, 0x21);
+    /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xA0, 0xA1);
+    /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
+    /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
+    /* ACPI PM Timer. */
+    if ( pmtmr_ioport )
+        rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
+    /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
+    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
+    /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
+    process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);
+
+    /* Modify I/O memory access permissions. */
+
+    /* Local APIC. */
+    if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
+    {
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
+        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+    }
+    /* I/O APICs. */
+    for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
+    {
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
+        if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+    }
+    /* MSI range. */
+    rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
+                            paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
+                                         MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
+    /* HyperTransport range. */
+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
+        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
+                                paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
+
+    /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
+    for ( i = 0; i < e820.nr_map; i++ )
+    {
+        unsigned long sfn, efn;
+        sfn = max_t(unsigned long, paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr), 0x100ul);
+        efn = paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr + e820.map[i].size - 1);
+        if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
+             (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
+             (sfn <= efn) )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, sfn, efn);
+    }
+
+    /* Prevent access to HPET */
+    if ( hpet_address )
+    {
+        u8 prot_flags = hpet_flags & ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT_MASK;
+
+        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(hpet_address);
+        if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT4 )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
+        else if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT64 )
+            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + 15);
+        else if ( ro_hpet )
+            rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
 int __init construct_dom0(
     struct domain *d,
     const module_t *image, unsigned long image_headroom,
@@ -1539,83 +1621,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
     if ( test_bit(XENFEAT_supervisor_mode_kernel, parms.f_required) )
         panic("Dom0 requires supervisor-mode execution");
 
-    rc = 0;
-
-    /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
-    rc |= ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF);
-    rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, (1UL << (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1);
-    rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
-
-    /*
-     * Modify I/O port access permissions.
-     */
-    /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x20, 0x21);
-    /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xA0, 0xA1);
-    /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
-    /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
-    /* ACPI PM Timer. */
-    if ( pmtmr_ioport )
-        rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
-    /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
-    rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
-    /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
-    process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);
-
-    /*
-     * Modify I/O memory access permissions.
-     */
-    /* Local APIC. */
-    if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
-    {
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
-        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-    }
-    /* I/O APICs. */
-    for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
-    {
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
-        if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-    }
-    /* MSI range. */
-    rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
-                            paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
-                                         MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
-    /* HyperTransport range. */
-    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
-        rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
-                                paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
-
-    /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
-    for ( i = 0; i < e820.nr_map; i++ )
-    {
-        unsigned long sfn, efn;
-        sfn = max_t(unsigned long, paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr), 0x100ul);
-        efn = paddr_to_pfn(e820.map[i].addr + e820.map[i].size - 1);
-        if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
-             (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
-             (sfn <= efn) )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, sfn, efn);
-    }
-
-    /* Prevent access to HPET */
-    if ( hpet_address )
-    {
-        u8 prot_flags = hpet_flags & ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT_MASK;
-
-        mfn = paddr_to_pfn(hpet_address);
-        if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT4 )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
-        else if ( prot_flags == ACPI_HPET_PAGE_PROTECT64 )
-            rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + 15);
-        else if ( ro_hpet )
-            rc |= rangeset_add_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn);
-    }
-
+    rc = setup_permissions(d);
     BUG_ON(rc != 0);
 
     if ( elf_check_broken(&elf) )
-- 
2.7.4 (Apple Git-66)


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-10-29  9:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 89+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-29  8:59 [PATCH v3.1 00/15] Initial PVHv2 Dom0 support Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 01/15] xen/x86: remove XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs for PVHv2 guests Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-31 16:32   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-03 12:35     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 12:52       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-03 14:25         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-11-03 15:05         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 14:22       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-11-03 15:01         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 15:43         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 02/15] xen/x86: fix return value of *_set_allocation functions Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29 22:11   ` Tim Deegan
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 03/15] xen/x86: allow calling {sh/hap}_set_allocation with the idle domain Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-31 16:34   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-01 10:45     ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-02 17:14       ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 10:20         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 10:33           ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-03 11:31           ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 04/15] xen/x86: assert that local_events_need_delivery is not called by " Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-31 16:37   ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 05/15] x86/paging: introduce paging_set_allocation Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-31 16:42   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-01 10:29     ` Tim Deegan
2016-10-29  8:59 ` Roger Pau Monne [this message]
2016-10-31 16:44   ` [PATCH v3.1 06/15] xen/x86: split the setup of Dom0 permissions to a function Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 07/15] xen/x86: do the PCI scan unconditionally Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-31 16:47   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-03 10:58     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-03 11:35       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-03 11:54         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2016-11-29 12:33           ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-29 12:47             ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 12:57               ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-30  5:53                 ` Tian, Kevin
2016-11-30  9:02                   ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 08/15] x86/vtd: fix mapping of RMRR regions Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04  9:16   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04  9:45     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 10:34       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 12:25         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 12:53           ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 13:03             ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 13:16               ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 15:33                 ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 16:13                   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 16:19                     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 17:08                       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 17:25                         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-07  8:36                           ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 09/15] xen/x86: allow the emulated APICs to be enabled for the hardware domain Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04  9:19   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04  9:47     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 10:21       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 12:09         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-04 12:50           ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-04 13:06             ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 10/15] xen/x86: split Dom0 build into PV and PVHv2 Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-11 16:53   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-16 18:02     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-17 10:49       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 17:49         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-29  9:34           ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 11/15] xen/mm: introduce a function to map large chunks of MMIO Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-11 16:58   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 12:41     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-29 13:00       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 15:32         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-11 20:17   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 12/15] xen/x86: populate PVHv2 Dom0 physical memory map Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-11 17:16   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:26     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-28 11:41       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 13:30         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-28 13:49           ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 16:02             ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  8:59 ` [PATCH v3.1 13/15] xen/x86: parse Dom0 kernel for PVHv2 Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-11 20:30   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-11-28 12:14     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  9:00 ` [PATCH v3.1 14/15] xen/x86: hack to setup PVHv2 Dom0 CPUs Roger Pau Monne
2016-10-29  9:00 ` [PATCH v3.1 15/15] xen/x86: setup PVHv2 Dom0 ACPI tables Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-14 16:15   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 12:40     ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-30 14:09       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 14:23         ` Roger Pau Monne
2016-11-30 16:38           ` Jan Beulich
2016-10-31 14:35 ` [PATCH v3.1 00/15] Initial PVHv2 Dom0 support Boris Ostrovsky
2016-10-31 14:43   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-10-31 16:35     ` Roger Pau Monne

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