From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/19] x86/pv: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 11:13:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480331616-6165-13-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1480331616-6165-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Use x86_emul_pagefault() rather than pv_inject_page_fault() to cause raised
pagefaults to be known to the emulator. This requires altering the callers of
x86_emulate() to properly re-inject the event.
While fixing this, fix the singlestep behaviour. Previously, an otherwise
successful emulation would fail if singlestepping was active, as the emulator
couldn't raise #DB. This is unreasonable from the point of view of the guest.
We therefore tolerate either #PF or #DB being raised by the emulator, but
reject anything else as unexpected.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
v2:
* New
---
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index 8a1e7b4..5b60b59 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -5136,7 +5136,7 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_read(
if ( !__addr_ok(addr) ||
(rc = __copy_from_user(p_data, (void *)addr, bytes)) )
{
- pv_inject_page_fault(0, addr + bytes - rc); /* Read fault. */
+ x86_emul_pagefault(0, addr + bytes - rc, ctxt); /* Read fault. */
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
@@ -5177,8 +5177,9 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update(
addr &= ~(sizeof(paddr_t)-1);
if ( (rc = copy_from_user(&full, (void *)addr, sizeof(paddr_t))) != 0 )
{
- pv_inject_page_fault(0, /* Read fault. */
- addr + sizeof(paddr_t) - rc);
+ x86_emul_pagefault(0, /* Read fault. */
+ addr + sizeof(paddr_t) - rc,
+ &ptwr_ctxt->ctxt);
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
/* Mask out bits provided by caller. */
@@ -5379,27 +5380,40 @@ int ptwr_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
page_unlock(page);
put_page(page);
- /*
- * TODO: Make this true:
- *
ASSERT(ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending == (rc == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION));
- *
- * Some codepaths still raise exceptions behind the back of the
- * emulator. (i.e. return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION but without
- * event_pending being set). In the meantime, use a slightly
- * relaxed check...
- */
- if ( ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
- ASSERT(rc == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION);
- if ( rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE || ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
- goto bail;
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION:
+ /*
+ * This emulation only covers writes to pagetables which marked
+ * read-only by Xen. We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page)
+ * and #DB (from singlestepping). Anything else is an emulation bug,
+ * or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
+ */
+ if ( ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+ (ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_debug ||
+ ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault) )
+ pv_inject_event(&ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ else
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+ "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
+ ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.type, ptwr_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector);
+
+ pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ }
- perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations);
- return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case X86EMUL_OKAY:
+ case X86EMUL_RETRY:
+ perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations);
+ return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
bail:
- return 0;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/*************************
@@ -5516,21 +5530,39 @@ int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr,
else
rc = x86_emulate(&ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops);
- /*
- * TODO: Make this true:
- *
ASSERT(ctxt.event_pending == (rc == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION));
- *
- * Some codepaths still raise exceptions behind the back of the
- * emulator. (i.e. return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION but without
- * event_pending being set). In the meantime, use a slightly
- * relaxed check...
- */
- if ( ctxt.event_pending )
- ASSERT(rc == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION);
- return ((rc != X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE && !ctxt.event_pending)
- ? EXCRET_fault_fixed : 0);
+ switch ( rc )
+ {
+ case X86EMUL_EXCEPTION:
+ /*
+ * This emulation only covers writes to MMCFG space or read-only MFNs.
+ * We tolerate #PF (from hitting an adjacent page) and #DB (from
+ * singlestepping). Anything else is an emulation bug, or a guest
+ * playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
+ */
+ if ( ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+ (ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_debug ||
+ ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault) )
+ pv_inject_event(&ctxt.event);
+ else
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+ "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
+ ctxt.event.type, ctxt.event.vector);
+
+ pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case X86EMUL_OKAY:
+ case X86EMUL_RETRY:
+ perfc_incr(ptwr_emulations);
+ return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
}
void *alloc_xen_pagetable(void)
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-28 11:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-28 11:13 [PATCH for-4.9 v2 00/19] XSA-191 followup Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] x86/shadow: Fix #PFs from emulated writes crossing a page boundary Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:55 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 15:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] x86/emul: Drop X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:55 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 15:29 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] x86/emul: Simplfy emulation state setup Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:58 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 12:54 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86/emul: Rename hvm_trap to x86_event and move it into the emulation infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86/emul: Rename HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE to X86_EVENT_NO_EC Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] x86/pv: Implement pv_inject_{event, page_fault, hw_exception}() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:58 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 11:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-29 16:00 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 8:41 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86/emul: Remove opencoded exception generation Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86/emul: Rework emulator event injection Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:04 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 12:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:24 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 14:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] x86/vmx: Use hvm_{get, set}_segment_register() rather than vmx_{get, set}_segment_register() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] x86/hvm: Reposition the modification of raw segment data from the VMCB/VMCS Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:18 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] x86/emul: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:47 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-29 16:02 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] x86/shadow: " Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:49 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 16:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 17:21 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 17:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] x86/hvm: Extend the hvm_copy_*() API with a pagefault_info pointer Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] x86/hvm: Reimplement hvm_copy_*_nofault() in terms of no pagefault_info Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:56 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] x86/hvm: Rename hvm_copy_*_guest_virt() to hvm_copy_*_guest_linear() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:59 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] x86/hvm: Avoid __hvm_copy() raising #PF behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:56 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 12:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 13:01 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 13:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:56 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 16:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 16:42 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 1:22 ` Tian, Kevin
2016-11-29 16:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-29 16:36 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] x86/hvm: Prepare to allow use of system segments for memory references Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] x86/hvm: Use system-segment relative memory accesses Andrew Cooper
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