From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 13/19] x86/shadow: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2016 11:13:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480331616-6165-14-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1480331616-6165-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Use x86_emul_{hw_exception,pagefault}() rather than
{pv,hvm}_inject_page_fault() and hvm_inject_hw_exception() to cause raised
faults to be known to the emulator. This requires altering the callers of
x86_emulate() to properly re-inject the event.
While fixing this, fix the singlestep behaviour. Previously, an otherwise
successful emulation would fail if singlestepping was active, as the emulator
couldn't raise #DB. This is unreasonable from the point of view of the guest.
We therefore tolerate #PF/#GP/SS and #DB being raised by the emulator, but
reject anything else as unexpected.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
v2:
* New
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 13 ++++-----
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index f07803b..e509cc1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
if ( !okay )
{
- hvm_inject_hw_exception(
- (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ x86_emul_hw_exception(
+ (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault,
+ 0, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ pv_emulate_read(enum x86_segment seg,
if ( (rc = copy_from_user(p_data, (void *)offset, bytes)) != 0 )
{
- pv_inject_page_fault(0, offset + bytes - rc); /* Read fault. */
+ x86_emul_pagefault(0, offset + bytes - rc, ctxt); /* Read fault. */
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
@@ -1720,10 +1721,8 @@ static mfn_t emulate_gva_to_mfn(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
gfn = paging_get_hostmode(v)->gva_to_gfn(v, NULL, vaddr, &pfec);
if ( gfn == gfn_x(INVALID_GFN) )
{
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
- hvm_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
- else
- pv_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
+ x86_emul_pagefault(pfec, vaddr, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
+
return _mfn(BAD_GVA_TO_GFN);
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
index 13fa1bf..50705a0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -3390,7 +3390,7 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
* would be a good unshadow hint. If we *do* decide to unshadow-on-fault
* then it must be 'failable': we cannot require the unshadow to succeed.
*/
- if ( r == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE || emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
+ if ( r == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE )
{
perfc_incr(shadow_fault_emulate_failed);
#if SHADOW_OPTIMIZATIONS & SHOPT_FAST_EMULATION
@@ -3434,6 +3434,34 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
v->arch.paging.last_write_emul_ok = 0;
#endif
+ if ( r == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
+ {
+ /*
+ * This emulation covers writes to shadow pagetables. We tolerate #PF
+ * (from hitting adjacent pages), #GP/#SS (from segmentation errors),
+ * and #DB (from singlestepping). Anything else is an emulation bug,
+ * or a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
+ */
+ if ( emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+ (emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector < 32) &&
+ ((1u << emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector) &
+ ((1u << TRAP_debug) | (1u << TRAP_stack_error) |
+ (1u << TRAP_gp_fault) | (1u << TRAP_page_fault))) )
+ {
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+ hvm_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ else
+ pv_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ else
+ pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS == 3 /* PAE guest */
if ( r == X86EMUL_OKAY ) {
int i, emulation_count=0;
@@ -3475,6 +3503,37 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
{
perfc_incr(shadow_em_ex_fail);
TRACE_SHADOW_PATH_FLAG(TRCE_SFLAG_EMULATION_LAST_FAILED);
+
+ if ( r == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
+ {
+ /*
+ * This emulation covers writes to shadow pagetables. We
+ * tolerate #PF (from hitting adjacent pages), #GP/#SS
+ * (from segmentation errors), and #DB (from
+ * singlestepping). Anything else is an emulation bug, or
+ * a guest playing with the instruction stream under Xen's
+ * feet.
+ */
+ if ( emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+ (emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector < 32) &&
+ ((1u << emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector) &
+ ((1u << TRAP_debug) | (1u << TRAP_stack_error) |
+ (1u << TRAP_gp_fault) | (1u << TRAP_page_fault))) )
+ {
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+ hvm_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ else
+ pv_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+ hvm_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ else
+ pv_inject_hw_exception(TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
break; /* Don't emulate again if we failed! */
}
}
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-28 11:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-28 11:13 [PATCH for-4.9 v2 00/19] XSA-191 followup Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] x86/shadow: Fix #PFs from emulated writes crossing a page boundary Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:55 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 15:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] x86/emul: Drop X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:55 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 15:29 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] x86/emul: Simplfy emulation state setup Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:58 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 12:54 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86/emul: Rename hvm_trap to x86_event and move it into the emulation infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86/emul: Rename HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE to X86_EVENT_NO_EC Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] x86/pv: Implement pv_inject_{event, page_fault, hw_exception}() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:58 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 11:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-29 16:00 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 8:41 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86/emul: Remove opencoded exception generation Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86/emul: Rework emulator event injection Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:04 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 12:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:24 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 14:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] x86/vmx: Use hvm_{get, set}_segment_register() rather than vmx_{get, set}_segment_register() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] x86/hvm: Reposition the modification of raw segment data from the VMCB/VMCS Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:18 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] x86/emul: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:47 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-29 16:02 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] x86/pv: " Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-11-28 14:49 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] x86/shadow: " Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 16:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 17:21 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 17:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] x86/hvm: Extend the hvm_copy_*() API with a pagefault_info pointer Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] x86/hvm: Reimplement hvm_copy_*_nofault() in terms of no pagefault_info Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 12:56 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] x86/hvm: Rename hvm_copy_*_guest_virt() to hvm_copy_*_guest_linear() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:59 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] x86/hvm: Avoid __hvm_copy() raising #PF behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:56 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 12:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 13:01 ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-28 13:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 14:56 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-28 16:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 16:42 ` Tim Deegan
2016-11-29 1:22 ` Tian, Kevin
2016-11-29 16:24 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-29 16:36 ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-29 16:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] x86/hvm: Prepare to allow use of system segments for memory references Andrew Cooper
2016-11-28 11:13 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] x86/hvm: Use system-segment relative memory accesses Andrew Cooper
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