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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 18/24] x86/shadow: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 13:50:35 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480513841-7565-19-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1480513841-7565-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Use x86_emul_{hw_exception,pagefault}() rather than
{pv,hvm}_inject_page_fault() and hvm_inject_hw_exception() to cause raised
faults to be known to the emulator.  This requires altering the callers of
x86_emulate() to properly re-inject the event.

While fixing this, fix the singlestep behaviour.  Previously, an otherwise
successful emulation would fail if singlestepping was active, as the emulator
couldn't raise #DB.  This is unreasonable from the point of view of the guest.

We therefore tolerate #PF/#GP/SS and #DB being raised by the emulator, but
reject anything else as unexpected.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>

v3:
 * Split out #DB handling to an earlier part of the series
 * Don't inject #GP faults for unexpected events, but do reenter the guest.
v2:
 * New
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 13 ++++++-------
 xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c  | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index f07803b..e509cc1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
 
     if ( !okay )
     {
-        hvm_inject_hw_exception(
-            (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+        x86_emul_hw_exception(
+            (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault,
+            0, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
         return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
     }
 
@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ pv_emulate_read(enum x86_segment seg,
 
     if ( (rc = copy_from_user(p_data, (void *)offset, bytes)) != 0 )
     {
-        pv_inject_page_fault(0, offset + bytes - rc); /* Read fault. */
+        x86_emul_pagefault(0, offset + bytes - rc, ctxt); /* Read fault. */
         return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
     }
 
@@ -1720,10 +1721,8 @@ static mfn_t emulate_gva_to_mfn(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
     gfn = paging_get_hostmode(v)->gva_to_gfn(v, NULL, vaddr, &pfec);
     if ( gfn == gfn_x(INVALID_GFN) )
     {
-        if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
-            hvm_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
-        else
-            pv_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
+        x86_emul_pagefault(pfec, vaddr, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
+
         return _mfn(BAD_GVA_TO_GFN);
     }
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
index 56c40f8..098b653 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -3373,18 +3373,35 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
 
     r = x86_emulate(&emul_ctxt.ctxt, emul_ops);
 
-    /*
-     * The previous lack of inject_{sw,hw}*() hooks caused exceptions raised
-     * by the emulator itself to become X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE.  Such exceptions
-     * now set event_pending instead.  Exceptions raised behind the back of
-     * the emulator don't yet set event_pending.
-     *
-     * For now, cause such cases to return to the X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE path,
-     * for no functional change from before.  Future patches will fix this
-     * properly.
-     */
     if ( r == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
-        r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+    {
+        /*
+         * This emulation covers writes to shadow pagetables.  We tolerate #PF
+         * (from hitting adjacent pages) and #GP/#SS (from segmentation
+         * errors).  Anything else is an emulation bug, or a guest playing
+         * with the instruction stream under Xen's feet.
+         */
+        if ( emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+             (emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector < 32) &&
+             ((1u << emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector) &
+              ((1u << TRAP_stack_error) | (1u << TRAP_gp_fault) |
+               (1u << TRAP_page_fault))) )
+        {
+            if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+                hvm_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+            else
+                pv_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+
+            goto emulate_done;
+        }
+        else
+        {
+            SHADOW_PRINTK(
+                "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
+                emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type, emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector);
+            r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+        }
+    }
 
     /*
      * NB. We do not unshadow on X86EMUL_EXCEPTION. It's not clear that it
-- 
2.1.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-11-30 13:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-30 13:50 [PATCH for-4.9 v3 00/24] XSA-191 followup Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 01/24] x86/shadow: Fix #PFs from emulated writes crossing a page boundary Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 02/24] x86/emul: Drop X86EMUL_CMPXCHG_FAILED Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 03/24] x86/emul: Simplfy emulation state setup Andrew Cooper
2016-12-08  6:34   ` George Dunlap
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 04/24] x86/emul: Rename hvm_trap to x86_event and move it into the emulation infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 05/24] x86/emul: Rename HVM_DELIVER_NO_ERROR_CODE to X86_EVENT_NO_EC Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 06/24] x86/pv: Implement pv_inject_{event, page_fault, hw_exception}() Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 10:06   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 07/24] x86/emul: Clean up the naming of the retire union Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:58   ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-30 14:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 14:05       ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-30 16:43         ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 10:08   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 08/24] x86/emul: Correct the behaviour of pop %ss and interrupt shadowing Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 10:18   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 10:51     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 11:19       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 09/24] x86/emul: Provide a wrapper to x86_emulate() to ASSERT() certain behaviour Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 10:40   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 10:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 11:21       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 10/24] x86/emul: Always use fault semantics for software events Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 17:55   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2016-12-01 10:53   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 11:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 11:23       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 11/24] x86/emul: Implement singlestep as a retire flag Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 14:28   ` Paul Durrant
2016-12-01 11:16   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 11:23     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 11:33       ` Tim Deegan
2016-12-01 12:05       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 12/24] x86/emul: Remove opencoded exception generation Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 13/24] x86/emul: Rework emulator event injection Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 14:26   ` Paul Durrant
2016-12-01 11:35   ` Tim Deegan
2016-12-01 12:31   ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 14/24] x86/vmx: Use hvm_{get, set}_segment_register() rather than vmx_{get, set}_segment_register() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 15/24] x86/hvm: Reposition the modification of raw segment data from the VMCB/VMCS Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 16/24] x86/emul: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 17/24] x86/pv: " Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 11:50   ` Tim Deegan
2016-12-01 12:57   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 13:12     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 13:27       ` Jan Beulich
2016-11-30 13:50 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-12-01 11:39   ` [PATCH v3 18/24] x86/shadow: " Tim Deegan
2016-12-01 11:40     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 13:00   ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 13:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 19/24] x86/hvm: Extend the hvm_copy_*() API with a pagefault_info pointer Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 20/24] x86/hvm: Reimplement hvm_copy_*_nofault() in terms of no pagefault_info Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 21/24] x86/hvm: Rename hvm_copy_*_guest_virt() to hvm_copy_*_guest_linear() Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 22/24] x86/hvm: Avoid __hvm_copy() raising #PF behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 14:29   ` Paul Durrant
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 23/24] x86/emul: Prepare to allow use of system segments for memory references Andrew Cooper
2016-11-30 13:50 ` [PATCH v3 24/24] x86/emul: Use system-segment relative memory accesses Andrew Cooper

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