From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 18/24] x86/shadow: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2016 16:56:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1480611361-15294-6-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1480611361-15294-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Use x86_emul_{hw_exception,pagefault}() rather than
{pv,hvm}_inject_page_fault() and hvm_inject_hw_exception() to cause raised
faults to be known to the emulator. This requires altering the callers of
x86_emulate() to properly re-inject the event.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
v4:
* Fix the commit message following v3's changes.
* s/is_hvm_vcpu/has_hvm_container_domain/
* Adjust description of permitted exceptions.
* Disallow #GP/#SS with non-zero error codes.
v3:
* Split out #DB handling to an earlier part of the series
* Don't inject #GP faults for unexpected events, but do reenter the guest.
v2:
* New
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 13 ++++++-------
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index f07803b..e509cc1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
if ( !okay )
{
- hvm_inject_hw_exception(
- (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault, 0);
+ x86_emul_hw_exception(
+ (seg == x86_seg_ss) ? TRAP_stack_error : TRAP_gp_fault,
+ 0, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ pv_emulate_read(enum x86_segment seg,
if ( (rc = copy_from_user(p_data, (void *)offset, bytes)) != 0 )
{
- pv_inject_page_fault(0, offset + bytes - rc); /* Read fault. */
+ x86_emul_pagefault(0, offset + bytes - rc, ctxt); /* Read fault. */
return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION;
}
@@ -1720,10 +1721,8 @@ static mfn_t emulate_gva_to_mfn(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long vaddr,
gfn = paging_get_hostmode(v)->gva_to_gfn(v, NULL, vaddr, &pfec);
if ( gfn == gfn_x(INVALID_GFN) )
{
- if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
- hvm_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
- else
- pv_inject_page_fault(pfec, vaddr);
+ x86_emul_pagefault(pfec, vaddr, &sh_ctxt->ctxt);
+
return _mfn(BAD_GVA_TO_GFN);
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
index 7d9081b..fc18d65 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c
@@ -3373,18 +3373,36 @@ static int sh_page_fault(struct vcpu *v,
r = x86_emulate(&emul_ctxt.ctxt, emul_ops);
- /*
- * The previous lack of inject_{sw,hw}*() hooks caused exceptions raised
- * by the emulator itself to become X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE. Such exceptions
- * now set event_pending instead. Exceptions raised behind the back of
- * the emulator don't yet set event_pending.
- *
- * For now, cause such cases to return to the X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE path,
- * for no functional change from before. Future patches will fix this
- * properly.
- */
if ( r == X86EMUL_EXCEPTION && emul_ctxt.ctxt.event_pending )
- r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ {
+ /*
+ * This emulation covers writes to shadow pagetables. We tolerate #PF
+ * (from accesses spanning pages, concurrent paging updated from
+ * vcpus, etc) and #GP[0]/#SS[0] (from segmentation errors). Anything
+ * else is an emulation bug, or a guest playing with the instruction
+ * stream under Xen's feet.
+ */
+ if ( emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type == X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION &&
+ ((emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_page_fault) ||
+ (((emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_gp_fault) ||
+ (emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector == TRAP_stack_error)) &&
+ emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.error_code == 0)) )
+ {
+ if ( has_hvm_container_domain(d) )
+ hvm_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+ else
+ pv_inject_event(&emul_ctxt.ctxt.event);
+
+ goto emulate_done;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ SHADOW_PRINTK(
+ "Unexpected event (type %u, vector %#x) from emulation\n",
+ emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.type, emul_ctxt.ctxt.event.vector);
+ r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ }
+ }
/*
* NB. We do not unshadow on X86EMUL_EXCEPTION. It's not clear that it
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-12-01 16:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-12-01 16:55 [PATCH v4 for-4.9 00/24] [SUBSET] XSA-191 followup Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 16:55 ` [PATCH v4 09/24] x86/emul: Provide a wrapper to x86_emulate() to ASSERT() certain behaviour Andrew Cooper
2016-12-02 11:26 ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 16:55 ` [PATCH v4 10/24] x86/emul: Always use fault semantics for software events Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 19:07 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2016-12-02 11:28 ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 16:55 ` [PATCH v4 11/24] x86/emul: Implement singlestep as a retire flag Andrew Cooper
2016-12-02 11:32 ` Jan Beulich
2016-12-01 16:56 ` [PATCH v4 17/24] x86/pv: Avoid raising faults behind the emulators back Andrew Cooper
2016-12-01 16:56 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-12-02 11:37 ` [PATCH v4 18/24] x86/shadow: " Jan Beulich
2016-12-02 11:48 ` Andrew Cooper
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