From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH for 4.9 4/6] x86/svm: Introduce svm_emul_swint_injection()
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 20:50:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1490989853-21879-5-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1490989853-21879-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Software events require emulation in some cases on AMD hardware. Introduce
svm_emul_swint_injection() to perform this emulation if necessary in
svm_inject_event(), which will cope with any sources of event, rather than
just those coming from x86_emulate().
This logic mirrors inject_swint() in the x86 instruction emulator.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
CC: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 136 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 4d7e49f..6d77c7e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1183,6 +1183,124 @@ static void svm_vcpu_destroy(struct vcpu *v)
passive_domain_destroy(v);
}
+/*
+ * Emulate enough of interrupt injection to cover the DPL check (omitted by
+ * hardware), and to work out whether it is safe to move %rip fowards for
+ * architectural trap vs fault semantics in the exception frame (which
+ * hardware won't cope with).
+ *
+ * The event parameter will be modified to a fault if necessary.
+ */
+static void svm_emul_swint_injection(struct x86_event *event)
+{
+ struct vcpu *curr = current;
+ struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = curr->arch.hvm_svm.vmcb;
+ struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+
+ unsigned int trap = event->vector, type = event->type;
+ unsigned int fault = TRAP_gp_fault, ec = 0;
+
+ if ( vmcb->_cr0 & X86_CR0_PE ) /* TODO: support real-mode injection? */
+ {
+ pagefault_info_t pf;
+ struct segment_register idtr;
+ unsigned int idte_size, idte_offset;
+ unsigned long idte_linear_addr;
+ struct { uint32_t a, b, c, d; } idte = {};
+ bool lm = vmcb->_efer & EFER_LMA;
+ enum hvm_segmentation_mode seg_mode =
+ lm ? hvm_seg_mode_long : hvm_seg_mode_prot;
+ int rc;
+
+ idte_size = lm ? 16 : 8;
+ idte_offset = trap * idte_size;
+
+ /* ICEBP sets the External Event bit despite being an instruction. */
+ ec = (trap << 3) | X86_XEC_IDT |
+ (type == X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION ? X86_XEC_EXT : 0);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: This does not cover the v8086 mode with CR4.VME case
+ * correctly, but falls on the safe side from the point of view of a
+ * 32bit OS. Someone with many TUITs can see about reading the TSS
+ * Software Interrupt Redirection bitmap.
+ */
+ if ( (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) &&
+ MASK_EXTR(regs->eflags, X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) != 3 )
+ goto raise_exception;
+
+ /*
+ * Read all 8/16 bytes so the idtr limit check is applied properly to
+ * this entry, even though don't look all the words read.
+ */
+ hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_idtr, &idtr);
+ if ( !hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(x86_seg_idtr, &idtr, idte_offset,
+ idte_size, hvm_access_read,
+ seg_mode, &idte_linear_addr) )
+ goto raise_exception;
+
+ rc = hvm_copy_from_guest_linear(&idte, idte_linear_addr, idte_size,
+ PFEC_implicit, &pf);
+ if ( rc )
+ {
+ if ( rc == HVMCOPY_bad_gva_to_gfn )
+ {
+ fault = TRAP_page_fault;
+ ec = pf.ec;
+ event->cr2 = pf.linear;
+ }
+
+ goto raise_exception;
+ }
+
+ /* This must be an interrupt, trap, or task gate. */
+ switch ( (idte.b >> 8) & 0x1f )
+ {
+ case SYS_DESC_irq_gate:
+ case SYS_DESC_trap_gate:
+ break;
+ case SYS_DESC_irq_gate16:
+ case SYS_DESC_trap_gate16:
+ case SYS_DESC_task_gate:
+ if ( !lm )
+ break;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ goto raise_exception;
+ }
+
+ /* The 64-bit high half's type must be zero. */
+ if ( idte.d & 0x1f00 )
+ goto raise_exception;
+
+ /* ICEBP counts as a hardware event, and bypasses the dpl check. */
+ if ( type != X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION &&
+ vmcb->_cpl > ((idte.b >> 13) & 3) )
+ goto raise_exception;
+
+ /* Is this entry present? */
+ if ( !(idte.b & (1u << 15)) )
+ {
+ fault = TRAP_no_segment;
+ goto raise_exception;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Any further fault during injection will cause a double fault. It
+ * is fine to leave this up to hardware, and software won't be in a
+ * position to care about the architectural correctness of %rip in the
+ * exception frame.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ raise_exception:
+ event->vector = fault;
+ event->type = X86_EVENTTYPE_HW_EXCEPTION;
+ event->insn_len = 0;
+ event->error_code = ec;
+}
+
static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
{
struct vcpu *curr = current;
@@ -1191,6 +1309,24 @@ static void svm_inject_event(const struct x86_event *event)
struct x86_event _event = *event;
struct cpu_user_regs *regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
+ /*
+ * For hardware lacking NRips support, and always for ICEBP instructions,
+ * the processor requires extra help to deliver software events.
+ *
+ * Xen must emulate enough of the event injection to be sure that a
+ * further fault shouldn't occur during delivery. This covers the fact
+ * that hardware doesn't perform DPL checking on injection.
+ *
+ * Also, it accounts for proper positioning of %rip for an event with trap
+ * semantics (where %rip should point after the instruction) which suffers
+ * a fault during injection (at which point %rip should point at the
+ * instruction).
+ */
+ if ( event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_PRI_SW_EXCEPTION ||
+ (!cpu_has_svm_nrips && (event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_INTERRUPT ||
+ event->type == X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_EXCEPTION)) )
+ svm_emul_swint_injection(&_event);
+
switch ( _event.vector )
{
case TRAP_debug:
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-31 19:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-03-31 19:50 [PATCH for 4.9 0/6] x86/emul: Fixes Andrew Cooper
2017-03-31 19:50 ` [PATCH for 4.9 1/6] x86/hvm: Correct some address space terminology Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 8:24 ` Paul Durrant
2017-04-03 8:24 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 10:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 10:29 ` Jan Beulich
2017-03-31 19:50 ` [PATCH for 4.9 2/6] x86/hvm: Correct long mode predicate Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 8:26 ` Paul Durrant
2017-04-03 8:30 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 8:50 ` George Dunlap
2017-04-05 7:08 ` Tian, Kevin
2017-03-31 19:50 ` [PATCH for 4.9 3/6] x86/hvm: Fix segmentation logic for system segments Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 8:31 ` Paul Durrant
2017-04-03 9:13 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 14:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 15:07 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 15:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 17:37 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-04 10:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-04 10:32 ` Jan Beulich
2017-03-31 19:50 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2017-04-03 9:30 ` [PATCH for 4.9 4/6] x86/svm: Introduce svm_emul_swint_injection() Jan Beulich
2017-04-03 14:04 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2017-03-31 19:50 ` [PATCH for 4.9 5/6] x86/emul: Drop swint_emulate infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 8:36 ` Paul Durrant
2017-04-03 9:38 ` Jan Beulich
2017-03-31 19:50 ` [PATCH for 4.9 6/6] x86/emul: Require callers to provide LMA in the emulation context Andrew Cooper
2017-04-03 8:40 ` Paul Durrant
2017-04-03 10:10 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-05 16:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-06 6:58 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-06 9:47 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-06 14:14 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-06 16:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-04-07 8:35 ` Jan Beulich
2017-04-05 16:07 ` Jan Beulich
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