Re: [PATCH v1 3/3] x86/vvmx: add a shadow vmcs check to vmlaunch

[Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>]

Acknowledging it formally...

Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan <krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>

The review was based on Intel SDM chapters 24 and 30.

-Krish

On 03/16/2017 11:24 AM, Krish Sadhukhan wrote:
> This one looks good to me.
>
> -Krish
>
> On 03/13/2017 03:51 AM, Sergey Dyasli wrote:
>> Intel SDM states that if the current VMCS is a shadow VMCS,
>> VMFailInvalid occurs and control passes to the next instruction.
>>
>> Implement such behaviour for nested vmlaunch.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
>> ---
>>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 7 +++++++
>>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> index 3017849..173ec74 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
>> @@ -1630,6 +1630,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs 
>> *regs)
>>           return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>>       }
>>   +    /* Check that guest is not using a shadow vmcs for vmentry */
>> +    if ( nvmx->shadow_vmcs )
>> +    {
>> +        vmfail_invalid(regs);
>> +        return X86EMUL_OKAY;
>> +    }
>> +
>>       __vmread(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, &intr_shadow);
>>       if ( intr_shadow & VMX_INTR_SHADOW_MOV_SS )
>>       {
>
>
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