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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 00:15:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515024955-13390-13-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Nothing very interesting at the moment, but the logic will grow as new
mitigations are added.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
v3:
 * New
v4:
 * Drop the else-clause printk
 * Rebase over AMD additions
---
 xen/arch/x86/Makefile           |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c            |  3 ++
 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c        | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
 create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
index 433233c..90ab93d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ obj-y += setup.o
 obj-y += shutdown.o
 obj-y += smp.o
 obj-y += smpboot.o
+obj-y += spec_ctrl.o
 obj-y += srat.o
 obj-y += string.o
 obj-y += sysctl.o
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 2e10c6b..470427b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
 #include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
 
 /* opt_nosmp: If true, secondary processors are ignored. */
 static bool __initdata opt_nosmp;
@@ -1502,6 +1503,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
     if ( cpu_has_fsgsbase )
         set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
 
+    init_speculation_mitigations();
+
     init_idle_domain();
 
     this_cpu(stubs.addr) = alloc_stub_page(smp_processor_id(),
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffee909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Citrix Systems Ltd.
+ */
+#include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/lib.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
+
+enum ind_thunk {
+    THUNK_DEFAULT, /* Decide which thunk to use at boot time. */
+    THUNK_NONE,    /* Missing compiler support for thunks. */
+
+    THUNK_RETPOLINE,
+};
+
+static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
+{
+    printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
+
+    /* Compiled-in support which pertains to BTI mitigations. */
+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
+        printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "  Compiled-in support: INDIRECT_THUNK\n");
+
+    printk(XENLOG_INFO
+           "BTI mitigations: Thunk %s\n",
+           thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "N/A" :
+           thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : "?");
+}
+
+void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
+{
+    enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
+
+    /*
+     * Supplimentary minor adjustments.  Without compiler support, there are
+     * no thunks.
+     */
+    if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
+        thunk = THUNK_NONE;
+
+    /*
+     * If there are still no thunk preferences, the compiled default is
+     * actually retpoline, and it is better than nothing.
+     */
+    if ( thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT )
+        thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
+
+    print_details(thunk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0b44f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Citrix Systems Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
+#define __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
+
+void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
+
+#endif /* !__X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__ */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
-- 
2.1.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-04  0:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-04  0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  8:51   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:18     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:02   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:23   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  8:36       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04  0:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04  9:29   ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:32   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  8:38       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:40   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  1:14   ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04  1:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  4:05     ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04  9:42   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51   ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:43   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:52   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:59   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44   ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41   ` Jan Beulich

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