From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 00:15:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515024955-13390-18-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v3:
* Brackets around && (.. & ..) operation
* Extend host to uint32_t for the benefit of the asm code.
v4:
* Extend MSR_PRED_CMD availability logic for AMD.
---
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 12 ++++++++++++
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 31983ed..02a7b49 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -119,11 +119,22 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v)
int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val)
{
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid;
const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = v->domain->arch.msr;
const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ /* Write-only */
+ goto gp_fault;
+
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault;
+ *val = vp->spec_ctrl.guest;
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
if ( !dp->plaform_info.available )
goto gp_fault;
@@ -152,14 +163,38 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val)
{
const struct vcpu *curr = current;
struct domain *d = v->domain;
+ const struct cpuid_policy *cp = d->arch.cpuid;
struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr;
struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr;
switch ( msr )
{
case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO:
+ /* Read-only */
goto gp_fault;
+ case MSR_SPEC_CTRL:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+ if ( val & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS |
+ (cp->feat.stibp ? SPEC_CTRL_STIBP : 0)) )
+ goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
+ vp->spec_ctrl.guest = val;
+ vp->spec_ctrl.host = val;
+ break;
+
+ case MSR_PRED_CMD:
+ if ( !cp->feat.ibrsb && !cp->extd.ibpb )
+ goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
+
+ /*
+ * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In
+ * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting.
+ */
+ if ( v == curr && (val & PRED_CMD_IBPB) )
+ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ break;
+
case MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES:
{
uint64_t rsvd = ~0ull;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
index 2fbed02..3d0012d 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h
@@ -223,6 +223,18 @@ struct msr_domain_policy
/* MSR policy object for per-vCPU MSRs */
struct msr_vcpu_policy
{
+ /* 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
+ struct {
+ /*
+ * Only the bottom two bits are defined, so no need to waste space
+ * with uint64_t at the moment. We maintain the guests idea of the
+ * value it wrote, and a value to install into hardware (extended to
+ * uint32_t to simplify the asm) which might be different.
+ */
+ uint32_t host;
+ uint8_t guest;
+ } spec_ctrl;
+
/* 0x00000140 MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES */
struct {
bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */
--
2.1.4
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-04 0:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-04 0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 8:51 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:23 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:36 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:38 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 1:14 ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04 1:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 4:05 ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:43 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:52 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:59 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41 ` Jan Beulich
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1515024955-13390-18-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).