From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed()
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 00:15:32 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515024955-13390-4-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
It will shortly be used for more than just changing the vendor.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v3:
* Drop forward declaration of vmx_update_guest_vendor()
---
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 ++---
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 6 +++---
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 36ab235..cc7f433 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
struct cpuid_policy *p = d->arch.cpuid;
const struct cpuid_leaf leaf = { ctl->eax, ctl->ebx, ctl->ecx, ctl->edx };
int old_vendor = p->x86_vendor;
+ bool call_policy_changed = false; /* Avoid for_each_vcpu() unnecessarily */
/*
* Skip update for leaves we don't care about. This avoids the overhead
@@ -128,13 +129,7 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
switch ( ctl->input[0] )
{
case 0:
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && (p->x86_vendor != old_vendor) )
- {
- struct vcpu *v;
-
- for_each_vcpu( d, v )
- hvm_update_guest_vendor(v);
- }
+ call_policy_changed = (p->x86_vendor != old_vendor);
break;
case 1:
@@ -299,6 +294,14 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
break;
}
+ if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && call_policy_changed )
+ {
+ struct vcpu *v;
+
+ for_each_vcpu( d, v )
+ hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
+ }
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 28bc7e4..61df92c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ int hvm_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, 0);
}
- hvm_update_guest_vendor(v);
+ hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
return 0;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 2e62b9b..c48fdfa 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static void svm_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v)
vmcb_set_efer(vmcb, new_efer);
}
-static void svm_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static void svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct arch_svm_struct *arch_svm = &v->arch.hvm_svm;
struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = arch_svm->vmcb;
@@ -2424,7 +2424,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata svm_function_table = {
.get_shadow_gs_base = svm_get_shadow_gs_base,
.update_guest_cr = svm_update_guest_cr,
.update_guest_efer = svm_update_guest_efer,
- .update_guest_vendor = svm_update_guest_vendor,
+ .cpuid_policy_changed = svm_cpuid_policy_changed,
.fpu_leave = svm_fpu_leave,
.set_guest_pat = svm_set_guest_pat,
.get_guest_pat = svm_get_guest_pat,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e526e88..e036303 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ static void vmx_free_vlapic_mapping(struct domain *d);
static void vmx_install_vlapic_mapping(struct vcpu *v);
static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr);
static void vmx_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v);
-static void vmx_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v);
static void vmx_wbinvd_intercept(void);
static void vmx_fpu_dirty_intercept(void);
static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content);
@@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
__vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, bitmap);
}
-static void vmx_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static void vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
{
if ( opt_hvm_fep ||
(v->domain->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor != boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) )
@@ -2318,7 +2317,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata vmx_function_table = {
.update_host_cr3 = vmx_update_host_cr3,
.update_guest_cr = vmx_update_guest_cr,
.update_guest_efer = vmx_update_guest_efer,
- .update_guest_vendor = vmx_update_guest_vendor,
+ .cpuid_policy_changed = vmx_cpuid_policy_changed,
.fpu_leave = vmx_fpu_leave,
.set_guest_pat = vmx_set_guest_pat,
.get_guest_pat = vmx_get_guest_pat,
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 6ecad33..7275c65 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
void (*update_guest_cr)(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr);
void (*update_guest_efer)(struct vcpu *v);
- void (*update_guest_vendor)(struct vcpu *v);
+ void (*cpuid_policy_changed)(struct vcpu *v);
void (*fpu_leave)(struct vcpu *v);
@@ -334,9 +334,9 @@ static inline void hvm_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v)
hvm_funcs.update_guest_efer(v);
}
-static inline void hvm_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static inline void hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
{
- hvm_funcs.update_guest_vendor(v);
+ hvm_funcs.cpuid_policy_changed(v);
}
/*
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-04 0:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-04 0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 8:51 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:23 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:36 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:38 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 1:14 ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04 1:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 4:05 ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:43 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:52 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:59 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41 ` Jan Beulich
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