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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed()
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 00:15:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515024955-13390-4-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

It will shortly be used for more than just changing the vendor.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
v3:
 * Drop forward declaration of vmx_update_guest_vendor()
---
 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c         | 17 ++++++++++-------
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c        |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c    |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c    |  5 ++---
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 36ab235..cc7f433 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
     struct cpuid_policy *p = d->arch.cpuid;
     const struct cpuid_leaf leaf = { ctl->eax, ctl->ebx, ctl->ecx, ctl->edx };
     int old_vendor = p->x86_vendor;
+    bool call_policy_changed = false; /* Avoid for_each_vcpu() unnecessarily */
 
     /*
      * Skip update for leaves we don't care about.  This avoids the overhead
@@ -128,13 +129,7 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
     switch ( ctl->input[0] )
     {
     case 0:
-        if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && (p->x86_vendor != old_vendor) )
-        {
-            struct vcpu *v;
-
-            for_each_vcpu( d, v )
-                hvm_update_guest_vendor(v);
-        }
+        call_policy_changed = (p->x86_vendor != old_vendor);
         break;
 
     case 1:
@@ -299,6 +294,14 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
         break;
     }
 
+    if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && call_policy_changed )
+    {
+        struct vcpu *v;
+
+        for_each_vcpu( d, v )
+            hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
+    }
+
     return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 28bc7e4..61df92c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ int hvm_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
         hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, 0);
     }
 
-    hvm_update_guest_vendor(v);
+    hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
 
     return 0;
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 2e62b9b..c48fdfa 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static void svm_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v)
     vmcb_set_efer(vmcb, new_efer);
 }
 
-static void svm_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static void svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     struct arch_svm_struct *arch_svm = &v->arch.hvm_svm;
     struct vmcb_struct *vmcb = arch_svm->vmcb;
@@ -2424,7 +2424,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata svm_function_table = {
     .get_shadow_gs_base   = svm_get_shadow_gs_base,
     .update_guest_cr      = svm_update_guest_cr,
     .update_guest_efer    = svm_update_guest_efer,
-    .update_guest_vendor  = svm_update_guest_vendor,
+    .cpuid_policy_changed = svm_cpuid_policy_changed,
     .fpu_leave            = svm_fpu_leave,
     .set_guest_pat        = svm_set_guest_pat,
     .get_guest_pat        = svm_get_guest_pat,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e526e88..e036303 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -72,7 +72,6 @@ static void vmx_free_vlapic_mapping(struct domain *d);
 static void vmx_install_vlapic_mapping(struct vcpu *v);
 static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr);
 static void vmx_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v);
-static void vmx_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v);
 static void vmx_wbinvd_intercept(void);
 static void vmx_fpu_dirty_intercept(void);
 static int vmx_msr_read_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t *msr_content);
@@ -655,7 +654,7 @@ void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
         __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, bitmap);
 }
 
-static void vmx_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static void vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     if ( opt_hvm_fep ||
          (v->domain->arch.cpuid->x86_vendor != boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) )
@@ -2318,7 +2317,7 @@ static struct hvm_function_table __initdata vmx_function_table = {
     .update_host_cr3      = vmx_update_host_cr3,
     .update_guest_cr      = vmx_update_guest_cr,
     .update_guest_efer    = vmx_update_guest_efer,
-    .update_guest_vendor  = vmx_update_guest_vendor,
+    .cpuid_policy_changed = vmx_cpuid_policy_changed,
     .fpu_leave            = vmx_fpu_leave,
     .set_guest_pat        = vmx_set_guest_pat,
     .get_guest_pat        = vmx_get_guest_pat,
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index 6ecad33..7275c65 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct hvm_function_table {
     void (*update_guest_cr)(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr);
     void (*update_guest_efer)(struct vcpu *v);
 
-    void (*update_guest_vendor)(struct vcpu *v);
+    void (*cpuid_policy_changed)(struct vcpu *v);
 
     void (*fpu_leave)(struct vcpu *v);
 
@@ -334,9 +334,9 @@ static inline void hvm_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v)
     hvm_funcs.update_guest_efer(v);
 }
 
-static inline void hvm_update_guest_vendor(struct vcpu *v)
+static inline void hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
 {
-    hvm_funcs.update_guest_vendor(v);
+    hvm_funcs.cpuid_policy_changed(v);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.1.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-04  0:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-04  0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  8:51   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:18     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:02   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:23   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  8:36       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:29   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:32   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09  8:38       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:40   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  1:14   ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04  1:16     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  4:05     ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04  9:42   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51   ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:43   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:52   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58           ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04  9:59   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44   ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41   ` Jan Beulich

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