From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated()
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 00:15:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515024955-13390-5-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
No practical change at the moment, but future changes will need to react
irrespective of guest type.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 12 ++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 --
xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h | 2 ++
4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index b17468c..d383489 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -363,6 +363,8 @@ int vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
if ( (rc = init_vcpu_msr_policy(v)) )
goto fail;
+
+ cpuid_policy_updated(v);
}
return rc;
@@ -2019,6 +2021,16 @@ int domain_relinquish_resources(struct domain *d)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Called during vcpu construction, and each time the toolstack changes the
+ * CPUID configuration for the domain.
+ */
+void cpuid_policy_updated(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+ if ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) )
+ hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
+}
+
void arch_dump_domain_info(struct domain *d)
{
paging_dump_domain_info(d);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index cc7f433..5973d9f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -294,12 +294,12 @@ static int update_domain_cpuid_info(struct domain *d,
break;
}
- if ( is_hvm_domain(d) && call_policy_changed )
+ if ( call_policy_changed )
{
struct vcpu *v;
for_each_vcpu( d, v )
- hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
+ cpuid_policy_updated(v);
}
return 0;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 61df92c..6a1c752 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1555,8 +1555,6 @@ int hvm_vcpu_initialise(struct vcpu *v)
hvm_set_guest_tsc(v, 0);
}
- hvm_cpuid_policy_changed(v);
-
return 0;
fail6:
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
index f699119..4679d54 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ void toggle_guest_mode(struct vcpu *);
/* x86/64: toggle guest page tables between kernel and user modes. */
void toggle_guest_pt(struct vcpu *);
+void cpuid_policy_updated(struct vcpu *v);
+
/*
* Initialise a hypercall-transfer page. The given pointer must be mapped
* in Xen virtual address space (accesses are not validated or checked).
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-04 0:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-04 0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 8:51 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-22 10:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:23 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:36 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:38 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 1:14 ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04 1:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 4:05 ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:43 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:52 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:59 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41 ` Jan Beulich
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