From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 38/44] x86/mca: Move __HYPERVISOR_mca IPI parameters off the stack
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 20:22:03 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515097329-31902-39-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515097329-31902-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
do_mca() makes several IPI with huge parameter blocks. All operations are
control-plane, and for debugging/development purposes, so restrict them to
being serialised. This allows the hypercall parameter block to safely be
static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index a8c287d..6e88c64 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -49,18 +49,6 @@ struct mca_banks *mca_allbanks;
#define SEG_PL(segsel) ((segsel) & 0x3)
#define _MC_MSRINJ_F_REQ_HWCR_WREN (1 << 16)
-#if 0
-#define x86_mcerr(fmt, err, args...) \
- ({ \
- int _err = (err); \
- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "x86_mcerr: " fmt ", returning %d\n", \
- ## args, _err); \
- _err; \
- })
-#else
-#define x86_mcerr(fmt, err, args...) (err)
-#endif
-
int mce_verbosity;
static int __init mce_set_verbosity(const char *str)
{
@@ -1306,8 +1294,11 @@ CHECK_mcinfo_recovery;
/* Machine Check Architecture Hypercall */
long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
{
+ static spinlock_t mca_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+ static struct xen_mc curop;
+
long ret = 0;
- struct xen_mc curop, *op = &curop;
+ struct xen_mc *op = &curop;
struct vcpu *v = current;
union {
struct xen_mc_fetch *nat;
@@ -1328,13 +1319,26 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
ret = xsm_do_mca(XSM_PRIV);
if ( ret )
- return x86_mcerr("", ret);
+ return ret;
+
+ while ( !spin_trylock(&mca_lock) )
+ {
+ if ( hypercall_preempt_check() )
+ return hypercall_create_continuation(__HYPERVISOR_mca,
+ "h", u_xen_mc);
+ }
if ( copy_from_guest(op, u_xen_mc, 1) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca: failed copyin of xen_mc_t", -EFAULT);
+ {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ( op->interface_version != XEN_MCA_INTERFACE_VERSION )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca: interface version mismatch", -EACCES);
+ {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
switch ( op->cmd )
{
@@ -1353,7 +1357,8 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
break;
default:
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca fetch: bad cmdflags", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
flags = XEN_MC_OK;
@@ -1368,8 +1373,10 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v)
? guest_handle_is_null(mc_fetch.nat->data)
: compat_handle_is_null(mc_fetch.cmp->data) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca fetch: guest buffer "
- "invalid", -EINVAL);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
mctc = mctelem_consume_oldest_begin(which);
if ( mctc )
@@ -1402,7 +1409,10 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
break;
case XEN_MC_notifydomain:
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca notify unsupported", -EINVAL);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
case XEN_MC_physcpuinfo:
mc_physcpuinfo.nat = &op->u.mc_physcpuinfo;
@@ -1413,12 +1423,17 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
: !compat_handle_is_null(mc_physcpuinfo.cmp->info) )
{
if ( mc_physcpuinfo.nat->ncpus <= 0 )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca cpuinfo: ncpus <= 0",
- -EINVAL);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
nlcpu = min(nlcpu, (int)mc_physcpuinfo.nat->ncpus);
log_cpus = xmalloc_array(xen_mc_logical_cpu_t, nlcpu);
if ( log_cpus == NULL )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca cpuinfo", -ENOMEM);
+ {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
on_each_cpu(do_mc_get_cpu_info, log_cpus, 1);
if ( !is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v)
? copy_to_guest(mc_physcpuinfo.nat->info, log_cpus, nlcpu)
@@ -1430,26 +1445,27 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
mc_physcpuinfo.nat->ncpus = nlcpu;
if ( copy_to_guest(u_xen_mc, op, 1) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca cpuinfo", -EFAULT);
-
+ ret = -EFAULT;
break;
case XEN_MC_msrinject:
if ( nr_mce_banks == 0 )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject", -ENODEV);
+ {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
mc_msrinject = &op->u.mc_msrinject;
target = mc_msrinject->mcinj_cpunr;
- if ( target >= nr_cpu_ids )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: bad target", -EINVAL);
-
- if ( !cpu_online(target) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: target offline",
- -EINVAL);
+ if ( target >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(target) )
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ( mc_msrinject->mcinj_count == 0 )
- return 0;
+ goto out;
if ( mc_msrinject->mcinj_flags & MC_MSRINJ_F_GPADDR )
{
@@ -1464,14 +1480,17 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
domid = (mc_msrinject->mcinj_domid == DOMID_SELF) ?
current->domain->domain_id : mc_msrinject->mcinj_domid;
if ( domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: incompatible flag "
- "MC_MSRINJ_F_GPADDR with domain %d",
- -EINVAL, domid);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
d = get_domain_by_id(domid);
if ( d == NULL )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: bad domain id %d",
- -EINVAL, domid);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
for ( i = 0, msr = &mc_msrinject->mcinj_msr[0];
i < mc_msrinject->mcinj_count;
@@ -1485,8 +1504,8 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
{
put_gfn(d, gfn);
put_domain(d);
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: bad gfn %#lx of domain %d",
- -EINVAL, gfn, domid);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
msr->value = pfn_to_paddr(mfn) | (gaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
@@ -1498,7 +1517,10 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
}
if ( !x86_mc_msrinject_verify(mc_msrinject) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: illegal MSR", -EINVAL);
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
add_taint(TAINT_ERROR_INJECT);
@@ -1509,16 +1531,19 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
case XEN_MC_mceinject:
if ( nr_mce_banks == 0 )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca #MC", -ENODEV);
+ {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
mc_mceinject = &op->u.mc_mceinject;
target = mc_mceinject->mceinj_cpunr;
- if ( target >= nr_cpu_ids )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca #MC: bad target", -EINVAL);
-
- if ( !cpu_online(target) )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca #MC: target offline", -EINVAL);
+ if ( target >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(target) )
+ {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
add_taint(TAINT_ERROR_INJECT);
@@ -1536,7 +1561,10 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
bool broadcast = op->u.mc_inject_v2.flags & XEN_MC_INJECT_CPU_BROADCAST;
if ( nr_mce_banks == 0 )
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca #MC", -ENODEV);
+ {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ( broadcast )
cpumap = &cpu_online_map;
@@ -1549,7 +1577,7 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
if ( !cpumask_intersects(cpumap, &cpu_online_map) )
{
free_cpumask_var(cmv);
- ret = x86_mcerr("No online CPU passed\n", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if ( !cpumask_subset(cpumap, &cpu_online_map) )
@@ -1568,7 +1596,7 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_CMCI:
if ( !cmci_apic_vector )
- ret = x86_mcerr("No CMCI supported in platform\n", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
else
{
if ( cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), cpumap) )
@@ -1580,26 +1608,25 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
case XEN_MC_INJECT_TYPE_LMCE:
if ( !lmce_support )
{
- ret = x86_mcerr("No LMCE support", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if ( broadcast )
{
- ret = x86_mcerr("Broadcast cannot be used with LMCE", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Ensure at most one CPU is specified. */
if ( nr_cpu_ids > cpumask_next(cpumask_first(cpumap), cpumap) )
{
- ret = x86_mcerr("More than one CPU specified for LMCE",
- -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
on_selected_cpus(cpumap, x86_mc_mceinject, NULL, 1);
break;
default:
- ret = x86_mcerr("Wrong mca type\n", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
@@ -1610,9 +1637,13 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
}
default:
- return x86_mcerr("do_mca: bad command", -EINVAL);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
}
+ out:
+ spin_unlock(&mca_lock);
+
return ret;
}
--
2.1.4
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-04 20:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-04 20:21 [PATCH FAIRLY-RFC 00/44] x86: Prerequisite work for a Xen KAISER solution Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 01/44] passthrough/vtd: Don't DMA to the stack in queue_invalidate_wait() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05 9:21 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-05 9:33 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 6:41 ` Tian, Kevin
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 02/44] x86/idt: Factor out enabling and disabling of ISTs Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 03/44] x86/pv: Rename invalidate_shadow_ldt() to pv_destroy_ldt() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 04/44] x86/boot: Introduce cpu_smpboot_bsp() to dynamically allocate BSP state Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 05/44] x86/boot: Move arch_init_memory() earlier in the boot sequence Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 06/44] x86/boot: Allocate percpu pagetables for the idle vcpus Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 07/44] x86/boot: Use " Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 08/44] x86/pv: Avoid an opencoded mov to %cr3 in toggle_guest_mode() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 09/44] x86/mm: Track the current %cr3 in a per_cpu variable Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 10/44] x86/pt-shadow: Initial infrastructure for L4 PV pagetable shadowing Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 11/44] x86/pt-shadow: Always set _PAGE_ACCESSED on L4e updates Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 12/44] x86/fixmap: Temporarily add a percpu fixmap range Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 13/44] x86/pt-shadow: Shadow L4 tables from 64bit PV guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 14/44] x86/mm: Added safety checks that pagetables aren't shared Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 15/44] x86: Rearrange the virtual layout to introduce a PERCPU linear slot Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 16/44] xen/ipi: Introduce arch_ipi_param_ok() to check IPI parameters Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 17/44] x86/smp: Infrastructure for allocating and freeing percpu pagetables Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 18/44] x86/mm: Maintain the correct percpu mappings on context switch Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 19/44] x86/boot: Defer TSS/IST setup until later during boot on the BSP Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 20/44] x86/smp: Allocate a percpu linear range for the IDT Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 21/44] x86/smp: Switch to using the percpu IDT mappings Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 22/44] x86/mm: Track whether the current cr3 has a short or extended directmap Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 23/44] x86/smp: Allocate percpu resources for map_domain_page() to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 24/44] x86/mapcache: Reimplement map_domain_page() from scratch Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 25/44] x86/fixmap: Drop percpu fixmap range Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 26/44] x86/pt-shadow: Maintain a small cache of shadowed frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 27/44] x86/smp: Allocate a percpu linear range for the compat translation area Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 28/44] x86/xlat: Use the percpu " Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 29/44] x86/smp: Allocate percpu resources for the GDT and LDT Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 30/44] x86/pv: Break handle_ldt_mapping_fault() out of handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 31/44] x86/pv: Drop support for paging out the LDT Andrew Cooper
2018-01-24 11:04 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 32/44] x86: Always reload the LDT on vcpu context switch Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 33/44] x86/smp: Use the percpu GDT/LDT mappings Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:21 ` [PATCH RFC 34/44] x86: Drop the PERDOMAIN mappings Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 35/44] x86/smp: Allocate the stack in the percpu range Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 36/44] x86/monitor: Capture Xen's intent to use monitor at boot time Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 37/44] x86/misc: Move some IPI parameters off the stack Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 39/44] x86/smp: Introduce get_smp_ipi_buf() and take more " Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 40/44] x86/boot: Switch the APs to the percpu pagetables before entering C Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 41/44] x86/smp: Switch to using the percpu stacks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 42/44] x86/smp: Allocate a percpu linear range for the TSS Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 43/44] x86/smp: Use the percpu TSS mapping Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 20:22 ` [PATCH RFC 44/44] misc debugging Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05 7:48 ` [PATCH FAIRLY-RFC 00/44] x86: Prerequisite work for a Xen KAISER solution Juergen Gross
2018-01-05 9:26 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05 9:39 ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-05 9:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-05 14:11 ` George Dunlap
2018-01-05 14:17 ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-05 14:21 ` George Dunlap
2018-01-05 14:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-05 14:27 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-05 14:35 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-08 11:41 ` George Dunlap
2018-01-09 23:14 ` Stefano Stabellini
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