From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 00/17] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 18:00:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515780067-31735-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
This series is availabe in git form from:
http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=people/andrewcoop/xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/sp2-mitigations-v8
In addition to this software series, you will need the following:
1) A compiler which understands -mindirect-branch=thunk-external and
-mindirect-branch-register. A GCC patch series implementing this should
be available imminently. In the meantime, a development branch can be
obtained from:
https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commits/hjl/indirect/gcc-7-branch/master
2) New microcode from Intel and AMD. These provide new MSRs for Xen to use,
and virtualise for guest kernels to use.
There are some limitations, even with the work presented here.
1) vCPU-to-vCPU SP2 attacks can only be mitigated at the hypervisor level
with IBPB support, which for internal pipeline reasons, we do not expect
to be made available on older processors. For now, I will leave these
details to the hardware vendors.
2) Hardware lacking SMEP is in a worse position than hardware with SMEP. If
you have SMEP (Intel IvyBridge and later, Some AMD Fam16h and all Fam17h
and later), make absolutely sure it is enabled in the BIOS and working.
3) On hardware lacking SMEP support, it is still an open question how to
protect against RSB-to-SMM speculation. Native operating systems can fix
this by prohibiting userspace from mmap()'ing addresses which alias the
SMM range, but Xen has no feasible way of enforcing this restriction on
PV guests, even if we could tolerate the ABI breakage. (However, see the
forthcoming SP3 mitigation series for alternatives for un trusted PV
guests).
~Andrew
Changes from v7:
* Spelling fixes
* Rebase over upstream fixes to IO emulation handling
* Tweak the RSB overwriting algorithm to be smaller
Andrew Cooper (17):
x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks
x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code
x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations
x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising
x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks
x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls
x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB,
STIBP and IBPB
x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL,PRED_CMD} for guests
x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate
x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL,PRED_CMD}
x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads
x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point
x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use
x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer/Return Address Stack on
entry to Xen
x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts
x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests
x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle
docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 39 ++++
tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 4 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c | 3 +
tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c | 12 +-
xen/Rules.mk | 4 +-
xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +
xen/arch/x86/Rules.mk | 13 ++
xen/arch/x86/acpi/cpu_idle.c | 21 ++
xen/arch/x86/boot/trampoline.S | 24 ++-
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 35 +++-
xen/arch/x86/cpu/mwait-idle.c | 7 +
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 43 ++++
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 19 ++
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 21 ++
xen/arch/x86/extable.c | 4 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 2 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S | 8 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 5 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S | 11 ++
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 18 ++
xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S | 49 +++++
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 37 ++++
xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 41 ++--
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 4 +
xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c | 2 +
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c | 6 +
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S | 12 ++
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 39 +++-
xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 4 +-
xen/arch/x86/xen.lds.S | 1 +
xen/common/kernel.c | 23 +++
xen/common/wait.c | 8 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h | 11 ++
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 4 +
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 8 +
xen/include/asm-x86/current.h | 6 +
xen/include/asm-x86/indirect_thunk_asm.h | 41 ++++
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 9 +
xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 15 ++
xen/include/asm-x86/nops.h | 7 +
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 101 ++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 3 +
xen/include/xen/lib.h | 7 +
xen/tools/gen-cpuid.py | 5 +
46 files changed, 1273 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 xen/arch/x86/indirect-thunk.S
create mode 100644 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/indirect_thunk_asm.h
create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
--
2.1.4
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next reply other threads:[~2018-01-12 18:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-12 18:00 Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-14 19:48 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 0:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 4:11 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-15 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 10:40 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:48 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 13:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:00 ` Jan Beulich
2018-02-04 10:57 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05 8:56 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 03/17] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:53 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 11:10 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-16 16:58 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17 9:11 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17 9:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:11 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 16:02 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 0:39 ` Tian, Kevin
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:26 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17 8:40 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17 8:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:09 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17 8:47 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17 9:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:10 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 14:13 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:25 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 15:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer/Return Address Stack on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:54 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 13:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 13:23 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 21:39 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-17 17:26 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-18 9:12 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
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