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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 03/17] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 18:00:53 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515780067-31735-4-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515780067-31735-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Nothing very interesting at the moment, but the logic will grow as new
mitigations are added.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/Makefile           |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c            |  3 ++
 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c        | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
 create mode 100644 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
index b334366..e8c4963 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ obj-y += setup.o
 obj-y += shutdown.o
 obj-y += smp.o
 obj-y += smpboot.o
+obj-y += spec_ctrl.o
 obj-y += srat.o
 obj-y += string.o
 obj-y += sysctl.o
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 65170fe..9426760 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/mc146818rtc.h>
 #include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
 
 /* opt_nosmp: If true, secondary processors are ignored. */
 static bool __initdata opt_nosmp;
@@ -1502,6 +1503,8 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
     if ( cpu_has_fsgsbase )
         set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
 
+    init_speculation_mitigations();
+
     init_idle_domain();
 
     this_cpu(stubs.addr) = alloc_stub_page(smp_processor_id(),
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..256701a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2018 Citrix Systems Ltd.
+ */
+#include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/lib.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
+
+enum ind_thunk {
+    THUNK_DEFAULT, /* Decide which thunk to use at boot time. */
+    THUNK_NONE,    /* Missing compiler support for thunks. */
+
+    THUNK_RETPOLINE,
+};
+
+static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
+{
+    printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
+
+    /* Compiled-in support which pertains to BTI mitigations. */
+    if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
+        printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "  Compiled-in support: INDIRECT_THUNK\n");
+
+    printk(XENLOG_INFO
+           "BTI mitigations: Thunk %s\n",
+           thunk == THUNK_NONE      ? "N/A" :
+           thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : "?");
+}
+
+void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
+{
+    enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
+
+    /*
+     * Supplimentary minor adjustments.  Without compiler support, there are
+     * no thunks.
+     */
+    if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) )
+        thunk = THUNK_NONE;
+
+    /*
+     * If there are still no thunk preferences, the compiled default is
+     * actually retpoline, and it is better than nothing.
+     */
+    if ( thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT )
+        thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
+
+    print_details(thunk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e088a55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ * include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2018 Citrix Systems Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
+#define __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__
+
+void init_speculation_mitigations(void);
+
+#endif /* !__X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__ */
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-file-style: "BSD"
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * tab-width: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
-- 
2.1.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-12 18:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12 18:00 [PATCH v8 00/17] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-14 19:48   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15  0:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15  4:11     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-15 10:14   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 10:40     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:48       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:28   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 13:55     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:00       ` Jan Beulich
2018-02-04 10:57   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05  8:56     ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:53   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 11:10   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-16 16:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  9:11       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  9:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:11   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 16:02     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16  0:39     ` Tian, Kevin
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:26   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  8:40       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  8:43         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:09   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  8:47       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  9:25         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:10   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 14:13     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:25       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 15:12         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer/Return Address Stack on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:54   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 13:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 13:23       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 21:39         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-17 17:26           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-18  9:12             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper

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