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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 15/17] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 10:12:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516266767.4937.118.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516210004.4937.106.camel@infradead.org>


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On Wed, 2018-01-17 at 18:26 +0100, David Woodhouse wrote:
> 
> > In both switching to idle, and back to the vCPU, we should hit this
> > case and not the 'else' case that does the IBPB:
> > 
> > 1710     if ( (per_cpu(curr_vcpu, cpu) == next) ||
> > 1711          (is_idle_domain(nextd) && cpu_online(cpu)) )
> > 1712     {
> > 1713         local_irq_enable();
> > 1714     }
> 
> I tested that; it doesn't seem to be the case. We end up here with prev
> being the idle thread, next being the actual vCPU, and
> per_cpu(curr_vcpu, cpu) being the idle thread too. So we still do the
> IBPB even when we've just switch from a given vCPU to idle and back
> again.
> 
> That's not actually tested on Xen master, but the code here looks very
> much the same as what I actually did test.

This appears to make the excessive IBPBs go away. There might be better
approaches.

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 04e9902..b8a9d54 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
 #include <asm/pv/mm.h>
 #include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
 
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, last_vcpu); /* Last non-idle vCPU */
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu *, curr_vcpu);
 
 static void default_idle(void);
@@ -1745,8 +1746,14 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next)
 
         ctxt_switch_levelling(next);
 
-        if ( opt_ibpb )
+        /* IBPB on switching to a non-idle vCPU, if that vCPU was not
+         * the last one to be scheduled on this pCPU */
+        if ( opt_ibpb && !is_idle_cpu(next) &&
+             per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu) != next )
+        {
+            per_cpu(last_vcpu, cpu) = next;
             wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+        }
     }
 
     context_saved(prev);

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-18  9:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12 18:00 [PATCH v8 00/17] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 01/17] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-14 19:48   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15  0:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15  4:11     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-15 10:14   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 10:40     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:48       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 02/17] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:28   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 13:55     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:00       ` Jan Beulich
2018-02-04 10:57   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05  8:56     ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 03/17] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 04/17] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 05/17] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 10:53   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 06/17] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 07/17] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 08/17] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 11:10   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-16 16:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  9:11       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  9:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:00 ` [PATCH v8 09/17] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 10/17] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:11   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-15 16:02     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16  0:39     ` Tian, Kevin
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 11/17] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 11:26   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:11     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  8:40       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  8:43         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 12/17] x86/entry: Organise the use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:09   ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-16 21:24     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-17  8:47       ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-17  9:25         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 13/17] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:10   ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 14:13     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-16 14:25       ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-01-16 15:12         ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 14/17] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer/Return Address Stack on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 15/17] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 12:54   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 13:02     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-15 13:23       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 21:39         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-17 17:26           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-18  9:12             ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 16/17] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-12 18:01 ` [PATCH v8 17/17] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper

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