From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 10:04:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516615469.9814.144.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515024955-13390-9-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
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On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 00:15 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/asm_defns.h
> @@ -217,22 +217,34 @@ static always_inline void stac(void)
> addq $-(UREGS_error_code-UREGS_r15), %rsp
> cld
> movq %rdi,UREGS_rdi(%rsp)
> + xor %edi, %edi
> movq %rsi,UREGS_rsi(%rsp)
> + xor %esi, %esi
> movq %rdx,UREGS_rdx(%rsp)
> + xor %edx, %edx
> movq %rcx,UREGS_rcx(%rsp)
> + xor %ecx, %ecx
> movq %rax,UREGS_rax(%rsp)
> + xor %eax, %eax
You didn't want to erase all 64 bits?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-22 10:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-04 0:15 [PATCH v6.5 00/26] x86: Mitigations for SP2/CVE-2017-5715/Branch Target Injection Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 01/26] x86/alt: Break out alternative-asm into a separate header file Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 02/26] x86/alt: Introduce ALTERNATIVE{, _2} macros Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 03/26] x86/hvm: Rename update_guest_vendor() callback to cpuid_policy_changed() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 04/26] x86: Introduce a common cpuid_policy_updated() Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 05/26] x86/entry: Remove support for partial cpu_user_regs frames Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 8:51 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 06/26] x86/entry: Rearrange RESTORE_ALL to restore register in stack order Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 07/26] x86/hvm: Use SAVE_ALL to construct the cpu_user_regs frame after VMExit Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 08/26] x86/entry: Erase guest GPR state on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:04 ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-22 10:18 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-22 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 09/26] x86: Support compiling with indirect branch thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:02 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 10/26] common/wait: Clarifications to wait infrastructure Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 11/26] x86: Support indirect thunks from assembly code Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:23 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 18:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:36 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:18 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-11 13:03 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-11 13:41 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-11 13:46 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 12/26] x86/boot: Report details of speculative mitigations Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 13/26] x86/amd: Try to set lfence as being Dispatch Serialising Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:32 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-08 19:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 8:38 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 14/26] x86: Introduce alternative indirect thunks Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:40 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:24 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:30 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 15/26] x86/feature: Definitions for Indirect Branch Controls Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 1:14 ` Doug Goldstein
2018-01-04 1:16 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 4:05 ` Anthony Liguori
2018-01-04 9:42 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 18:51 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 16/26] x86/cmdline: Introduce a command line option to disable IBRS/IBPB, STIBP and IBPB Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:43 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 17/26] x86/msr: Emulation of MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} for guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 18/26] x86/migrate: Move MSR_SPEC_CTRL on migrate Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 19/26] x86/hvm: Permit guests direct access to MSR_{SPEC_CTRL, PRED_CMD} Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:52 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 12:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:28 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 13:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 20/26] x86: Protect unaware domains from meddling hyperthreads Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 9:59 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-09 14:21 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 14:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 21/26] x86/entry: Use MSR_SPEC_CTRL at each entry/exit point Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:14 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 22/26] x86/boot: Calculate the most appropriate BTI mitigation to use Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:17 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 23/26] x86/entry: Clobber the Return Stack Buffer on entry to Xen Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:22 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 24/26] x86/ctxt: Issue a speculation barrier between vcpu contexts Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:25 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 25/26] x86/cpuid: Offer Indirect Branch Controls to guests Andrew Cooper
2018-01-09 11:44 ` Wei Liu
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [PATCH v6.5 26/26] x86/idle: Clear SPEC_CTRL while idle Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 10:29 ` Jan Beulich
2018-01-04 10:41 ` Jan Beulich
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