From: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>,
Martin Pohlack <mpohlack@amazon.de>,
Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@amazon.de>,
Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
Martin Mazein <amazein@amazon.de>,
Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>,
Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
Subject: [PATCH L1TF v10 8/8] common/domain: block speculative out-of-bound accesses
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2019 13:50:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1552567811-5301-9-git-send-email-nmanthey@amazon.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1552567811-5301-1-git-send-email-nmanthey@amazon.de>
When issuing a vcpu_op hypercall, guests have control over the
vcpuid variable. In the old code, this allowed to perform
speculative out-of-bound accesses. To block this, we make use
of the domain_vcpu function.
This is part of the speculative hardening effort.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
---
xen/common/domain.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ long do_vcpu_op(int cmd, unsigned int vcpuid, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
struct vcpu *v;
long rc = 0;
- if ( vcpuid >= d->max_vcpus || (v = d->vcpu[vcpuid]) == NULL )
+ if ( (v = domain_vcpu(d, vcpuid)) == NULL )
return -ENOENT;
switch ( cmd )
--
2.7.4
Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrer: Christian Schlaeger, Ralf Herbrich
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg HRB 149173 B
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-03-14 12:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-14 12:50 L1TF Patch Series v10 Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 1/8] spec: add l1tf-barrier Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 2/8] nospec: introduce evaluate_nospec Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 13:19 ` Jan Beulich
2019-03-14 13:21 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 3/8] is_control_domain: block speculation Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 4/8] is_hvm/pv_domain: " Norbert Manthey
2019-04-05 15:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-04-05 15:34 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2019-04-05 18:29 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-04-05 18:29 ` [Xen-devel] " Norbert Manthey
2019-04-05 18:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-04-05 18:38 ` [Xen-devel] " Andrew Cooper
2019-04-08 9:19 ` Jan Beulich
2019-04-08 9:19 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 5/8] common/memory: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 6/8] x86/hvm: add nospec to hvmop param Norbert Manthey
2019-03-14 12:50 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 7/8] common/grant_table: block speculative out-of-bound accesses Norbert Manthey
2019-03-29 17:11 ` Jan Beulich
2019-05-20 14:27 ` Norbert Manthey
2019-05-20 14:27 ` [Xen-devel] " Norbert Manthey
2019-05-21 9:41 ` Jan Beulich
2019-05-21 9:41 ` [Xen-devel] " Jan Beulich
2019-03-14 12:50 ` Norbert Manthey [this message]
2019-03-14 13:20 ` [PATCH L1TF v10 8/8] common/domain: " Jan Beulich
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