Re: [RFC v3] xSplice design

[Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>]

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On Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 09:34:34AM +0200, Martin Pohlack wrote:
> Hi,

Hey!
> 
> I have a couple of high-level points here:

Also one more thing - I would like to make sure your (and anybody else)
contribution to the design is reflected in the file. What would
be a good way to reflect that?
> 
> * Do you think it would be reasonable to have a minimal design without
>   in-place patching, just using trampolines?  The examples discussed
>   below suggest so.

Yes and no. The inplace patching is quite useful for doing simple tests.
And also for .data modifications.

For example for the OSSTest regression I had in mind to an xsplice
which would alter the xen_compile_domain and make it easy to verify that
the patching was complete.

> 
> * Regarding tboot integration: Do you plan to report hotpatching state
>   to guests or do you want to keep that unchanged?

I have not thought that far ahead. My thinking was that we preserve
the chain of trust because of signatures. But tboot is all about
recomputing all the values up to the BIOS and making sure they
are in sync. I am not really sure what to suggest?

> 
> * If reporting:  Should we hash / sign the hotpatches in load order or
>   should we work on an otherwise ordered set?
> 
>   In other words, do the sequences
>   1: load + activate A, load + activate B
>   2: load + activate B, load + activate A

or:
 3: load A, load B + active A|B
>   Result in the same system state and hash or not?

Definitly same system state. Hash you mean if one was to do checksum
of the .text area?

> 
> * Should we consider pairs of activation / deactivation events as
>   no-ops?
> 
>   In other words, should hypervisor X and hypervisor X after activating
>   and deactivating module A report the same system state and hash?

I am not sure what you mean? Module A being the hot-patch right?

> 
> * What about auditing?  Currently the design discusses a method to
>   query about the current state of affairs with regard to hotpatch
>   modules.  Do we need something like a audit log for hotpatch
>   operations?  We should at least report high-level operations that
>   could impact the integrity on the console with a low threshold.

Certainly. Logging on the Xen ring buffer would be good. In my mind
I also had thought to use the debugtrace_printk to give extreme
details.
> 
> * There is a general (and mostly obscure) limitation on unloading
>   hotpatches:
> 
>   In contrast to normal kernel modules where the module code adheres
>   to specific conventions around resource allocation and locking,
>   hotpatches typically contain code from any context.  That code is
>   usually not aware that it can be unloaded.
> 
>   That code could leave behind in Xen references to itself, e.g., by
>   installing a function pointer in a global data structure, without
>   incrementing something like a usage count.  While most hotpatch code
>   will probably be very simple and small, a similar effect could even
>   be achieved by code called from the hotpatch in Xen, e.g., some code
>   patch could dynamically generate a backtrace and later decide to
>   inspect individual elements from the collected trace, later being a
>   time, where the hotpatch has been unloaded again.
> 
>   One could approach that proplem from multiple angles: code
>   inspection of generated hotpatches, testing, and by making unloading
>   a very special and exceptional operation.

Or you could have an idea of all the changes that had to be done
to apply it - and walk it backwards.
> 
> 
> ... and more inline comments below.

I am also attaching an very RFC patch of the hypercall API
implementation, libxc implementation, and an user-space tool.
It does no patching  - just loads/unloads/fake apply/fake revert
/fake check - etc - to check the validity of the design.

It has updates from this review - thought not all. I think the
major outstanding ones are:

 - Hypercall for build-id.
 - Clarify/settle on the 'id'
 - Clarify/settle on the preemption technique for long-running
   operations.

> 
> Regards,
> Martin Pohlack
> 
> On 06.07.2015 22:26, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > Since RFC v2 [http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-05/msg02142.html]
> >  - Ingested every review comment in.
> > 
> > For those who prefer an diff of what changed between v2 and this
> > I am attaching an diff to help easy reviewing.
> > 
> > Please see inline the RFC v3 which in general:
> >  - Ditches the attempt at defining an ELF payload using semi-Elf language
> >    and just concentrates on structures.
> >  - Expands on the preemption of the hypercalls
> >  - Expands the implementation details with various topics that emerged
> >    during v2 review
> >  - Adds ASCII art (if you can call it that), and an example.
> >  - state diagram the command hypercall.
> > 
> > # xSplice Design v1 (EXTERNAL RFC v3)
> > 
> > ## Rationale
> > 
> > A mechanism is required to binarily patch the running hypervisor with new
> > opcodes that have come about due to primarily security updates.
> > 
> > This document describes the design of the API that would allow us to
> > upload to the hypervisor binary patches.
> > 
> > The document is split in four sections:
> >  - Detailed descriptions of the problem statement.
> >  - Design of the data structures.
> >  - Design of the hypercalls.
> >  - Implementation notes that should be taken into consideration.
> > 
> > 
> > ## Glossary
> > 
> >  * splice - patch in the binary code with new opcodes
> >  * trampoline - a jump to a new instruction.
> >  * payload - telemetries of the old code along with binary blob of the new
> >    function (if needed).
> >  * reloc - telemetries contained in the payload to construct proper trampoline.
> > 
> > ## Multiple ways to patch
> > 
> > The mechanism needs to be flexible to patch the hypervisor in multiple ways
> > and be as simple as possible. The compiled code is contiguous in memory with
> > no gaps - so we have no luxury of 'moving' existing code and must either
> > insert a trampoline to the new code to be executed - or only modify in-place
> > the code if there is sufficient space. The placement of new code has to be done
> > by hypervisor and the virtual address for the new code is allocated dynamically.
> > 
> > This implies that the hypervisor must compute the new offsets when splicing
> > in the new trampoline code. Where the trampoline is added (inside
> > the function we are patching or just the callers?) is also important.
> > 
> > To lessen the amount of code in hypervisor, the consumer of the API
> > is responsible for identifying which mechanism to employ
> 
> The hypervisor at least needs to make sure that in-place patches fit in
> the old place.

Yes, let me add that to the implementation notes.
> 
> > and how many locations
> > to patch. Combinations of modifying in-place code, adding trampoline, etc
> > has to be supported. The API should allow read/write any memory within
> > the hypervisor virtual address space.
> > 
> > We must also have a mechanism to query what has been applied and a mechanism
> > to revert it if needed.
> 
> In-place modifications are more restrictive in when they can be applied
> and need undo buffers in the size of the replacement code.  Trampolines
> only need small fixed-size undo buffers (e.g., 5 bytes on x86).

True.
> 
> If you have multiple levels of patching for a function, mixing the
> different types can become tricky.  We need to think about where
> in-place patches should go, always to the original function or also
> potentially into replacement functions spliced via trampolines?

Keep in mind that the payload can have multiple sections which
can detail in-place the various points of inline patching
and also trampoline patching.

Each individual section defines where the patching has to be done.

> 
> I feel that a pure trampoline mechanism could be enough and would result
> in the smallest hypervisor code footprint.

True.
> 
> In which scenarios would you prefer an in-place solution?

When modifying .data sections primarily.

> 
> > We must also have a mechanism to: provide an copy of the old code - so that
> > the hypervisor can verify it against the code in memory; the new code;
> > the symbol name of the function to be patched; or offset from the symbol;
> > or virtual address.
> 
> I am a bit confused by the "must" above:
> 
> If you consider my previous build ID suggestion as a hash over all
> hypervisor code and you embed a designated build ID in each hotpatch
> module together with a list of required previous modules, comparing the
> two IDs and checking for required modules gives you a *safety* guarantee
> of similar strength with a simpler implementation, right?

True. This 'required previous modules' is missing in this design.
It would have to be added as part of the Elf payload I think - and
in it would have an 'id' (or name?) of the other ones.

> 
> Providing a copy of the old code provides you with additional
> flexibility as you can potentially load a specific hotpatch into more
> Xen builds or you have more freedom regarding module load order.
> 

True.
> We should think a bit about expected workflows of higher-level tools
> that manage hotpatch stacks on production machines:
> 
> * The first obvious task is loading all available / suggested
>   hotpatches around system start.
> * Whenever new hotpatches are installed, they should be loaded too.
> * One wants to query which modules have been loaded at runtime.
> * If unloading is deemed safe (see comment far below), one may want to
>   support a workflow where a specific hotpatch is marked as bad and
>   unloaded.
> * If we do no restrict module activation order and want to report tboot
> state on sequences, we might have a complexity explosion problem, in
> what system hashes should be considered acceptable.

Copied this in the doc.
> 
> > The complications that this design will encounter are explained later
> > in this document.
> > 
> > ## Patching code
> > 
> > The first mechanism to patch that comes in mind is in-place replacement.
> > That is replace the affected code with new code. Unfortunately the x86
> > ISA is variable size which places limits on how much space we have available
> > to replace the instructions.
> 
> I see no special limitation here for variable instruction size ISAs
> except that you may have to fill the end of a smaller in-place patch
> with nops.  You will have similar space trouble with all ISAs when the
> replacement code is longer.

Correct. Updated the comment.
> 
> > The second mechanism is by replacing the call or jump to the
> > old function with the address of the new function.
> > 
> > A third mechanism is to add a jump to the new function at the
> > start of the old function.
> > 
> > ### Example of trampoline and in-place splicing
> > 
> > As example we will assume the hypervisor does not have XSA-132 (see
> > *domctl/sysctl: don't leak hypervisor stack to toolstacks*
> > 4ff3449f0e9d175ceb9551d3f2aecb59273f639d) and we would like to binary patch
> > the hypervisor with it. The original code looks as so:
> > 
> > <pre>
> >    48 89 e0                  mov    %rsp,%rax  
> >    48 25 00 80 ff ff         and    $0xffffffffffff8000,%rax  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > while the new patched hypervisor would be:
> > 
> > <pre>
> >    48 c7 45 b8 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)  
> >    48 c7 45 c0 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x40(%rbp)  
> >    48 c7 45 c8 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x38(%rbp)  
> >    48 89 e0                  mov    %rsp,%rax  
> >    48 25 00 80 ff ff         and    $0xffffffffffff8000,%rax  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > This is inside the arch_do_domctl. This new change adds 21 extra
> > bytes of code which alters all the offsets inside the function. To alter
> > these offsets and add the extra 21 bytes of code we might not have enough
> > space in .text to squeze this in.
> 
> squeze -> squeeze

Done.
> 
> > As such we could simplify this problem by only patching the site
> > which calls arch_do_domctl:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > <do_domctl>:  
> >  e8 4b b1 05 00          callq  ffff82d08015fbb9 <arch_do_domctl>  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > with a new address for where the new `arch_do_domctl` would be (this
> > area would be allocated dynamically).
> > 
> > Astute readers will wonder what we need to do if we were to patch `do_domctl`
> > - which is not called directly by hypervisor but on behalf of the guests via
> > the `compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table`.
> > Patching the offset in `hypercall_table` for `do_domctl:
> > (ffff82d080103079 <do_domctl>:)
> > <pre>
> > 
> >  ffff82d08024d490:   79 30  
> >  ffff82d08024d492:   10 80 d0 82 ff ff   
> > 
> > </pre>
> > with the new address where the new `do_domctl` is possible. The other
> > place where it is used is in `hvm_hypercall64_table` which would need
> > to be patched in a similar way. This would require an in-place splicing
> > of the new virtual address of `arch_do_domctl`.
> > 
> > In summary this example patched the callee of the affected function by
> >  * allocating memory for the new code to live in,
> >  * changing the virtual address of all the functions which called the old
> 
> "of all" -> "in all" ?

Yes.
> 
> >    code (computing the new offset, patching the callq with a new callq).
> >  * changing the function pointer tables with the new virtual address of
> >    the function (splicing in the new virtual address). Since this table
> >    resides in the .rodata section we would need to temporarily change the
> >    page table permissions during this part.
> > 
> > 
> > However it has severe drawbacks - the safety checks which have to make sure
> > the function is not on the stack - must also check every caller. For some
> > patches this could if there were an sufficient large amount of callers
> 
> "could" -> "could mean"

Updated.
> 
> > that we would never be able to apply the update.
> > 
> > ### Example of different trampoline patching.
> > 
> > An alternative mechanism exists where we can insert an trampoline in the
> > existing function to be patched to jump directly to the new code. This
> > lessens the locations to be patched to one but it puts pressure on the
> > CPU branching logic (I-cache, but it is just one unconditional jump).
> > 
> > For this example we will assume that the hypervisor has not been compiled
> > with fe2e079f642effb3d24a6e1a7096ef26e691d93e (XSA-125: *pre-fill structures
> > for certain HYPERVISOR_xen_version sub-ops*) which mem-sets an structure
> > in `xen_version` hypercall. This function is not called **anywhere** in
> > the hypervisor (it is called by the guest) but referenced in the
> > `compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table` (and indirectly called
> > from that). Patching the offset in `hypercall_table` for the old
> > `do_xen_version` (ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>)
> > 
> > </pre>
> >  ffff82d08024b270 <hypercall_table>  
> >  ...  
> >  ffff82d08024b2f8:   9e 2f 11 80 d0 82 ff ff  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > with the new address where the new `do_xen_version` is possible. The other
> > place where it is used is in `hvm_hypercall64_table` which would need
> > to be patched in a similar way. This would require an in-place splicing
> > of the new virtual address of `do_xen_version`.
> > 
> > An alternative solution would be to patch insert an trampoline in the
> 
> "an trampoline" -> "a trampoline"

Updated this and all other uses of this.
> 
> > old `do_xen_version' function to directly jump to the new `do_xen_version`.
> > 
> > <pre>
> >  ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>:  
> >  ffff82d080112f9e:       48 c7 c0 da ff ff ff    mov    $0xffffffffffffffda,%rax  
> >  ffff82d080112fa5:       83 ff 09                cmp    $0x9,%edi  
> >  ffff82d080112fa8:       0f 87 24 05 00 00       ja     ffff82d0801134d2 <do_xen_version+0x534>  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > with:
> > 
> > <pre>
> >  ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>:  
> >  ffff82d080112f9e:       e9 XX YY ZZ QQ          jmpq   [new do_xen_version]  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > which would lessen the amount of patching to just one location.
> > 
> > In summary this example patched the affected function to jump to the
> > new replacement function which required:
> >  * allocating memory for the new code to live in,
> >  * inserting trampoline with new offset in the old function to point to the
> >    new function.
> >  * Optionally we can insert in the old function an trampoline jump to an function
> 
> "an trampoline" -> "a trampoline"
> 
> >    providing an BUG_ON to catch errant code.
> 
> Where exactly in the old function would you put that second trampoline?

At the start.
> 
> > The disadvantage of this are that the unconditional jump will consume a small
> > I-cache penalty. However the simplicity of the patching of safety checks
> > make this a worthwhile option.
> 
> I don't understand the "of safety checks".

I reworded it a bit:
The disadvantage of this are that the unconditional jump will consume a small
I-cache penalty. However the simplicity of the patching and higher chance 
of passing safety checks make this a worthwhile option.



> 
> > ### Security
> > 
> > With this method we can re-write the hypervisor - and as such we **MUST** be
> > diligent in only allowing certain guests to perform this operation.
> > 
> > Furthermore with SecureBoot or tboot, we **MUST** also verify the signature
> > of the payload to be certain it came from a trusted source.
> 
> + "... and integrity was intact."
> 
> > 
> > As such the hypercall **MUST** support an XSM policy to limit the what
> > guest is allowed.
> 
> "to limit the what guest is allowed." -> "to limit what guest is allowed
> to invoke it." ?
Yes.
> 
> > If the system is booted with signature checking the
> > signature checking will be enforced.
> 
> Are there any plans to extend signature reporting on hotpatch loading or
> do you plan to hide that completely from guests?

I was thinking to hide it from the guests. Thought with tboot in the
picture I am not sure.
> 
> What about a hotpatch loading and unloading sequence?  Do you consider
> the hypervirsor to be in the same state with regard to its signature as
> before the loading sequence and should it report the same signature
> after such a pair of operations?

Yes. The hotpatches are signed with a signature that the hypervisor
recognizes - which means it is from a trusted source.
> 
> Do you plan for load order to be reflected in such updated signatures,
> that is, do you plan the hash the set or sequence of hotpatches loaded?

I am not really sure what you mean. Is this hash an tboot value?
> 
> > ## Design of payload format
> > 
> > The payload **MUST** contain enough data to allow us to apply the update
> > and also safely reverse it. As such we **MUST** know:
> > 
> >  * What the old code is expected to be. We **MUST** be able verify it
> >    against the runtime code.
> 
> See comment above about build IDs.

Updated comments to make it 'optional'
> 
> >  * The locations in memory to be patched. This can be determined dynamically
> >    via symbols or via virtual addresses.
> >  * The new code (or data) to will be patched in.
> 
> to -> that

Updated.
> 
> >  * Signature to verify the payload.
> > 
> > This binary format can be constructed using an custom binary format but
> > there are severe disadvantages of it:
> > 
> >  * The format might need to be change and we need an mechanism to accommodate
> 
> change -> changed
> 
> >    that.
> >  * It has to be platform agnostic.
> >  * Easily constructed using existing tools.
> > 
> > As such having the payload in an ELF file is the sensible way. We would be
> > carrying the various set of structures (and data) in the ELF sections under
> 
> set -> sets
> 
> > different names and with definitions. The prefix for the ELF section name
> > would always be: *.xsplice* to match up to the names of the structures.
> > 
> > Note that every structure has padding. This is added so that the hypervisor
> > can re-use those fields as it sees fit.
> > 
> > Earlier design attempted to ineptly explain the relations of the ELF sections
> > to each other without using proper ELF mechanism (sh_info, sh_link, data
> > structures using Elf_* types, etc). This design will explain in detail
> > the structures and how they are used together and not dig in the ELF
> > format - except mention that the section names should match the
> > structure names.
> > 
> > ### ASCII art of structures.
> > 
> > The diagram below is omitting some entries to easy the relationship explanation.
> 
> ommitting -> omitting

Updated.
> 
> > 
> > <pre>
> >                                                                           /---------------------\  
> >                                                                        +->| xsplice_reloc_howto |  
> >                                                                       /   \---------------------/  
> >                                                 /---------------\ 1:1/  
> >                                              +->| xsplice_reloc |   /  
> >                                             /   | - howto       +--/  1:1 /----------------\  
> >                                            /    | - symbol      +-------->| xsplice_symbol |  
> >                                      1:N  /     \---------------/       / \----------------/  
> > /----------\        /--------------\     /                             /  
> > | xsplice  |  1:1   | xsplice_code |    /                          1:1/  
> > | - new    +------->|  - relocs    +---/  1:N   /-----------------\  /  
> > | - old    +------->|  - sections  +----------->| xsplice_section | /  
> > \----------/        |  - patches   +--\         | - symbol        +/ 1:1   /----------------\  
> >                     \--------------/   \        | - addr          +------->| .text or .data |  
> >                                         \       \----------------/         \----------------/  
> >                                          \  
> >                                       1:N \  
> >                                            \    /----------------\  
> >                                             +-->| xsplice_patch  |  1:1  /----------------\  
> >                                                 | - content      +------>| binary code or |  
> >                                                 \----------------/       | data           |  
> >                                                                          \----------------/  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > ### xsplice structures
> > 
> > From the top (or left in the above diagram) the structures are:
> > 
> >  *  `xsplice`. The top most structure - contains the the name of the update,
> >     the id to match against the hypervisor, the pointer to the metadata for
> >     the new code and optionally the metadata for the old code.
> > 
> >  * `xsplice_code`. The structure that ties all of this together and defines
> >    the payload. Contains arrays of `xsplice_reloc`, `xsplice_section`, and
> >    `xsplice_patch`.
> > 
> >  * `xsplice_reloc` contains telemtry used for patching - which describes the
> 
> telemtry -> telemetry

Done
> 
> >    targets to be patched and how to do it.
> > 
> >  * `xsplice_section` - the safety data for the code. Contains pointer to the
> >    symbol (`xsplice_symbols`) and pointer to the code (`.text`) or data (`.data`),
> >    which are to be used during safety and dependency checking.
> > 
> >  * `xsplice_patch`: the description of the new function to be patched in
> >    along with the binary code or data.
> > 
> >  * ` xsplice_reloc_howto`: the howto properly construct trampolines for an patch.
> >    We may have multiple locations for which we need to insert an trampoline for a
> >    payload and each location might require a different way of handling it.
> > 
> >  * `xsplice_symbols `.  The symbol that will be patched.
> > 
> > In short the *.xsplice* sections (with `xsplice` being the top) represent
> > various structures to define the new code and safety checks for the old
> > code (optional). The ELF provides the mechanism to glue it all together when
> > loaded in memory.
> 
> I am wondering if it would be useful to provide special call-once hooks
> for activation and deactivation for scenarios where once-off data
> transformations should happen when activating or deactivating a patch,
> for example, for small changes to data structures.  Or for debug-type
> modules that allow to dump or change some runtime state (debug level).

As in the ELF payload provide runtime code that will be invoked as part
of the patching/reverting?

> 
> > Note that a lot of these ideas are borrowed from kSplice which is
> > available at: https://github.com/jirislaby/ksplice
> > 
> > ### struct xsplice
> > 
> > The top most structure is quite simple. It defines the name, the id
> > of the hypervisor, pointer to the new code and an pointer to
> > the old code (optional).
> > 
> > The new code uses all of the `xsplice_*` structures while the
> > old code does not use the `xsplice_reloc` structures.
> > 
> > The sections defining the structures will explicitly state
> > when they are not used.
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xsplice {
> >     const char *name; /* A sensible name for the patch. Up to 40 characters. */  
> 
> A version for the module might come in handy, depending on the tooling
> around it.  This information could also be encoded in the name.

OK
> 
> >     const char *id; /* ID of the hypervisor this binary was built against. */  
> 
> Should we define an ID type here with a fixed length?  Otherwise you
> would need to rely on 0 termination and store the ID as hex string
> instead of binary.

It should be the same size as 'build-id'. But that is a linker
implementation and I am not sure if it will change in the future. We
can add a size. 
> 
> >     struct xsplice_code *new; /* Pointer to the new code to be patched. */  
> >     struct xsplice_code *old; /* Pointer to the old code to be checked against. */  
> >     uint8_t pad[32];  /* Must be zero. */  
> > };
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure should be 64 bytes.
> > 
> > ### xsplice_code
> > 
> > The structure embedded within this section ties the other
> > structures together. It has the pointers with an start and end
> > address for each set of structures. This means that an update
> > can be split in multiple changes - for example to accomodate
> > an update that contains both code and data and will need patching
> > in both .text and .data sections.
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xsplice_code {  
> >     struct xsplice_reloc *relocs, *relocs_end; /* How to patch it. */  
> >     struct xsplice_section *sections, *sections_end; /* Safety data. */  
> >     struct xsplice_patch *patches, *patches_end; /* Patch code and data */  
> >     uint8_t pad[16]; /* Must be zero. */
> > };
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
> > 
> > There can be at most two of those structures in the payload.
> > One for the new code and another for the old code (optional).
> 
> You mentioned several times that you also want to support patching data
> sections but restrict yourself here to code.  Would there be a use-case
> for having the old-data that you expect to be there before applying changes?

That should say 'data and code'
> 
> > If it is for the old code the relocs, and relocs_end values will be ignored.
> > 
> > 
> > ### xsplice_reloc
> > 
> > The `xsplice_code` defines an array of these structures. As such
> > an singular structure defines an singular point where to patch the
> > hypervisor.
> > 
> > The structure contains the address of the hypervisor (if known),
> > the symbol associated with this address, how the patching is to
> > be done, and platform specific details.
> > 
> > The `isns_added` is an value to be used to compute the new offset
> > due to the quirks of the operands of the instruction. For example
> > to patch in an jump operation to the new code - the offset is relative
> > to the program counter of the next instruction - hence the offset
> > value has to be subtracted by four bytes - hence this would contain -4 .
> > 
> > The `isns_target` is the offset against the symbol.
> > 
> > The relation of this structure with `xsplice_patch` is 1:1, even
> > for inline patches. See the section detailing the structure
> > `xsplice_reloc_howto`.
> > 
> > The relation of this structure with `xsplice_section` is 1:1.
> > 
> > This structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xsplice_reloc {  
> >     uint64_t addr; /* The address of the relocation (if known). */  
> >     struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* Symbol for this relocation. */  
> >     int64_t isns_target; /* rest of the ELF addend.  This is equal to the offset against the symbol that the relocation refers to. */  
> >     struct xsplice_reloc_howto  *howto; /* Pointer to the above structure. */  
> >     int64_t isns_added; /* ELF addend resulting from quirks of instruction one of whose operands is the relocation. For example, this is -4 on x86 pc-relative jumps. */  
> >     uint8_t pad[24];  /* Must be zero. */  
> > };  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
> > 
> > ### xsplice_section
> > 
> > The structure defined in this section is used during pre-patching and
> > during patching. Pre-patching it is used to verify that it is safe
> > to update with the new changes - and contains safety data on the old code
> > and what kind of matching we are to expect.
> > 
> > That is whether the address (either provided or resolved when payload is
> > loaded by referencing the symbols) is:
> > 
> >  * in memory,
> >  * correct size,
> >  * in it's proper ELF section,
> >  * has been already patched (or not),
> >  * is expected not to be the CPU stack - (or it is OK for it be on the CPU stack).
> 
> "the CPU stack" -> "on any CPU stack"?
> 
Yes
> > with what we expect it to be.
> > 
> > Some of the checks can be relaxed, as such the `flag` values
> > can be or-ed together.
> > 
> > <pre>
> > 
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT   0x00000001 /* Section is in .text */  
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_RODATA 0x00000002 /* Section is in .rodata */  
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_DATA   0x00000004 /* Section is in .data */  
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_STRING 0x00000008 /* Section is in .str */  
> > 
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT_INLINE 0x00000200 /* Change is to be inline. */   
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_MATCH_EXACT 0x00000400 /* Must match exactly. */  
> > #define XSPLICE_SECTION_NO_STACKCHECK 0x00000800 /* Do not check the stack. */  
> 
> Depending on the time when patching is done, stack checking might not be
> required.

True. Which is why the hot-patch may have many of 'struct xsplice_section' where only
some of the sections need to have stack checking done.
> 
> For stack checking, do you need to compile with framepointers?

Not sure. I somehow thought that was enabled by default.
> 
> > struct xsplice_section {  
> >     struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* The symbol associated with this change. */  
> >     uint64_t address; /* The address of the section (if known). */  
> >     uint32_t size; /* The size of the section. */  
> >     uint32_t flags; /* Various XSPLICE_SECTION_* flags. */
> >     uint8_t pad[12]; /* To be zero. */  
> > };
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
> > 
> > ### xsplice_patch
> > 
> > This structure has the binary code (or data) to be patched. Depending on the
> > type it can either an inline patch (data or text) or require an relocation
> > change (which requires an trampoline). Naturally it also points to a blob
> > of the binary data to patch in, and the size of the patch.
> > 
> > The `addr` is used when the patch is for inline change. If it is an relocation
> > (requiring an trampoline), the `addr` should be zero.
> 
> Why?  Do you expect inline patches not to cover whole functions?

I don't. I expect them to be for tiny little offsets within an function.

> 
> Could you not still address the area of the inline relative to a symbol?

Hmm, hadn't thought of that. That could be - in which case the
'addr' is actually an offset.

> 
> > There must be an corresponding ` struct xsplice_reloc` and
> > `struct xsplice_section` describing this patch.
> > 
> > <pre>
> > #define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_TEXT   0x1
> > #define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_DATA   0x2
> > #define XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT    0x3
> > 
> > struct xsplice_patch {  
> >     uint32_t type; /* XSPLICE_PATCH_* .*/  
> >     uint32_t size; /* Size of patch. */  
> >     uint64_t addr; /* The address of the inline new code (or data). */  
> >     void *content; /* The bytes to be installed. */  
> >     uint8_t pad[40]; /* Must be zero. */  
> > };
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
> > 
> > ### xsplice_symbols
> > 
> > The structure contains an pointer to the name of the ELF symbol
> > to be patched and as well an unique name for the symbol.
> > 
> > The `label` is used for diagnostic purposes - such as including the
> > name and the offset.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xsplice_symbol {  
> >     const char *name; /* The ELF name of the symbol. */  
> >     const char *label; /* A unique xSplice name for the symbol. */  
> >     uint8_t pad[16]; /* Must be zero. */  
> > };  
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
> > 
> > 
> > ### xsplice_reloc_howto
> > 
> > The howto defines in the detail the change. It contains the type,
> > whether the relocation is relative, the size of the relocation,
> > bitmask for which parts of the instruction or data are to be replaced,
> > amount the final relocation is shifted by (to drop unwanted data), and
> > whether the replacement should be interpreted as signed value.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > #define XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_INLINE  0x1 /* It is an inline replacement. */  
> > #define XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH   0x2 /* Add an trampoline. */  
> 
> _RELOC_ ...

?
> 
> > #define XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL    0x1 /* Is PC relative. */  
> > #define XSPLICE_HOWOT_FLAG_SIGN      0x2 /* Should the new value be treated as signed value. */  
> > 
> > struct xsplice_reloc_howto {  
> >     uint32_t    type; /* XSPLICE_HOWTO_* */  
> 
> ... refers to type?  Rename to relationship clear?

'howto'?
> 
> >     uint32_t    flag; /* XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_* */  
> >     uint32_t    size; /* Size, in bytes, of the item to be relocated. */  
> >     uint32_t    r_shift; /* The value the final relocation is shifted right by; used to drop unwanted data from the relocation. */  
> >     uint64_t    mask; /* Bitmask for which parts of the instruction or data are replaced with the relocated value. */  
> >     uint8_t     pad[8]; /* Must be zero. */  
> > };  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
> > 
> > ### Example
> > 
> > There is a wealth of information that the payload must have to define a simple
> > patch.  For this example we will assume that the hypervisor has not been compiled
> > with fe2e079f642effb3d24a6e1a7096ef26e691d93e (XSA-125: *pre-fill structures
> > for certain HYPERVISOR_xen_version sub-ops*) which mem-sets an structure
> > in `xen_version` hypercall. This function is not called **anywhere** in
> > the hypervisor (it is called by the guest) but referenced in the
> > `compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table` (and indirectly called
> > from that). There are two ways to patch this:
> > inline patch `hvm_hypercall64_table` and `hvm_hypercall` with a new
> > address for the new `do_xen_version` , or insert
> > trampoline in `do_xen_version` code. The example will focus on the later.
> > 
> > The `do_xen_version` code is located at virtual address ffff82d080112f9e.
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125;  
> > struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1];  
> > struct xsplice_section sections[1];  
> > struct xsplice_patch patches[1];  
> > struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol;  
> > struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto;  
> > char do_xen_version_new_code[1728];  
> > 
> > #ifndef HYPERVISOR_ID  
> > #define HYPERVISOR_ID "92dd05a61556c554155b1508c9cf67d993336d28"
> > #endif  
> > 
> > struct xsplice xsa125 = {  
> >     .name = "xsa125",  
> >     .id = HYPERVISOR_ID,  
> >     .old = NULL,  
> >     .new = &xsplice_xsa125,  
> > };  
> > 
> > struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125 = {  
> >     .relocs = &relocs[0],  
> >     .relocs_end = &relocs[0],  
> 
> Odd to have end point to the beginning of the last element.  An "int
> n_relocs = 1" feels more readable and does not have to be relocated.
> 
> Similar for all _end pointers below.

Good idea.
> 
> >     .sections = &sections[0],  
> >     .sections_end = &sections[0],  
> >     .patches = &patches[0],  
> >     .patches_end = &patches[0],   
> > };
> > 
> > struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1] = {  
> >     {  
> >         .addr = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
> >         .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
> >         .isns_target = 0,  
> >         .howto = &do_xen_version_howto,  
> >         .isns_added = -4,  
> >     },  
> > };  
> > 
> > struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol = {  
> >     .name = "do_xen_version",  
> >     .label = "do_xen_version+<0x0>",  
> > };  
> > 
> > struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto = {  
> >     .type = XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH,  
> >     .flag = XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL,  
> >     .r_shift = 0,  
> >     .mask = (-1ULL),  
> > };  
> > 
> > 
> > struct xsplice_section sections[1] = {  
> >     {  
> >         .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
> >         .address = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
> >         .size = 1728,  
> >         .flags = XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT,  
> >     },  
> > };  
> > 
> > struct xsplice_patch patches[1] = {  
> >     {  
> >         .type = XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT,  
> >         .size = 1728,  
> >         .addr = 0,  
> >         .content = &do_xen_version_new_code,  
> >     },  
> > };  
> > 
> > char do_xen_version_new_code[1728] = { 0x83, 0xff, 0x09, /* And more code. */};  
> > </pre>
> 
> Nice example.

Thank you. Thought I was thinking that the inline patching as part
of this should also be added. But not yet there.
> 
> > ## Signature checking requirements.
> > 
> > The signature checking requires that the layout of the data in memory
> > **MUST** be same for signature to be verified. This means that the payload
> > data layout in ELF format **MUST** match what the hypervisor would be
> > expecting such that it can properly do signature verification.
> > 
> > The signature is based on the all of the payloads continuously laid out
> > in memory. The signature is to be appended at the end of the ELF payload
> > prefixed with the string '~Module signature appended~\n", followed by
> 
> Unbalanced quotes break my syntax highlighting :-/

Fixed!
> 
> > an signature header then followed by the signature, key identifier, and signers
> > name.
> > 
> > Specifically the signature header would be:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > #define PKEY_ALGO_DSA       0  
> > #define PKEY_ALGO_RSA       1  
> > 
> > #define PKEY_ID_PGP         0 /* OpenPGP generated key ID */  
> > #define PKEY_ID_X509        1 /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */  
> > 
> > #define HASH_ALGO_MD4          0  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_MD5          1  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_SHA1         2  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160  3  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_SHA256       4  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_SHA384       5  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_SHA512       6  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_SHA224       7  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_128  8  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_256  9  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_320 10  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_WP_256      11  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_WP_384      12  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_WP_512      13  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_TGR_128     14  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_TGR_160     15  
> > #define HASH_ALGO_TGR_192     16  
> > 
> > 
> > struct elf_payload_signature {  
> > 	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm PKEY_ALGO_*. */  
> > 	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm: HASH_ALGO_*. */  
> > 	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type PKEY_ID*. */  
> > 	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name */  
> > 	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier */  
> > 	u8	__pad[3];  
> > 	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */  
> > };
> > 
> > </pre>
> > (Note that this has been borrowed from Linux module signature code.).
> > 
> > 
> > ## Hypercalls
> > 
> > We will employ the sub operations of the system management hypercall (sysctl).
> > There are to be four sub-operations:
> > 
> >  * upload the payloads.
> >  * listing of payloads summary uploaded and their state.
> >  * getting an particular payload summary and its state.
> >  * command to apply, delete, or revert the payload.
> 
> Runtime querying of the hypervisor ID of the currently active hypervisor
> could also be part of this design.

Yes, definitly.
> 
> > The actions are asynchronous therefore the caller is responsible
> 
> "listing" and "getting payload summary" are probably not
> asynchronous.

Listing can.
> 
> > to verify that it has been applied properly by retrieving the summary of it
> > and verifying that there are no error codes associated with the payload.
> > 
> > We **MUST** make it asynchronous due to the nature of patching: it requires
> > every physical CPU to be lock-step with each other. The patching mechanism
> > while an implementation detail, is not an short operation and as such
> > the design **MUST** assume it will be an long-running operation.
> 
> I disagree with the strong wording here, but we had some discussions
> about this before.  The specific quiescencing mechanism plays a role here.

Yes we did. And I believe we came to the conclusion that some form
of preemption has to be presented. Either via -EBUSY or other.

[edit: I think we need to hash this out better. I am including
the code of one mechanism that I was thinking off - which hopefully
demonstrates what I was thinking off]

> 
> > The sub-operations will spell out how preemption is to be handled (if at all).
> > 
> > Furthermore it is possible to have multiple different payloads for the same
> > function. As such an unique id has to be visible to allow proper manipulation.
> 
> Unique ID per hotpatch?

Updated.
> 
> > The hypercall is part of the `xen_sysctl`. The top level structure contains
> > one uint32_t to determine the sub-operations:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op {  
> >     uint32_t cmd;  
> > 	union {  
> >           ... see below ...  
> >         } u;  
> > };  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > while the rest of hypercall specific structures are part of the this structure.
> > 
> > ### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD (0)
> > 
> > Upload a payload to the hypervisor. The payload is verified and if there
> > are any issues the proper return code will be returned. The payload is
> > not applied at this time - that is controlled by *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION*.
> > 
> > The caller provides:
> > 
> >  * `id` unique id.
> 
> The hypervisor could return a unique ID as return value of the operation
> for future reference.  How can the caller generate a unique ID?
> 
> After some thinking about this:
> 
> * You probably have something like a UUID in mind that stays fixed
>   forever for a given hotpatch module.  Maybe a hash-like build ID of
>   the module itself.  It could be embedded into the module at creation
>   time.

Right.
> 
>   It could also be used for specifying hotpatch module
>   interdependencies.  That would be nice.
> 
> * I had a transient ID in mind, that the hypervisor could simply create
>   by counting up a 64-bit value and that would only be used for
>   addressing specific payloads at runtime, but not necessarily uniquely
>   over time and accross different machines.

I think just having the user-space / module decide the value is easier.

But this value / 'id' (or name) would need to be used for dependency
checking. So the hypervisor has to verify it at least when loading
an Elf payload.

> 
> >  * `payload` the virtual address of where the ELF payload is.
> > 
> > The return value is zero if the payload was succesfully uploaded and the
> > signature was verified. Otherwise an EXX return value is provided.
> 
> That sounds synchronous.

EBUSY / EAGAIN is a preemptive mechanism that allows us to give to
continue work without soft locking up the CPU.

[edit: We come again with this. Perhaps an IRC conversation about this
and I can come up with a better way to explain it?]

The big problem we had in the past was long running hypercalls.
They wouldn't allow the dom0 VCPU to run other tasks - and cause
the Linux kernel to eventually complain about soft lockups.

There had been XSAs to fix this by either returning -EAGAIN
to userspace and modifying the hypercall parameters and having
user-space restart the operation and continuing on. Or actually
stashing the hypercall state in the hypervisor and letting dom0
do its thing and then resuming once we are back running in
the hypervisor.

The operations for patching, checking, reverting - being done
with IPIs and such (hand waving) would make it appear to a guest
that the hypercall is long running.

Hogging the CPU on a hypercall also imposes a restriction on patching
 - we can't patch do_domctl anymore as that is on the stack.
Hence to allow this we should seperate the operation of
patching, reverting, checking from the hypercall itself.

> 
> > Duplicate `id` are not supported.
> > 
> > The `payload` is the ELF payload as mentioned in the `Payload format` section.
> > 
> > This operation can be preempted by the hypercall returning EAGAIN.
> 
> Would the client be expected to submit the request again or should he
> spin a bit and query for the results?

It would have to submit it again.

On second thought I think we can make it so that it can spin a bit and query
for results. Especially as the framework is there for it - and we just
add a new state - VERIFY - as prerequisite for going to CHECKING.

Or perhaps make it part of CHECKING.
> 
> > This is due to the nature of signature verification - which may require
> > SecureBoot firmware calls which are unbounded.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload {  
> >     char id[40];  /* IN, name of the patch. */
> 
> Does this have to be unique?  Earlier there was a distinction between
> the patch name and a request ID.
> 
> I was a bit confused about the different IDs at play here, I suggest to
> introduce a term (e.g., payload ID) for the IDs referring to a specific
> payload.  It seems you expect the ID for a given payload to remain
> constant, ideally over time?

Yes. This could be the same as the Elf payload id for the hot-patch?

The 'id' I had in mind would be the same across all the hypercalls to refer
to a specific payload/patch/xsplice.

> 
> Where does the size 40 come from?

I didn't want to do 42 :-)

> 
> Inspecting the common ld --buil-id options, sha1 with 160 bits is the
> largest and can be represented with 40 characters in ASCII
> representation or 20 bytes binary.
> 
> sha-256 would also fit in binary representation with 32 bytes.
> 
> Is there more behind this?

We can also pick an variable size and not worry much about this.

> 
> >     uint64_t size; /* IN, size of the ELF file. */
> >     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint8) payload; /* ELF file. */  
> > }; 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > ### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET (1)
> > 
> > Retrieve an summary of an specific payload. This caller provides:
> > 
> >  * `id` the unique id.
> >  * `status` *MUST* be set to zero.
> > 
> > The `summary` structure contains an summary of payload which includes:
> > 
> >  * `id` the unique id.
> >  * `status` - whether it has been:
> >  1. *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* (0) has been loaded.
> >  2. *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* (1) acting on the **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION** command.
> >  3. *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED*  (2) the ELF payload safety checks passed.
> >  4. *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* (3) loaded, checked, and applied.
> >  5. *XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED* (4) loaded, checked, applied and then also reverted.
> >  6. Negative values is an error. The error would be of EXX format.
> > 
> > The return value is zero on success and EXX on failure. This operation
> > is synchronous and does not require preemption.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > #define XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED    0  
> > #define XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS  1  
> > #define XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED   2  
> > #define XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED   3  
> > #define XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED  4  
> > 
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary {  
> >     char id[40];  /* IN/OUT, name of the patch. */  
> 
> ID or name (comment)?

Well, it is whatever would show up as the name of the hotpatch.
It could be an UUID or something more human readable. It would
be something that the Elf payload would have or the toolstack
would supply. Either way.

> 
> >     int32_t status;   /* OUT */  
> > }; 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > ### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST (2)
> > 
> > Retrieve an array of abbreviated summary of payloads that are loaded in the
> > hypervisor.
> > 
> > The caller provides:
> > 
> >  * `version`. Initially it *MUST* be zero.
> >  * `idx` index iterator. Initially it *MUST* be zero.
> >  * `count` the max number of entries to populate.
> >  * `summary` virtual address of where to write payload summaries.
> > 
> > The hypercall returns zero on success and updates the `idx` (index) iterator
> > with the number of payloads returned, `count` to the number of remaining
> > payloads, and `summary` with an number of payload summaries. The `version`
> > is updated on every hypercall
> 
> It remains a bit unclear what is updated when.  I am guessing:
> 
>   Each operation in Xen that mutates relevant payload state updates the
>   single global payload-version field in Xen.

Yes.
> 
>   Each invocation of XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST will also return a current
>   copy thereoff.  An acquired snapshot in userland is only consistent
>   if all individual operations returned the same version.

Yes.
> 
> > - if it varies from one hypercall to another
> > the data is stale and further calls could fail.
> 
> ... or result in an inconsistent snapshot even if returning succesfully?

Yes. Hence the user should restart the operation.
> 
> > If the hypercall returns E2BIG the `count` is too big and should be
> > lowered.
> > 
> > Note that due to the asynchronous nature of hypercalls the domain might have
> > added or removed the number of payloads making this information stale. It is
> > the responsibility of the toolstack to use the `version` field to check
> > between each invocation.
> > 
> > This operation is synchronous and does not require preemption.
> > 
> > The `summary` structure contains an summary of payload which includes:
> > 
> >  * `version` version of the data.
> >  * `id` unique id.
> 
> Per payload?

Well, whatever the name of the hotpatch the toolstack wants to pick.
It does have to be unique to the other payloads so we don't have
duplicates.
> 
> >  * `status` - whether it has been:
> >  1. *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* (0) has been loaded.
> >  2. *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* (1) acting on the **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION** command.
> >  3. *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED*  (2) the ELF payload safety checks passed.
> >  4. *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* (3) loaded, checked, and applied.
> >  5. *XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED* (4) loaded, checked, applied and then also reverted.
> >  6. Any negative values means there has been error. The value is in EXX format.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_list {  
> >     uint32_t version; /* OUT */
> >     uint32_t idx;  /* IN/OUT */  
> >     uint32_t count;  /* IN/OUT */
> >     XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary) summary;  /* OUT */  
> > };  
> > 
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary {  
> >     char id[40];  /* OUT, name of the patch. */  
> 
> Again, name or module ID?

Heh.
> 
> >     int32_t status;  /* OUT */  
> > };  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > ### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION (3)
> > 
> > Perform an operation on the payload structure referenced by the `id` field.
> > The operation request is asynchronous and the status should be retrieved
> > by using either **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET** or **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST** hypercall.
> > 
> > There are two ways about doing preemption. Either via returning back EBUSY
> > or the mechanism outlined here.
> 
> What do you mean by preemption?  Are you referring to quiescing Xen?

No. Not hogging the VCPU when this operation is happening.
> 
> > Doing it in userland would remove any tracking of states in
> > the hypervisor - except the simple commands apply, unload, and revert.
> 
> ?

I feel like we should have an IRC conversation about this to
come up with a good clarification. FreeNode works for you?

> 
> > However we would not be able to patch all the code that is invoked while
> > this hypercall is in progress. That is - the do_domctl, the spinlocks,
> > anything put on the stack, etc.
> > 
> > The disadvantage of the mechanism outlined here is that the hypervisor
> > code has to keep the state atomic and have an upper bound of time
> > on actions. If within the time the operation does not succeed the
> > operation would go in error state.
> > 
> >  * `id` the unique id.
> >  * `time` the upper bound of time the cmd should take. Zero means infinite.
> >  * `cmd` the command requested:
> >   1. *XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK* (1) check that the payload will apply properly.
> >   2. *XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD* (2) unload the payload.
> >    Any further hypercalls against the `id` will result in failure unless
> >    **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD** hypercall is perfomed with same `id`.
> >   3. *XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT* (3) revert the payload. If the operation takes
> >   more time than the upper bound of time the `status` will EBUSY.
> >   4. *XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY* (4) apply the payload. If the operation takes
> >   more time than the upper bound of time the `status` will be EBUSY.
> >   5. *XSPLICE_ACTION_LOADED* is an initial state and cannot be requested.  
> > 
> > The return value will be zero unless the provided fields are incorrect.
> > 
> > The structure is as follow:
> > 
> > <pre>
> > #define XSPLICE_ACTION_LOADED 0  
> > #define XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK  1  
> > #define XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD 2  
> > #define XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT 3  
> > #define XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY  4  
> > 
> > struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_action {  
> >     char id[40];  /* IN, name of the patch. */  
> >     uint64_t time; /* IN, upper bound of time (ms) for the operation to take. */  
> >     uint32_t cmd; /* IN */  
> > };  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > ## State diagrams of XSPLICE_ACTION values.
> > 
> > There is a strict ordering state of what the commands can be.
> > The XSPLICE_ACTION prefix has been dropped to easy reading:
> > 
> > <pre>
> >                         /->\  
> >                         \  /  
> >              /-------< CHECK <--------\  
> >              |          |             |  
> >              |           +            /  
> >              |    +--->UNLOAD<--\    /  
> >              |   /               \  /  
> >              | /                  \/  
> >       /-> APPLY -----------> REVERT --\  
> >       |                               |  
> >       \-------------------------------/  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > Or an state transition table of valid states:
> > <pre>
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > | CHECK | APPLY | REVERT | UNLOAD | Current | Next  | Result           |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |   x   |       |        |        | LOADED  | CHECK | Check payload.   |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |   x   |       |        |        | CHECK   | CHECK | Check payload.   |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |       |   x   |        |        | CHECK   | APPLY | Apply payload.   |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |       |       |        |   x    | CHECK   | UNLOAD| Unload payload.  |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |       |       |   x    |        | APPLY   | REVERT| Revert payload.  |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |       |       |        |   x    | APPLY   | UNLOAD| unload payload.  |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > |       |   x   |        |        | REVERT  | APPLY | Apply payload.   |  
> > +-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
> > </pre>
> > All the other states are invalid.
> 
> "states" -> "state transistions" ?

Yes.
> 
> > ## Sequence of events.
> > 
> > The normal sequence of events is to:
> > 
> >  1. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD* to upload the payload. If there are errors *STOP* here.
> >  2. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* go to next step.
> >  3. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION* with *XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK* command to verify that the payload can be succesfully applied.
> >  4. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED* go to next step.
> >  5. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION* with *XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY* to apply the patch.
> >  6. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* exit with success.
> > 
> > ## Addendum
> > 
> > Implementation quirks should not be discussed in a design document.
> > 
> > However these observations can provide aid when developing against this
> > document.
> > 
> > 
> > ### Alternative assembler
> > 
> > Alternative assembler is a mechanism to use different instructions depending
> > on what the CPU supports. This is done by providing multiple streams of code
> > that can be patched in - or if the CPU does not support it - padded with
> > `nop` operations. The alternative assembler macros cause the compiler to
> > expand the code to place a most generic code in place - emit a special
> > ELF .section header to tag this location. During run-time the hypervisor
> > can leave the areas alone or patch them with an better suited opcodes.
> > 
> > However these sections are part of .init. and as such can't reasonably be
> > subject to patching.
> > 
> > ### .rodata sections
> > 
> > The patching might require strings to be updated as well. As such we must be
> > also able to patch the strings as needed. This sounds simple - but the compiler
> > has a habit of coalescing strings that are the same - which means if we in-place
> > alter the strings - other users will be inadvertently affected as well.
> > 
> > This is also where pointers to functions live - and we may need to patch this
> > as well.
> 
> switch-style jump tables sometimes too.

Added that in.
> 
> > To guard against that we must be prepared to do patching similar to
> > trampoline patching or in-line depending on the flavour. If we can
> > do in-line patching we would need to:
> > 
> >  * alter `.rodata` to be writeable.
> >  * inline patch.
> >  * alter `.rodata` to be read-only.
> > 
> > If are doing trampoline patching we would need to:
> > 
> >  * allocate a new memory location for the string.
> >  * all locations which use this string will have to be updated to use the
> >    offset to the string.
> >  * mark the region RO when we are done.
> > 
> > ### .bss and .data sections.
> > 
> > Patching writable data is not suitable as it is unclear what should be done
> > depending on the current state of data. As such it should not be attempted.
> > 
> > 
> > ### Patching code which is in the stack.
> > 
> > We should not patch the code which is on the stack. That can lead
> > to corruption.
> 
> To clarify:
> * Are you referreing to code that is generated on actual stacks (where
>   is that done in Xen?), or
> * Code which is target to return addresses that are live in specific
>   CPU stacks?

Functions calling other functions. And their return address (EIP)
is on the stack. If we were to patch a function that is on the stack
we may return back to the old code and resume execution - which
could be dangerous.

I think this is what you mean by the the second line item?


> 
> > ### Trampoline (e9 opcode)
> > 
> > The e9 opcode used for jmpq uses a 32-bit signed displacement. That means
> > we are limited to up to 2GB of virtual address to place the new code
> > from the old code. That should not be a problem since Xen hypervisor has
> > a very small footprint.
> > However if we need - we can always add two trampolines. One at the 2GB
> > limit that calls the next trampoline.
> 
> There is a small limitation for trampolines in function entries: The
> target function (+ trailing padding) must be able to accomodate the
> trampoline.  On x86 with +-2 GB relative jumps, this means 5 bytes are
> required.
> 
> Depending on compiler settings, there are several functions in Xen that
> are smaller (without inter-function padding).
> 
> readelf -sW xen-syms | grep " FUNC " | \
>     awk '{ if ($3 < 5) print $3, $4, $5, $8 }'
> 
> ...
> 3 FUNC LOCAL wbinvd_ipi
> 3 FUNC LOCAL shadow_l1_index
> ...
> 
> A compile-time check for, e.g., a minimum alignment of functions or a
> runtime check that verifies symbol size (+ padding to next symbols) for
> that in the hypervisor seems advised.

Good point. Let me add that in.
> 
> > ### When to patch
> > 
> > During the discussion on the design two candidates bubbled where
> > the call stack for each CPU would be deterministic. This would
> > minimize the chance of the patch not being applied due to safety
> > checks failing.
> > 
> > #### Rendezvous code instead of stop_machine for patching
> > 
> > The hypervisor's time rendezvous code runs synchronously across all CPUs
> > every second. Using the stop_machine to patch can stall the time rendezvous
> > code and result in NMI. As such having the patching be done at the tail
> > of rendezvous code should avoid this problem.
> 
> Could you indicate what functions you would expect to be live at this
> point in each CPU?  Can the rendezvous code interrupt other hypervisor
> operations or is that entered via the softirq mechanism close to return
> from hypervisor code?

The code looks to be using on_selected_cpus, so what we end up
is calling CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR on all the other CPUs. The local
stack is do_softirq->timer_softirq_action->time_calibration

Hmm, it would have a smaller local CPU stack if we did indeed
check around the same place as calling do_softirq and did
our IPI or what not from there.

> 
> > #### Before entering the guest code.
> > 
> > Before we call VMXResume we check whether any soft IRQs need to be executed.
> > This is a good spot because all Xen stacks are effectively empty at
> > that point.
> > 
> > To randezvous all the CPUs an barrier with an maximum timeout (which
> > could be adjusted), combined with forcing all other CPUs through the
> > hypervisor with IPIs, can be utilized to have all the CPUs be lockstep.
> > 
> > The approach is similar in concept to stop_machine and the time rendezvous
> > but is time-bound.
> > 
> > ### Compiling the hypervisor code
> > 
> > Hotpatch generation often requires support for compiling the target
> > with -ffunction-sections / -fdata-sections.  Changes would have to
> > be done to the linker scripts to support this.
> > 
> > 
> > ### Generation of xSplice ELF payloads
> > 
> > The design of that is not discussed in this design.
> > 
> > The author of this design envisions objdump and objcopy along
> > with special GCC parameters (see above) to create .o.xsplice files
> > which can be used to splice an ELF with the new payload.
> 
> I would expect ksplice userland code to be a good source of inspiration
> at least.

Yes, and in all likely many concepts will be borrowed from it.

> 
> > ### Exception tables and symbol tables growth
> > 
> > We may need support for adapting or augmenting exception tables if
> > patching such code.  Hotpatches may need to bring their own small
> > exception tables (similar to how Linux modules support this).
> > 
> > If supporting hotpatches that introduce additional exception-locations
> > is not important, one could also change the exception table in-place
> > and reorder it afterwards.
> > 
> > 
> > ### xSplice interdependencies
> > 
> > xSplice patches interdependencies are tricky.
> > 
> > There are the ways this can be addressed:
> >  * A single large patch that subsumes and replaces all previous ones.
> >    Over the life-time of patching the hypervisor this large patch
> >    grows to accumulate all the code changes.
> >  * Hotpatch stack - where an mechanism exists that loads the hotpatches
> >    in the same order they were built in. We would need an build-id
> >    of the hypevisor to make sure the hot-patches are build against the
> >    correct build.
> >  * Payload containing the old code to check against that. That allows
> >    the hotpatches to be loaded indepedently (if they don't overlap) - or
> >    if the old code also containst previously patched code - even if they
> >    overlap.
> > 
> > The disadvantage of the first large patch is that it can grow over
> > time and not provide an bisection mechanism to identify faulty patches.
> > 
> > The hot-patch stack puts stricts requirements on the order of the patches
> > being loaded and requires an hypervisor build-id to match against.
> > 
> > The old code allows much more flexibility and an additional guard,
> > but is more complex to implement.
> > 
> > ### Hypervisor ID (buid-id)
> > 
> > The build-id can help with:
> > 
> >   * Prevent loading of wrong hotpatches (intended for other builds)
> > 
> >   * Allow to identify suitable hotpatches on disk and help with runtime
> >     tooling (if laid out using build ID)
> > 
> > The build-id (aka hypervisor id) can be easily obtained by utilizing
> > the ld --build-id operatin which (copied from ld):
> > 
> > <pre>
> > --build-id  
> >     --build-id=style  
> >         Request creation of ".note.gnu.build-id" ELF note section.  The contents of the note are unique bits identifying this  
> >         linked file.  style can be "uuid" to use 128 random bits, "sha1" to use a 160-bit SHA1 hash on the normative parts of the  
> >         output contents, "md5" to use a 128-bit MD5 hash on the normative parts of the output contents, or "0xhexstring" to use a  
> >         chosen bit string specified as an even number of hexadecimal digits ("-" and ":" characters between digit pairs are  
> >         ignored).  If style is omitted, "sha1" is used.  
> > 
> >         The "md5" and "sha1" styles produces an identifier that is always the same in an identical output file, but will be  
> >         unique among all nonidentical output files.  It is not intended to be compared as a checksum for the file's contents.  A  
> >         linked file may be changed later by other tools, but the build ID bit string identifying the original linked file does  
> >         not change.  
> > 
> >         Passing "none" for style disables the setting from any "--build-id" options earlier on the command line.  
> > 
> > </pre>
> > 
> > ### Symbol names
> > 
> > 
> > Xen as it is now, has a couple of non-unique symbol names which will
> > make runtime symbol identification hard.  Sometimes, static symbols
> > simply have the same name in C files, sometimes such symbols get
> > included via header files, and some C files are also compiled
> > multiple times and linked under different names (guest_walk.c).
> > 
> > As such we need to modify the linker to make sure that the symbol
> > table qualifies also symbols by their source file name.
> 
> The convention for file-type symbols (that would allow to map many
> symbols to their compilation unit) says that only the basename (i.e.,
> without directories) is embedded.  This creates another layer of
> confusion for duplicate file names in the build tree.
> 
> > find . -name \*.c -print0 | xargs -0 -n1 basename | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n10
>       3 shutdown.c
>       3 sysctl.c
>       3 time.c
>       3 xenoprof.c
>       4 gdbstub.c
>       4 irq.c
>       5 domain.c
>       5 mm.c
>       5 pci.c
>       5 traps.c
> 

Eww.
> > For the awkward situations in which C-files are compiled multiple
> > times patches we would need to some modification in the Xen code.
> > 
> > ### Security
> > 
> > Only the privileged domain should be allowed to do this operation.
> > 

[-- Attachment #2: 0001-xsplice-rfc.v3.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 90924 bytes --]

>From 3ecaf6e01e262273335e3d751c585e5d5d497d5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:13:29 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] xsplice: rfc.v3.

*TODO*:
 - XSM
 - Authors on xsplice.markdown
 - Runtime query of build-id hypercall (rfc.v4 target)
 - Figure out the preemption method (rfc.v4 target)
 - Further work - write out an Wiki detailing what implementation
   pieces to be done for individual contributions.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
 docs/misc/xsplice.h           |   80 +++
 docs/misc/xsplice.markdown    | 1230 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 docs/misc/xsplice_test.c      |   78 +++
 tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h |   16 +
 tools/libxc/xc_misc.c         |  183 ++++++
 tools/misc/Makefile           |    4 +
 tools/misc/xen-xsplice.c      |  360 ++++++++++++
 xen/common/Makefile           |    1 +
 xen/common/keyhandler.c       |    8 +-
 xen/common/sysctl.c           |    5 +
 xen/common/xsplice.c          |  405 ++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/sysctl.h   |   66 +++
 xen/include/xen/xsplice.h     |    9 +
 13 files changed, 2444 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/misc/xsplice.h
 create mode 100644 docs/misc/xsplice.markdown
 create mode 100644 docs/misc/xsplice_test.c
 create mode 100644 tools/misc/xen-xsplice.c
 create mode 100644 xen/common/xsplice.c
 create mode 100644 xen/include/xen/xsplice.h

diff --git a/docs/misc/xsplice.h b/docs/misc/xsplice.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00061fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/misc/xsplice.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_INLINE        0x1 /* It is an inline replacement. */  
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH   0x2 /* Add an trampoline. */  
+
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL    0x1 /* Is PC relative. */  
+#define XSPLICE_HOWOT_FLAG_SIGN      0x2 /* Should the new value be treated as signed value. */  
+
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto {  
+    uint32_t    howto;/* XSPLICE_HOWTO_* */  
+    uint32_t    flag; /* XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_* */  
+    uint32_t    size; /* Size, in bytes, of the item to be relocated. */  
+    uint32_t    r_shift; /* The value the final relocation is shifted right by; used to drop unwanted data from the relocation. */  
+    uint64_t    mask; /* Bitmask for which parts of the instruction or data are replaced with the relocated value. */  
+    uint8_t     pad[8]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_symbol {  
+    const char *name; /* The ELF name of the symbol. */  
+    const char *label; /* A unique xSplice name for the symbol. */  
+    uint8_t pad[16]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_TEXT   0x1
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_DATA   0x2
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT    0x3
+
+struct xsplice_patch {  
+    uint32_t type; /* XSPLICE_PATCH_* .*/  
+    uint32_t size; /* Size of patch. */  
+    uint64_t addr; /* The address of the inline new code (or data). */  
+    void *content; /* The bytes to be installed. */  
+    uint8_t pad[40]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};
+
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT   0x00000001 /* Section is in .text */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_RODATA 0x00000002 /* Section is in .rodata */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_DATA   0x00000004 /* Section is in .data */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_STRING 0x00000008 /* Section is in .str */  
+
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT_INLINE 0x00000200 /* Change is to be inline. */   
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_MATCH_EXACT 0x00000400 /* Must match exactly. */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_NO_STACKCHECK 0x00000800 /* Do not check the stack. */  
+
+struct xsplice_section {  
+    struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* The symbol associated with this change. */  
+    uint64_t address; /* The address of the section (if known). */  
+    uint32_t size; /* The size of the section. */  
+    uint32_t flags; /* Various XSPLICE_SECTION_* flags. */
+    uint8_t pad[12]; /* To be zero. */  
+};
+
+struct xsplice_reloc {  
+    uint64_t addr; /* The address of the relocation (if known). */  
+    struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* Symbol for this relocation. */  
+    int64_t isns_target; /* rest of the ELF addend.  This is equal to the offset against the symbol that the relocation refers to. */  
+    struct xsplice_reloc_howto  *howto; /* Pointer to the above structure. */  
+    int64_t isns_added; /* ELF addend resulting from quirks of instruction one of whose operands is the relocation. For example, this is -4 on x86 pc-relative jumps. */  
+    uint8_t pad[24];  /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_code {  
+    struct xsplice_reloc *relocs; /* How to patch it. */  
+    uint32_t n_relocs;
+    struct xsplice_section *sections; /* Safety data. */  
+    uint32_t n_sections;
+    struct xsplice_patch *patches; /* Patch code and data */  
+    uint32_t n_patches;
+    uint8_t pad[28]; /* Must be zero. */
+};
+struct xsplice {
+    uint32_t version;
+    const char *name; /* A sensible name for the patch. Up to 40 characters. */  
+    const char *id; /* ID of the hypervisor this binary was built against. */  
+    uint32_t id_size;
+    struct xsplice_code *new; /* Pointer to the new code to be patched. */  
+    struct xsplice_code *old; /* Pointer to the old code to be checked against. */  
+    uint8_t pad[24];  /* Must be zero. */  
+};
diff --git a/docs/misc/xsplice.markdown b/docs/misc/xsplice.markdown
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02fd4d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/misc/xsplice.markdown
@@ -0,0 +1,1230 @@
+# xSplice Design v1 (EXTERNAL RFC v3)
+
+## Rationale
+
+A mechanism is required to binarily patch the running hypervisor with new
+opcodes that have come about due to primarily security updates.
+
+This document describes the design of the API that would allow us to
+upload to the hypervisor binary patches.
+
+The document is split in four sections:
+ - Detailed descriptions of the problem statement.
+ - Design of the data structures.
+ - Design of the hypercalls.
+ - Implementation notes that should be taken into consideration.
+
+
+## Glossary
+
+ * splice - patch in the binary code with new opcodes
+ * trampoline - a jump to a new instruction.
+ * payload - telemetries of the old code along with binary blob of the new
+   function (if needed).
+ * reloc - telemetries contained in the payload to construct proper trampoline.
+
+## Multiple ways to patch
+
+The mechanism needs to be flexible to patch the hypervisor in multiple ways
+and be as simple as possible. The compiled code is contiguous in memory with
+no gaps - so we have no luxury of 'moving' existing code and must either
+insert a trampoline to the new code to be executed - or only modify in-place
+the code if there is sufficient space. The placement of new code has to be done
+by hypervisor and the virtual address for the new code is allocated dynamically.
+
+This implies that the hypervisor must compute the new offsets when splicing
+in the new trampoline code. Where the trampoline is added (inside
+the function we are patching or just the callers?) is also important.
+
+To lessen the amount of code in hypervisor, the consumer of the API
+is responsible for identifying which mechanism to employ and how many locations
+to patch. Combinations of modifying in-place code, adding trampoline, etc
+has to be supported. The API should allow read/write any memory within
+the hypervisor virtual address space.
+
+We must also have a mechanism to query what has been applied and a mechanism
+to revert it if needed.
+
+We must also have a mechanism to: (optional) provide an copy of the old code - so
+that the hypervisor can verify it against the code in memory; the new code;
+the symbol name of the function to be patched; or offset from the symbol;
+or virtual address.
+
+The complications that this design will encounter are explained later
+in this document.
+
+## Workflow
+
+
+The expected workflows of higher-level tools that manage multiple patches
+on production machines would be:
+
+ * The first obvious task is loading all available / suggested
+   hotpatches around system start.
+ * Whenever new hotpatches are installed, they should be loaded too.
+ * One wants to query which modules have been loaded at runtime.
+ * If unloading is deemed safe (see unloading below), one may want to
+   support a workflow where a specific hotpatch is marked as bad and
+   unloaded.
+ * If we do no restrict module activation order and want to report tboot
+   state on sequences, we might have a complexity explosion problem, in
+   what system hashes should be considered acceptable.
+
+## Patching code
+
+The first mechanism to patch that comes in mind is in-place replacement.
+That is replace the affected code with new code. Unfortunately the x86
+ISA is variable size which places limits on how much space we have available
+to replace the instructions. That is not a problem if the change is smaller
+than the original opcode and we can fill it with nops. Problems will
+appear if the replacement code is longer.
+
+The second mechanism is by replacing the call or jump to the
+old function with the address of the new function.
+
+A third mechanism is to add a jump to the new function at the
+start of the old function.
+
+### Example of trampoline and in-place splicing
+
+As example we will assume the hypervisor does not have XSA-132 (see
+*domctl/sysctl: don't leak hypervisor stack to toolstacks*
+4ff3449f0e9d175ceb9551d3f2aecb59273f639d) and we would like to binary patch
+the hypervisor with it. The original code looks as so:
+
+<pre>
+   48 89 e0                  mov    %rsp,%rax  
+   48 25 00 80 ff ff         and    $0xffffffffffff8000,%rax  
+</pre>
+
+while the new patched hypervisor would be:
+
+<pre>
+   48 c7 45 b8 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x48(%rbp)  
+   48 c7 45 c0 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x40(%rbp)  
+   48 c7 45 c8 00 00 00 00   movq   $0x0,-0x38(%rbp)  
+   48 89 e0                  mov    %rsp,%rax  
+   48 25 00 80 ff ff         and    $0xffffffffffff8000,%rax  
+</pre>
+
+This is inside the arch_do_domctl. This new change adds 21 extra
+bytes of code which alters all the offsets inside the function. To alter
+these offsets and add the extra 21 bytes of code we might not have enough
+space in .text to squeeze this in.
+
+As such we could simplify this problem by only patching the site
+which calls arch_do_domctl:
+
+<pre>
+<do_domctl>:  
+ e8 4b b1 05 00          callq  ffff82d08015fbb9 <arch_do_domctl>  
+</pre>
+
+with a new address for where the new `arch_do_domctl` would be (this
+area would be allocated dynamically).
+
+Astute readers will wonder what we need to do if we were to patch `do_domctl`
+- which is not called directly by hypervisor but on behalf of the guests via
+the `compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table`.
+Patching the offset in `hypercall_table` for `do_domctl:
+(ffff82d080103079 <do_domctl>:)
+<pre>
+
+ ffff82d08024d490:   79 30  
+ ffff82d08024d492:   10 80 d0 82 ff ff   
+
+</pre>
+with the new address where the new `do_domctl` is possible. The other
+place where it is used is in `hvm_hypercall64_table` which would need
+to be patched in a similar way. This would require an in-place splicing
+of the new virtual address of `arch_do_domctl`.
+
+In summary this example patched the callee of the affected function by
+ * allocating memory for the new code to live in,
+ * changing the virtual address in all the functions which called the old
+   code (computing the new offset, patching the callq with a new callq).
+ * changing the function pointer tables with the new virtual address of
+   the function (splicing in the new virtual address). Since this table
+   resides in the .rodata section we would need to temporarily change the
+   page table permissions during this part.
+
+
+However it has severe drawbacks - the safety checks which have to make sure
+the function is not on the stack - must also check every caller. For some
+patches this could mean - if there were an sufficient large amount of
+callers - that we would never be able to apply the update.
+
+### Example of different trampoline patching.
+
+An alternative mechanism exists where we can insert a trampoline in the
+existing function to be patched to jump directly to the new code. This
+lessens the locations to be patched to one but it puts pressure on the
+CPU branching logic (I-cache, but it is just one unconditional jump).
+
+For this example we will assume that the hypervisor has not been compiled
+with fe2e079f642effb3d24a6e1a7096ef26e691d93e (XSA-125: *pre-fill structures
+for certain HYPERVISOR_xen_version sub-ops*) which mem-sets an structure
+in `xen_version` hypercall. This function is not called **anywhere** in
+the hypervisor (it is called by the guest) but referenced in the
+`compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table` (and indirectly called
+from that). Patching the offset in `hypercall_table` for the old
+`do_xen_version` (ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>)
+
+</pre>
+ ffff82d08024b270 <hypercall_table>  
+ ...  
+ ffff82d08024b2f8:   9e 2f 11 80 d0 82 ff ff  
+
+</pre>
+with the new address where the new `do_xen_version` is possible. The other
+place where it is used is in `hvm_hypercall64_table` which would need
+to be patched in a similar way. This would require an in-place splicing
+of the new virtual address of `do_xen_version`.
+
+An alternative solution would be to patch insert a trampoline in the
+old `do_xen_version' function to directly jump to the new `do_xen_version`.
+
+<pre>
+ ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>:  
+ ffff82d080112f9e:       48 c7 c0 da ff ff ff    mov    $0xffffffffffffffda,%rax  
+ ffff82d080112fa5:       83 ff 09                cmp    $0x9,%edi  
+ ffff82d080112fa8:       0f 87 24 05 00 00       ja     ffff82d0801134d2 <do_xen_version+0x534>  
+</pre>
+
+with:
+
+<pre>
+ ffff82d080112f9e <do_xen_version>:  
+ ffff82d080112f9e:       e9 XX YY ZZ QQ          jmpq   [new do_xen_version]  
+</pre>
+
+which would lessen the amount of patching to just one location.
+
+In summary this example patched the affected function to jump to the
+new replacement function which required:
+ * allocating memory for the new code to live in,
+ * inserting trampoline with new offset in the old function to point to the
+   new function.
+ * Optionally we can insert in the old function a trampoline jump to an function
+   providing an BUG_ON to catch errant code.
+
+The disadvantage of this are that the unconditional jump will consume a small
+I-cache penalty. However the simplicity of the patching and higher chance
+of passing safety checks make this a worthwhile option.
+
+### Security
+
+With this method we can re-write the hypervisor - and as such we **MUST** be
+diligent in only allowing certain guests to perform this operation.
+
+Furthermore with SecureBoot or tboot, we **MUST** also verify the signature
+of the payload to be certain it came from a trusted source and integrity
+was intact.
+
+As such the hypercall **MUST** support an XSM policy to limit what the guest
+is allowed to invoke. If the system is booted with signature checking the
+signature checking will be enforced.
+
+## Design of payload format
+
+The payload **MUST** contain enough data to allow us to apply the update
+and also safely reverse it. As such we **MUST** know:
+
+ * (optional) What the old code is expected to be. We **MUST** be able verify it
+   against the runtime code if old code is included in the payload.
+ * Verify the build-id of hypervisor against the payload build-id.
+ * The locations in memory to be patched. This can be determined dynamically
+   via symbols or via virtual addresses.
+ * The new code (or data) that will be patched in.
+ * Signature to verify the payload.
+
+This binary format can be constructed using an custom binary format but
+there are severe disadvantages of it:
+
+ * The format might need to be changed and we need an mechanism to accommodate
+   that.
+ * It has to be platform agnostic.
+ * Easily constructed using existing tools.
+
+As such having the payload in an ELF file is the sensible way. We would be
+carrying the various sets of structures (and data) in the ELF sections under
+different names and with definitions. The prefix for the ELF section name
+would always be: *.xsplice* to match up to the names of the structures.
+
+Note that every structure has padding. This is added so that the hypervisor
+can re-use those fields as it sees fit.
+
+Earlier design attempted to ineptly explain the relations of the ELF sections
+to each other without using proper ELF mechanism (sh_info, sh_link, data
+structures using Elf_* types, etc). This design will explain in detail
+the structures and how they are used together and not dig in the ELF
+format - except mention that the section names should match the
+structure names.
+
+### ASCII art of structures.
+
+The diagram below is omitting some entries to easy the relationship explanation.
+
+<pre>
+                                                                          /---------------------\  
+                                                                       +->| xsplice_reloc_howto |  
+                                                                      /   \---------------------/  
+                                                /---------------\ 1:1/  
+                                             +->| xsplice_reloc |   /  
+                                            /   | - howto       +--/  1:1 /----------------\  
+                                           /    | - symbol      +-------->| xsplice_symbol |  
+                                     1:N  /     \---------------/       / \----------------/  
+/----------\        /--------------\     /                             /  
+| xsplice  |  1:1   | xsplice_code |    /                          1:1/  
+| - new    +------->|  - relocs    +---/  1:N   /-----------------\  /  
+| - old    +------->|  - sections  +----------->| xsplice_section | /  
+\----------/        |  - patches   +--\         | - symbol        +/ 1:1   /----------------\  
+                    \--------------/   \        | - addr          +------->| .text or .data |  
+                                        \       \----------------/         \----------------/  
+                                         \  
+                                      1:N \  
+                                           \    /----------------\  
+                                            +-->| xsplice_patch  |  1:1  /----------------\  
+                                                | - content      +------>| binary code or |  
+                                                \----------------/       | data           |  
+                                                                         \----------------/  
+
+</pre>
+
+### xsplice structures
+
+From the top (or left in the above diagram) the structures are:
+
+ *  `xsplice`. The top most structure - contains the the name of the update,
+    the id to match against the hypervisor, the pointer to the metadata for
+    the new code and optionally the metadata for the old code.
+
+ * `xsplice_code`. The structure that ties all of this together and defines
+   the payload. Contains arrays of `xsplice_reloc`, `xsplice_section`, and
+   `xsplice_patch`.
+
+ * `xsplice_reloc` contains telemetry used for patching - which describes the
+   targets to be patched and how to do it.
+
+ * `xsplice_section` - the safety data for the code. Contains pointer to the
+   symbol (`xsplice_symbols`) and pointer to the code (`.text`) or data (`.data`),
+   which are to be used during safety and dependency checking.
+
+ * `xsplice_patch`: the description of the new function to be patched in
+   along with the binary code or data.
+
+ * ` xsplice_reloc_howto`: the howto properly construct trampolines for an patch.
+   We may have multiple locations for which we need to insert a trampoline for a
+   payload and each location might require a different way of handling it.
+
+ * `xsplice_symbols `.  The symbol that will be patched.
+
+In short the *.xsplice* sections (with `xsplice` being the top) represent
+various structures to define the new code and safety checks for the old
+code (optional). The ELF provides the mechanism to glue it all together when
+loaded in memory.
+
+
+Note that a lot of these ideas are borrowed from kSplice which is
+available at: https://github.com/jirislaby/ksplice
+
+### struct xsplice
+
+The top most structure is quite simple. It defines the name, the id
+of the hypervisor, pointer to the new code & data and an pointer to
+the old code & data (optional).
+
+The `new` code uses all of the `xsplice_*` structures while the
+`old`  does not use the `xsplice_reloc` structures.
+
+The sections defining the structures will explicitly state
+when they are not used.
+
+<pre>
+struct xsplice {
+    uint32_t version; /* Version of payload. */
+    const char *name; /* A sensible name for the patch. Up to 40 characters. */  
+    const char *id; /* ID of the hypervisor this binary was built against. */  
+    uint32_t id_size; /* Size of the ID. */  
+    struct xsplice_code *new; /* Pointer to the new code & data to be patched. */  
+    struct xsplice_code *old; /* Pointer to the old code & data to be checked against. */  
+    uint8_t pad[24];  /* Must be zero. */  
+};
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure should be 64 bytes.
+
+### xsplice_code
+
+The structure embedded within this section ties the other
+structures together. It has the pointers with an start and end
+address for each set of structures. This means that an update
+can be split in multiple changes - for example to accomodate
+an update that contains both code and data and will need patching
+in both .text and .data sections.
+
+<pre>
+struct xsplice_code {  
+    struct xsplice_reloc *relocs; /* How to patch it. */  
+    uint32_t n_relocs;
+    struct xsplice_section *sections; /* Safety data. */  
+    uint32_t n_sections;
+    struct xsplice_patch *patches; /* Patch code and data */  
+    uint32_t n_patches;  
+    uint8_t pad[28]; /* Must be zero. */
+};
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
+
+There can be at most two of those structures in the payload.
+One for the `new` and another for the `old` (optional).
+
+If it is for the old code the relocs, and relocs_end values will be ignored.
+
+
+### xsplice_reloc
+
+The `xsplice_code` defines an array of these structures. As such
+an singular structure defines an singular point where to patch the
+hypervisor.
+
+The structure contains the address of the hypervisor (if known),
+the symbol associated with this address, how the patching is to
+be done, and platform specific details.
+
+The `isns_added` is an value to be used to compute the new offset
+due to the quirks of the operands of the instruction. For example
+to patch in an jump operation to the new code - the offset is relative
+to the program counter of the next instruction - hence the offset
+value has to be subtracted by four bytes - hence this would contain -4 .
+
+The `isns_target` is the offset against the symbol.
+
+The relation of this structure with `xsplice_patch` is 1:1, even
+for inline patches. See the section detailing the structure
+`xsplice_reloc_howto`.
+
+The relation of this structure with `xsplice_section` is 1:1.
+
+This structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+struct xsplice_reloc {  
+    uint64_t addr; /* The address of the relocation (if known). */  
+    struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* Symbol for this relocation. */  
+    int64_t isns_target; /* rest of the ELF addend.  This is equal to the offset against the symbol that the relocation refers to. */  
+    struct xsplice_reloc_howto  *howto; /* Pointer to the above structure. */  
+    int64_t isns_added; /* ELF addend resulting from quirks of instruction one of whose operands is the relocation. For example, this is -4 on x86 pc-relative jumps. */  
+    uint8_t pad[24];  /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
+
+### xsplice_section
+
+The structure defined in this section is used during pre-patching and
+during patching. Pre-patching it is used to verify that it is safe
+to update with the new changes - and contains safety data on the old code
+and what kind of matching we are to expect.
+
+That is whether the address (either provided or resolved when payload is
+loaded by referencing the symbols) is:
+
+ * in memory,
+ * correct size,
+ * in it's proper ELF section,
+ * has been already patched (or not),
+ * is expected not to be on any CPU stack - (or if it is OK for it be on the CPU stack).
+
+with what we expect it to be.
+
+Some of the checks can be relaxed, as such the `flag` values
+can be or-ed together.
+
+Depending on the time when patching is done, stack checking might not
+be required.
+<pre>
+
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT   0x00000001 /* Section is in .text */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_RODATA 0x00000002 /* Section is in .rodata */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_DATA   0x00000004 /* Section is in .data */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_STRING 0x00000008 /* Section is in .str */  
+
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT_INLINE 0x00000200 /* Change is to be inline. */   
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_MATCH_EXACT 0x00000400 /* Must match exactly. */  
+#define XSPLICE_SECTION_NO_STACKCHECK 0x00000800 /* Do not check the stack. */  
+
+
+struct xsplice_section {  
+    struct xsplice_symbol *symbol; /* The symbol associated with this change. */  
+    uint64_t address; /* The address of the section (if known). */  
+    uint32_t size; /* The size of the section. */  
+    uint32_t flags; /* Various XSPLICE_SECTION_* flags. */
+    uint8_t pad[12]; /* To be zero. */  
+};
+
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
+
+### xsplice_patch
+
+This structure has the binary code (or data) to be patched. Depending on the
+type it can either an inline patch (data or text) or require an relocation
+change (which requires a trampoline). Naturally it also points to a blob
+of the binary data to patch in, and the size of the patch.
+
+The `addr` is used when the patch is for inline change. It can be
+an virtual address or an offset from the symbol start.
+
+If it is an relocation (requiring a trampoline), the `addr` should be zero.
+
+There must be an corresponding ` struct xsplice_reloc` and
+`struct xsplice_section` describing this patch.
+
+<pre>
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_TEXT   0x1
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_INLINE_DATA   0x2
+#define XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT    0x3
+
+struct xsplice_patch {  
+    uint32_t type; /* XSPLICE_PATCH_* .*/  
+    uint32_t size; /* Size of patch. */  
+    uint64_t addr; /* The address (or offset from symbol) of the inline new code (or data). */  
+    void *content; /* The bytes to be installed. */  
+    uint8_t pad[40]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};
+
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 64 bytes.
+
+### xsplice_symbols
+
+The structure contains an pointer to the name of the ELF symbol
+to be patched and as well an unique name for the symbol.
+
+The `label` is used for diagnostic purposes - such as including the
+name and the offset.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+struct xsplice_symbol {  
+    const char *name; /* The ELF name of the symbol. */  
+    const char *label; /* A unique xSplice name for the symbol. */  
+    uint8_t pad[16]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
+
+
+### xsplice_reloc_howto
+
+The howto defines in the detail the change. It contains the type,
+whether the relocation is relative, the size of the relocation,
+bitmask for which parts of the instruction or data are to be replaced,
+amount the final relocation is shifted by (to drop unwanted data), and
+whether the replacement should be interpreted as signed value.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_INLINE        0x1 /* It is an inline replacement. */  
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH   0x2 /* Add a trampoline. */  
+
+#define XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL    0x1 /* Is PC relative. */  
+#define XSPLICE_HOWOT_FLAG_SIGN      0x2 /* Should the new value be treated as signed value. */  
+
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto {  
+    uint32_t    howto; /* XSPLICE_HOWTO_* */  
+    uint32_t    flag; /* XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_* */  
+    uint32_t    size; /* Size, in bytes, of the item to be relocated. */  
+    uint32_t    r_shift; /* The value the final relocation is shifted right by; used to drop unwanted data from the relocation. */  
+    uint64_t    mask; /* Bitmask for which parts of the instruction or data are replaced with the relocated value. */  
+    uint8_t     pad[8]; /* Must be zero. */  
+};  
+
+</pre>
+
+The size of this structure is 32 bytes.
+
+### Example
+
+There is a wealth of information that the payload must have to define a simple
+patch.  For this example we will assume that the hypervisor has not been compiled
+with fe2e079f642effb3d24a6e1a7096ef26e691d93e (XSA-125: *pre-fill structures
+for certain HYPERVISOR_xen_version sub-ops*) which mem-sets an structure
+in `xen_version` hypercall. This function is not called **anywhere** in
+the hypervisor (it is called by the guest) but referenced in the
+`compat_hypercall_table` and `hypercall_table` (and indirectly called
+from that). There are two ways to patch this:
+inline patch `hvm_hypercall64_table` and `hvm_hypercall` with a new
+address for the new `do_xen_version` , or insert
+trampoline in `do_xen_version` code. The example will focus on the later.
+
+The `do_xen_version` code is located at virtual address ffff82d080112f9e.
+
+<pre>
+struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125;  
+struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1];  
+struct xsplice_section sections[1];  
+struct xsplice_patch patches[1];  
+struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol;  
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto;  
+char do_xen_version_new_code[1728];  
+
+#ifndef HYPERVISOR_ID  
+#define HYPERVISOR_ID "92dd05a61556c554155b1508c9cf67d993336d28"
+#endif  
+
+struct xsplice xsa125 = {  
+    .name = "xsa125",  
+    .id = HYPERVISOR_ID,  
+    .old = NULL,  
+    .new = &xsplice_xsa125,  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125 = {  
+    .relocs = &relocs[0],  
+    .n_relocs = 1,  
+    .sections = &sections[0],  
+    .n_sections = 1,  
+    .patches = &patches[0],  
+    .n_patches = 1,   
+};
+
+struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .addr = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
+        .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
+        .isns_target = 0,  
+        .howto = &do_xen_version_howto,  
+        .isns_added = -4,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol = {  
+    .name = "do_xen_version",  
+    .label = "do_xen_version+<0x0>",  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto = {  
+    .type = XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH,  
+    .flag = XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL,  
+    .r_shift = 0,  
+    .mask = (-1ULL),  
+};  
+
+
+struct xsplice_section sections[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
+        .address = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
+        .size = 1728,  
+        .flags = XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_patch patches[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .type = XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT,  
+        .size = 1728,  
+        .addr = 0,  
+        .content = &do_xen_version_new_code,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+char do_xen_version_new_code[1728] = { 0x83, 0xff, 0x09, /* And more code. */};  
+</pre>
+
+
+## Signature checking requirements.
+
+The signature checking requires that the layout of the data in memory
+**MUST** be same for signature to be verified. This means that the payload
+data layout in ELF format **MUST** match what the hypervisor would be
+expecting such that it can properly do signature verification.
+
+The signature is based on the all of the payloads continuously laid out
+in memory. The signature is to be appended at the end of the ELF payload
+prefixed with the string '~Module signature appended~\n', followed by
+an signature header then followed by the signature, key identifier, and signers
+name.
+
+Specifically the signature header would be:
+
+<pre>
+#define PKEY_ALGO_DSA       0  
+#define PKEY_ALGO_RSA       1  
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PGP         0 /* OpenPGP generated key ID */  
+#define PKEY_ID_X509        1 /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */  
+
+#define HASH_ALGO_MD4          0  
+#define HASH_ALGO_MD5          1  
+#define HASH_ALGO_SHA1         2  
+#define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_160  3  
+#define HASH_ALGO_SHA256       4  
+#define HASH_ALGO_SHA384       5  
+#define HASH_ALGO_SHA512       6  
+#define HASH_ALGO_SHA224       7  
+#define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_128  8  
+#define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_256  9  
+#define HASH_ALGO_RIPE_MD_320 10  
+#define HASH_ALGO_WP_256      11  
+#define HASH_ALGO_WP_384      12  
+#define HASH_ALGO_WP_512      13  
+#define HASH_ALGO_TGR_128     14  
+#define HASH_ALGO_TGR_160     15  
+#define HASH_ALGO_TGR_192     16  
+
+
+struct elf_payload_signature {  
+	u8	algo;		/* Public-key crypto algorithm PKEY_ALGO_*. */  
+	u8	hash;		/* Digest algorithm: HASH_ALGO_*. */  
+	u8	id_type;	/* Key identifier type PKEY_ID*. */  
+	u8	signer_len;	/* Length of signer's name */  
+	u8	key_id_len;	/* Length of key identifier */  
+	u8	__pad[3];  
+	__be32	sig_len;	/* Length of signature data */  
+};
+
+</pre>
+(Note that this has been borrowed from Linux module signature code.).
+
+
+## Hypercalls
+
+We will employ the sub operations of the system management hypercall (sysctl).
+There are to be four sub-operations:
+
+ * upload the payloads.
+ * listing of payloads summary uploaded and their state.
+ * getting an particular payload summary and its state.
+ * command to apply, delete, or revert the payload.
+ * querying of the hypervisor ID (TODO).
+
+Most of the actions are asynchronous therefore the caller is responsible
+to verify that it has been applied properly by retrieving the summary of it
+and verifying that there are no error codes associated with the payload.
+
+We **MUST** make some of them asynchronous due to the nature of patching
+it requires every physical CPU to be lock-step with each other.
+The patching mechanism while an implementation detail, is not an short
+operation and as such the design **MUST** assume it will be an long-running
+operation.
+
+The sub-operations will spell out how preemption is to be handled (if at all).
+
+Furthermore it is possible to have multiple different payloads for the same
+function. As such an unique id per payload has to be visible to allow proper manipulation.
+
+The hypercall is part of the `xen_sysctl`. The top level structure contains
+one uint32_t to determine the sub-operations:
+
+<pre>
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op {  
+    uint32_t cmd;  
+	union {  
+          ... see below ...  
+        } u;  
+};  
+
+</pre>
+while the rest of hypercall specific structures are part of the this structure.
+
+### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD (0)
+
+Upload a payload to the hypervisor. The payload is verified and if there
+are any issues the proper return code will be returned. The payload is
+not applied at this time - that is controlled by *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION*.
+
+The caller provides:
+
+ * `id` unique id.
+ * `payload` the virtual address of where the ELF payload is.
+
+The `id` could be an UUID in mind that stays fixed forever for a given
+hotpatch. It can be embedded into the Elf payload at creation time
+and extracted by tools.
+
+The return value is zero if the payload was succesfully uploaded and the
+signature was verified. Otherwise an EXX return value is provided.
+Duplicate `id` are not supported.
+
+The `payload` is the ELF payload as mentioned in the `Payload format` section.
+
+This operation can be preempted by the hypercall returning EAGAIN.
+This is due to the nature of signature verification - which may require
+SecureBoot firmware calls which are unbounded.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload {  
+    char id[40];  /* IN, name of the patch. */  
+    uint64_t size; /* IN, size of the ELF file. */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint8) payload; /* ELF file. */  
+}; 
+</pre>
+
+### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET (1)
+
+Retrieve an summary of an specific payload. This caller provides:
+
+ * `id` the unique id.
+ * `status` *MUST* be set to zero.
+
+The `summary` structure contains an summary of payload which includes:
+
+ * `id` the unique id.
+ * `status` - whether it has been:
+ 1. *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* (0x1) has been loaded.
+ 2. *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* (0x2) acting on the **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION** command.
+ 3. *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED*  (0x4) the ELF payload safety checks passed.
+ 4. *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* (0x8) loaded, checked, and applied.
+ 5. *XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED* (0x10) loaded, checked, applied and then also reverted.
+ 6. Negative values is an error. The error would be of EXX format.
+
+The return value is zero on success and EXX on failure. This operation
+is synchronous and does not require preemption.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED    0x1  
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS  0x2  
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED   0x4  
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED   0x8  
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED  0x10  
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary {  
+    char id[40];  /* IN/OUT, name of the patch. */  
+    int32_t status;   /* OUT */  
+}; 
+</pre>
+
+### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST (2)
+
+Retrieve an array of abbreviated summary of payloads that are loaded in the
+hypervisor.
+
+The caller provides:
+
+ * `version`. Initially it *MUST* be zero.
+ * `idx` index iterator. On first call *MUST* be zero, subsequent calls varies.
+ * `count` the max number of entries to populate.
+ * `summary` virtual address of where to write payload summaries.
+
+The hypercall returns zero on success and updates the `idx` (index) iterator
+with the number of payloads returned, `count` with the number of remaining
+payloads, and `summary` with an number of payload summaries. The `version`
+is updated on every hypercall - if it varies from one hypercall to another
+the data is stale and further calls could fail.
+
+
+If the hypercall returns E2BIG the `count` is too big and should be
+lowered.
+
+Note that due to the asynchronous nature of hypercalls the domain might have
+added or removed the number of payloads making this information stale. It is
+the responsibility of the toolstack to use the `version` field to check
+between each invocation. if the version differs it should discard the stale
+data and start from scratch.
+
+This operation is synchronous and does not require preemption.
+
+The `summary` structure contains an summary of payload which includes:
+
+ * `version` version of the data.
+ * `id` unique id per payload.
+ * `status` - whether it has been:
+ 1. *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* (0x1) has been loaded.
+ 2. *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* (0x2) acting on the **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION** command.
+ 3. *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED*  (0x4) the ELF payload safety checks passed.
+ 4. *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* (0x8) loaded, checked, and applied.
+ 5. *XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED* (0x10) loaded, checked, applied and then also reverted.
+ 6. Any negative values means there has been error. The value is in EXX format.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_list {  
+    uint32_t version; /* OUT */
+    uint32_t idx;  /* IN/OUT */  
+    uint32_t count;  /* IN/OUT */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary) summary;  /* OUT */  
+};  
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary {  
+    char id[40];  /* OUT, name of the patch. */  
+    int32_t status;  /* OUT */  
+};  
+
+</pre>
+### XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION (3)
+
+Perform an operation on the payload structure referenced by the `id` field.
+The operation request is asynchronous and the status should be retrieved
+by using either **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET** or **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST** hypercall.
+
+There are two ways about doing preemption. Either via returning back EBUSY
+or the mechanism outlined here.
+
+Doing it in userland would remove any tracking of states in
+the hypervisor - except the simple commands apply, unload, and revert.
+
+However we would not be able to patch all the code that is invoked while
+this hypercall is in progress. That is - the do_domctl, the spinlocks,
+anything put on the stack, etc.
+
+The disadvantage of the mechanism outlined here is that the hypervisor
+code has to keep the state atomic and have an upper bound of time
+on actions. If within the time the operation does not succeed the
+operation would go in error state.
+
+ * `id` the unique id.
+ * `time` the upper bound of time the cmd should take. Zero means infinite.
+ * `cmd` the command requested:
+  1. *XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK* (1) check that the payload will apply properly.
+  2. *XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD* (2) unload the payload.
+   Any further hypercalls against the `id` will result in failure unless
+   **XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD** hypercall is perfomed with same `id`.
+  3. *XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT* (3) revert the payload. If the operation takes
+  more time than the upper bound of time the `status` will EBUSY.
+  4. *XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY* (4) apply the payload. If the operation takes
+  more time than the upper bound of time the `status` will be EBUSY.
+  5. *XSPLICE_ACTION_LOADED* is an initial state and cannot be requested.  
+
+The return value will be zero unless the provided fields are incorrect.
+
+The structure is as follow:
+
+<pre>
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK  1  
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD 2  
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT 3  
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY  4  
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_action {  
+    char id[40];  /* IN, name of the patch. */  
+    uint64_t time; /* IN, upper bound of time (ms) for the operation to take. */  
+    uint32_t cmd; /* IN */  
+};  
+
+</pre>
+
+## State diagrams of XSPLICE_ACTION values.
+
+There is a strict ordering state of what the commands can be.
+The XSPLICE_ACTION prefix has been dropped to easy reading:
+
+<pre>
+                        /->\  
+                        \  /  
+             /-------< CHECK  
+             |          |  
+             |          +  
+             |       UNLOAD<--\  
+             |                 \  
+             |                   \  
+      /-> APPLY -----------> REVERT --\  
+      |                               |  
+      \-------------------------------/  
+
+</pre>
+Or an state transition table of valid states:
+<pre>
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+| CHECK | APPLY | REVERT | UNLOAD | Current | Next  | Result           |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|   x   |       |        |        | LOADED  | CHECK | Check payload.   |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |       |        |   x    | LOADED  | UNLOAD| unload payload.  |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|   x   |       |        |        | CHECK   | CHECK | Check payload.   |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |   x   |        |        | CHECK   | APPLY | Apply payload.   |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |       |        |   x    | CHECK   | UNLOAD| Unload payload.  |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |       |   x    |        | APPLY   | REVERT| Revert payload.  |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |   x   |        |        | REVERT  | APPLY | Apply payload.   |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+|       |       |        |   x    | REVERT  | UNLOAD| Unload payload.  |  
++-------+-------+--------+--------+---------+-------+------------------+  
+</pre>
+All the other state transitions are invalid.
+
+## Sequence of events.
+
+The normal sequence of events is to:
+
+ 1. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD* to upload the payload. If there are errors *STOP* here.
+ 2. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED* go to next step.
+ 3. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION* with *XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK* command to verify that the payload can be succesfully applied.
+ 4. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED* go to next step.
+ 5. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION* with *XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY* to apply the patch.
+ 6. *XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET* to check the `->status`. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS* spin. If in *XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED* exit with success.
+
+ 
+## Addendum
+
+Implementation quirks should not be discussed in a design document.
+
+However these observations can provide aid when developing against this
+document.
+
+
+### Alternative assembler
+
+Alternative assembler is a mechanism to use different instructions depending
+on what the CPU supports. This is done by providing multiple streams of code
+that can be patched in - or if the CPU does not support it - padded with
+`nop` operations. The alternative assembler macros cause the compiler to
+expand the code to place a most generic code in place - emit a special
+ELF .section header to tag this location. During run-time the hypervisor
+can leave the areas alone or patch them with an better suited opcodes.
+
+However these sections are part of .init. and as such can't reasonably be
+subject to patching.
+
+### .rodata sections
+
+The patching might require strings to be updated as well. As such we must be
+also able to patch the strings as needed. This sounds simple - but the compiler
+has a habit of coalescing strings that are the same - which means if we in-place
+alter the strings - other users will be inadvertently affected as well.
+
+This is also where pointers to functions live - and we may need to patch this
+as well. And switch-style jump tables.
+
+To guard against that we must be prepared to do patching similar to
+trampoline patching or in-line depending on the flavour. If we can
+do in-line patching we would need to:
+
+ * alter `.rodata` to be writeable.
+ * inline patch.
+ * alter `.rodata` to be read-only.
+
+If are doing trampoline patching we would need to:
+
+ * allocate a new memory location for the string.
+ * all locations which use this string will have to be updated to use the
+   offset to the string.
+ * mark the region RO when we are done.
+
+### .bss and .data sections.
+
+Patching writable data is not suitable as it is unclear what should be done
+depending on the current state of data. As such it should not be attempted.
+
+
+### Patching code which is in the stack.
+
+We should not patch the code which is on the stack. That can lead
+to corruption.
+
+### Inline patching
+
+The hypervisor should verify that the in-place patching would fit within
+the code or data.
+
+### Trampoline (e9 opcode)
+
+The e9 opcode used for jmpq uses a 32-bit signed displacement. That means
+we are limited to up to 2GB of virtual address to place the new code
+from the old code. That should not be a problem since Xen hypervisor has
+a very small footprint.
+
+However if we need - we can always add two trampolines. One at the 2GB
+limit that calls the next trampoline.
+
+Please note there is a small limitation for trampolines in
+function entries: The target function (+ trailing padding) must be able
+to accomodate the trampoline. On x86 with +-2 GB relative jumps,
+this means 5 bytes are  required.
+
+Depending on compiler settings, there are several functions in Xen that
+are smaller (without inter-function padding).
+
+<pre> 
+readelf -sW xen-syms | grep " FUNC " | \
+    awk '{ if ($3 < 5) print $3, $4, $5, $8 }'
+
+...
+3 FUNC LOCAL wbinvd_ipi
+3 FUNC LOCAL shadow_l1_index
+...
+</pre>
+A compile-time check for, e.g., a minimum alignment of functions or a
+runtime check that verifies symbol size (+ padding to next symbols) for
+that in the hypervisor is advised.
+
+### When to patch
+
+During the discussion on the design two candidates bubbled where
+the call stack for each CPU would be deterministic. This would
+minimize the chance of the patch not being applied due to safety
+checks failing.
+
+#### Rendezvous code instead of stop_machine for patching
+
+The hypervisor's time rendezvous code runs synchronously across all CPUs
+every second. Using the stop_machine to patch can stall the time rendezvous
+code and result in NMI. As such having the patching be done at the tail
+of rendezvous code should avoid this problem.
+
+However the entrance point for that code is
+do_softirq->timer_softirq_action->time_calibration
+which ends up calling on_selected_cpus on remote CPUs.
+
+The remote CPUs receive CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR IPI and execute the
+desired function.
+
+
+#### Before entering the guest code.
+
+Before we call VMXResume we check whether any soft IRQs need to be executed.
+This is a good spot because all Xen stacks are effectively empty at
+that point.
+
+To randezvous all the CPUs an barrier with an maximum timeout (which
+could be adjusted), combined with forcing all other CPUs through the
+hypervisor with IPIs, can be utilized to have all the CPUs be lockstep.
+
+The approach is similar in concept to stop_machine and the time rendezvous
+but is time-bound. However the local CPU stack is much shorter and
+a lot more deterministic.
+
+### Compiling the hypervisor code
+
+Hotpatch generation often requires support for compiling the target
+with -ffunction-sections / -fdata-sections.  Changes would have to
+be done to the linker scripts to support this.
+
+
+### Generation of xSplice ELF payloads
+
+The design of that is not discussed in this design.
+
+The author of this design envisions objdump and objcopy along
+with special GCC parameters (see above) to create .o.xsplice files
+which can be used to splice an ELF with the new payload.
+
+The ksplice code can provide inspiration.
+
+### Exception tables and symbol tables growth
+
+We may need support for adapting or augmenting exception tables if
+patching such code.  Hotpatches may need to bring their own small
+exception tables (similar to how Linux modules support this).
+
+If supporting hotpatches that introduce additional exception-locations
+is not important, one could also change the exception table in-place
+and reorder it afterwards.
+
+
+### xSplice interdependencies
+
+xSplice patches interdependencies are tricky.
+
+There are the ways this can be addressed:
+ * A single large patch that subsumes and replaces all previous ones.
+   Over the life-time of patching the hypervisor this large patch
+   grows to accumulate all the code changes.
+ * Hotpatch stack - where an mechanism exists that loads the hotpatches
+   in the same order they were built in. We would need an build-id
+   of the hypevisor to make sure the hot-patches are build against the
+   correct build.
+ * Payload containing the old code to check against that. That allows
+   the hotpatches to be loaded indepedently (if they don't overlap) - or
+   if the old code also containst previously patched code - even if they
+   overlap.
+
+The disadvantage of the first large patch is that it can grow over
+time and not provide an bisection mechanism to identify faulty patches.
+
+The hot-patch stack puts stricts requirements on the order of the patches
+being loaded and requires an hypervisor build-id to match against.
+
+The old code allows much more flexibility and an additional guard,
+but is more complex to implement.
+
+### Hypervisor ID (buid-id)
+
+The build-id can help with:
+
+  * Prevent loading of wrong hotpatches (intended for other builds)
+
+  * Allow to identify suitable hotpatches on disk and help with runtime
+    tooling (if laid out using build ID)
+
+The build-id (aka hypervisor id) can be easily obtained by utilizing
+the ld --build-id operatin which (copied from ld):
+
+<pre>
+--build-id  
+    --build-id=style  
+        Request creation of ".note.gnu.build-id" ELF note section.  The contents of the note are unique bits identifying this  
+        linked file.  style can be "uuid" to use 128 random bits, "sha1" to use a 160-bit SHA1 hash on the normative parts of the  
+        output contents, "md5" to use a 128-bit MD5 hash on the normative parts of the output contents, or "0xhexstring" to use a  
+        chosen bit string specified as an even number of hexadecimal digits ("-" and ":" characters between digit pairs are  
+        ignored).  If style is omitted, "sha1" is used.  
+
+        The "md5" and "sha1" styles produces an identifier that is always the same in an identical output file, but will be  
+        unique among all nonidentical output files.  It is not intended to be compared as a checksum for the file's contents.  A  
+        linked file may be changed later by other tools, but the build ID bit string identifying the original linked file does  
+        not change.  
+
+        Passing "none" for style disables the setting from any "--build-id" options earlier on the command line.  
+
+</pre>
+
+### Symbol names
+
+
+Xen as it is now, has a couple of non-unique symbol names which will
+make runtime symbol identification hard.  Sometimes, static symbols
+simply have the same name in C files, sometimes such symbols get
+included via header files, and some C files are also compiled
+multiple times and linked under different names (guest_walk.c).
+
+As such we need to modify the linker to make sure that the symbol
+table qualifies also symbols by their source file name.
+
+For the awkward situations in which C-files are compiled multiple
+times patches we would need to some modification in the Xen code.
+
+
+The convention for file-type symbols (that would allow to map many
+symbols to their compilation unit) says that only the basename (i.e.,
+without directories) is embedded.  This creates another layer of
+confusion for duplicate file names in the build tree.
+
+That would have to be resolved.
+
+<pre>
+> find . -name \*.c -print0 | xargs -0 -n1 basename | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail -n10
+      3 shutdown.c
+      3 sysctl.c
+      3 time.c
+      3 xenoprof.c
+      4 gdbstub.c
+      4 irq.c
+      5 domain.c
+      5 mm.c
+      5 pci.c
+      5 traps.c
+</pre>
+
+### Security
+
+Only the privileged domain should be allowed to do this operation.
+
diff --git a/docs/misc/xsplice_test.c b/docs/misc/xsplice_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e0cf93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/misc/xsplice_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+#include "xsplice.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125;  
+struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1];  
+struct xsplice_section sections[1];  
+struct xsplice_patch patches[1];  
+struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol;  
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto;  
+char do_xen_version_new_code[1728];  
+
+#ifndef HYPERVISOR_ID  
+#define HYPERVISOR_ID "Xen 4.6-unstable-g9348394"  
+#endif  
+
+struct xsplice xsa125 = {  
+    .name = "xsa125",  
+    .id = HYPERVISOR_ID,  
+    .old = NULL,  
+    .new = &xsplice_xsa125,  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_code xsplice_xsa125 = {  
+    .relocs = &relocs[0],  
+    .n_relocs = 1,
+    .sections = &sections[0],  
+    .n_sections = 1,
+    .patches = &patches[0],  
+    .n_patches = 1,
+};
+
+struct xsplice_reloc relocs[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .addr = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
+        .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
+        .isns_target = 0,  
+        .howto = &do_xen_version_howto,  
+        .isns_added = -4,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_symbol do_xen_version_symbol = {  
+    .name = "do_xen_version",  
+    .label = "do_xen_version+<0x0>",  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_reloc_howto do_xen_version_howto = {  
+    .howto = XSPLICE_HOWTO_RELOC_PATCH,  
+    .flag = XSPLICE_HOWTO_FLAG_PC_REL,  
+    .r_shift = 0,  
+    .mask = (-1ULL),  
+};  
+
+
+struct xsplice_section sections[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .symbol = &do_xen_version_symbol,  
+        .address = 0xffff82d080112f9e,  
+        .size = 1728,  
+        .flags = XSPLICE_SECTION_TEXT,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+struct xsplice_patch patches[1] = {  
+    {  
+        .type = XSPLICE_PATCH_RELOC_TEXT,  
+        .size = 1728,  
+        .addr = 0,  
+        .content = &do_xen_version_new_code,  
+    },  
+};  
+
+char do_xen_version_new_code[1728] = { 0x83, 0xff, 0x09, };  
+
+void main()
+{
+   printf("%s\n", xsa125.name); 
+}
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
index ce9029c..7a89656 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xenctrl.h
@@ -2797,6 +2797,22 @@ int xc_psr_cat_get_l3_info(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t socket,
                            uint32_t *cos_max, uint32_t *cbm_len);
 #endif
 
+int xc_xsplice_upload(xc_interface *xch,
+                      char *id, char *payload, uint32_t size);
+
+int xc_xsplice_get(xc_interface *xch,
+                   char *id,
+                   xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *summary);
+
+int xc_xsplice_list(xc_interface *xch, unsigned int max, unsigned int start,
+                    xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *info, unsigned int *done,
+                    unsigned int *left);
+
+int xc_xsplice_apply(xc_interface *xch, char *id);
+int xc_xsplice_revert(xc_interface *xch, char *id);
+int xc_xsplice_unload(xc_interface *xch, char *id);
+int xc_xsplice_check(xc_interface *xch, char *id);
+
 #endif /* XENCTRL_H */
 
 /*
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c b/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c
index b827bbb..bb91930 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_misc.c
@@ -719,6 +719,189 @@ int xc_hvm_inject_trap(
     return rc;
 }
 
+int xc_xsplice_upload(xc_interface *xch,
+                      char *id,
+                      char *payload,
+                      uint32_t size)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_SYSCTL;
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(payload, size, XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_IN);
+
+    if ( !id || !payload )
+        return -1;
+
+    if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, payload) )
+        return -1;
+
+    sysctl.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.upload.size = size;
+    memcpy(sysctl.u.xsplice.u.upload.id, id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+    set_xen_guest_handle(sysctl.u.xsplice.u.upload.payload, payload);
+
+    rc = do_sysctl(xch, &sysctl);
+
+    xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, payload);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_get(xc_interface *xch,
+                   char *id,
+                   xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *summary)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_SYSCTL;
+
+    if ( !id )
+        return -1;
+
+    sysctl.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.get.status = 0;
+    memcpy(sysctl.u.xsplice.u.get.id, id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+
+    rc = do_sysctl(xch, &sysctl);
+
+    memcpy(summary, &sysctl.u.xsplice.u.get, sizeof(*summary));
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_list(xc_interface *xch, unsigned int max, unsigned int start,
+                    xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *info, unsigned int *done,
+                    unsigned int *left)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_SYSCTL;
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BOUNCE(info, 0 /* adjust later. */, XC_HYPERCALL_BUFFER_BOUNCE_OUT);
+    uint32_t max_batch_sz, nr;
+    uint32_t version = 0, retries = 0;
+    uint32_t adjust = 0;
+
+    if ( !max )
+        return -1;
+
+    sysctl.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.version = 0;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.idx = start;
+
+    max_batch_sz = max;
+
+    *done = 0;
+    *left = 0;
+    do {
+        if ( adjust )
+            adjust = 0; /* Used when adjusting the 'max_batch_sz' or 'retries'. */
+
+        nr = min(max - *done, max_batch_sz);
+
+        sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.nr = nr;
+        HYPERCALL_BOUNCE_SET_SIZE(info, nr * sizeof(*info));
+
+        /* Move the pointer to proper offset into 'info'. */
+        (HYPERCALL_BUFFER(info))->ubuf = info + *done;
+        if ( xc_hypercall_bounce_pre(xch, info) )
+            return -1;
+
+        set_xen_guest_handle(sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.summary, info);
+
+        rc = do_sysctl(xch, &sysctl);
+        if ( rc < 0 && errno == E2BIG )
+        {
+            if ( max_batch_sz <= 1 )
+                break;
+            max_batch_sz >>= 1;
+            adjust = 1; /* For the loop conditional to let us loop again. */
+            xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, info); /* No memory leaks! */
+            continue;
+        }
+        if ( rc < 0 ) /* For all other errors we bail out. */
+            break;
+
+        if ( !version )
+            version = sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.version;
+
+        if ( sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.version != version )
+        {
+            /* TODO: retries should be configurable? */
+            if ( retries++ > 3 )
+            {
+                rc = -1;
+                errno = EBUSY;
+                break;
+            }
+            *done = 0; /* Retry from scratch. */
+            version = sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.version;
+            adjust = 1; /* And make sure we continue in the loop. */
+            xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, info); /* No memory leaks! */
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* We should never hit this, but just in case. */
+        if ( rc > nr )
+        {
+            errno = EINVAL; /* Overflow! */
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+        *left = sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.nr; /* Total remaining count. */
+        /* Copy only up 'rc' of data' - we could add 'min(rc,nr) if desired. */
+        HYPERCALL_BOUNCE_SET_SIZE(info, (rc * sizeof(*info)));
+        /* Bounce the data and free the bounce buffer. */
+        xc_hypercall_bounce_post(xch, info);
+        /* And update how many elements of info we have copied into. */
+        *done += rc;
+        /* Update idx. */
+        sysctl.u.xsplice.u.list.idx = rc;
+    } while ( adjust || (*done < max && *left != 0) );
+
+    return rc > 0 ? 0 : rc;
+}
+
+static int _xc_xsplice_action(xc_interface *xch,
+                              char *id,
+                              unsigned int action)
+{
+    int rc;
+    DECLARE_SYSCTL;
+
+    if ( !id )
+        return -1;
+
+    sysctl.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.cmd = XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.action.cmd = action;
+    sysctl.u.xsplice.u.action.time = 0; /* TODO */
+    memcpy(sysctl.u.xsplice.u.action.id, id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+
+    rc = do_sysctl(xch, &sysctl);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_apply(xc_interface *xch, char *id)
+{
+    return _xc_xsplice_action(xch, id, XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY);
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_revert(xc_interface *xch, char *id)
+{
+    return _xc_xsplice_action(xch, id, XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT);
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_unload(xc_interface *xch, char *id)
+{
+    return _xc_xsplice_action(xch, id, XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD);
+}
+
+int xc_xsplice_check(xc_interface *xch, char *id)
+{
+    return _xc_xsplice_action(xch, id, XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK);
+}
+
 /*
  * Local variables:
  * mode: C
diff --git a/tools/misc/Makefile b/tools/misc/Makefile
index c4490f3..c46873e 100644
--- a/tools/misc/Makefile
+++ b/tools/misc/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ INSTALL_SBIN                   += xenlockprof
 INSTALL_SBIN                   += xenperf
 INSTALL_SBIN                   += xenpm
 INSTALL_SBIN                   += xenwatchdogd
+INSTALL_SBIN                   += xen-xsplice
 INSTALL_SBIN += $(INSTALL_SBIN-y)
 
 # Everything to be installed in a private bin/
@@ -98,6 +99,9 @@ xen-mfndump: xen-mfndump.o
 xenwatchdogd: xenwatchdogd.o
 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
 
+xen-xsplice: xen-xsplice.o
+	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
+
 xen-lowmemd: xen-lowmemd.o
 	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDLIBS_libxenctrl) $(LDLIBS_libxenstore) $(APPEND_LDFLAGS)
 
diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-xsplice.c b/tools/misc/xen-xsplice.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cf9879
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/misc/xen-xsplice.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+#include <xenctrl.h>
+#include <xenstore.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+static xc_interface *xch;
+
+void show_help(void)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "xen-xsplice: Xsplice test tool\n"
+            "Usage: xen-xsplice <command> [args]\n"
+            " <id> An unique name of payload. Up to 40 characters.\n"
+            "Commands:\n"
+            "  help                 display this help\n"
+            "  upload <id> <file>   upload file <cpuid> with <id> name\n"
+            "  list                 list payloads uploaded.\n"
+            "  apply <id>           apply <id> patch.\n"
+            "  revert <id>          revert id <id> patch.\n"
+            "  unload <id>          unload id <id> patch.\n"
+            "  check <id>           check id <id> patch.\n"
+           );
+}
+
+/* wrapper function */
+static int help_func(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    show_help();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof (a) / sizeof ((a)[0]))
+
+static const char *status2str(long status)
+{
+#define STATUS(x) [XSPLICE_STATUS_##x] = #x
+    static const char *const names[] = {
+            STATUS(LOADED),
+            STATUS(PROGRESS),
+            STATUS(CHECKED),
+            STATUS(APPLIED),
+            STATUS(REVERTED),
+    };
+
+    if (status >= ARRAY_SIZE(names))
+        return "unknown";
+
+    if (status < 0)
+        return "-EXX";
+
+    if (!names[status])
+        return "unknown";
+
+    return names[status];
+}
+
+#define MAX 11
+static int list_func(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    unsigned int idx, done, left, rc, i;
+    xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *info;
+
+    if ( argc )
+    {
+        show_help();
+        return -1;
+    }
+    idx = left = 0;
+    info = malloc(sizeof(*info) * MAX);
+    if ( !info )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Could not allocate buffer!\n");
+        return ENOMEM;
+    }
+    fprintf(stdout," ID                                     | status\n"
+                   "----------------------------------------+------------\n");
+    do {
+        done = 0;
+        memset(info, 'A', sizeof(*info) * MAX); /* Optional. */
+        rc = xc_xsplice_list(xch, MAX, idx, info, &done, &left);
+        if ( rc )
+        {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Failed to list %d/%d: %d(%s)!\n", idx, left, errno, strerror(errno));
+            return errno;
+        }
+        for ( i = 0; i < done; i++ )
+        {
+            fprintf(stdout, "%-40s| ", info[i].id);
+            if ( info[i].status < 0 )
+                fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", strerror(info[i].status));
+            else
+                fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", status2str(info[i].status));
+        }
+        idx += done;
+    } while ( left );
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_id(int argc, char *argv[], char *id)
+{
+    ssize_t len = strlen(argv[0]);
+    if ( len > XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "ID MUST be %d characters!\n", XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return errno;
+    }
+    /* Don't want any funny strings from the stack. */
+    memset(id, 0, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+    strncpy(id, argv[0], len);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int upload_func(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    char *filename;
+    char id[XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE];
+    int fd = 0, rc;
+    struct stat buf;
+    unsigned char *fbuf;
+    ssize_t len;
+    DECLARE_HYPERCALL_BUFFER(char, payload);
+
+    if ( argc != 2 )
+    {
+        show_help();
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( get_id(argc, argv, id) )
+        return EINVAL;
+
+    filename = argv[1];
+    fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
+    if ( fd < 0 )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Could not open %s, error: %d(%s)\n",
+                filename, errno, strerror(errno));
+        return errno;
+    }
+    if ( stat(filename, &buf) != 0 )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Could not get right size %s, error: %d(%s)\n",
+                filename, errno, strerror(errno));
+        close(fd);
+        return errno;
+    }
+
+    len = buf.st_size;
+    fbuf = mmap(0, len, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+    if ( fbuf == MAP_FAILED )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr,"Could not map: %s, error: %d(%s)\n",
+                filename, errno, strerror(errno));
+        close (fd);
+        return errno;
+    }
+    printf("Uploading %s (%ld bytes)\n", filename, len);
+    payload = xc_hypercall_buffer_alloc(xch, payload, len);
+    memcpy(payload, fbuf, len);
+
+    rc = xc_xsplice_upload(xch, id, payload, len);
+    if ( rc )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Upload failed: %s, error: %d(%s)!\n",
+                filename, errno, strerror(errno));
+        goto out;
+    }
+    xc_hypercall_buffer_free(xch, payload);
+
+out:
+    if ( munmap( fbuf, len) )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "Could not unmap!? error: %d(%s)!\n",
+                errno, strerror(errno));
+        rc = errno;
+    }
+    close(fd);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+struct {
+    int allow; /* State it must be in to call function. */
+    int expected; /* The state to be in after the function. */
+    const char *name;
+    int (*function)(xc_interface *xch, char *id);
+    unsigned int executed; /* Has the function been called?. */
+} action_options[] = {
+    {   .allow = XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED | XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED,
+        .expected = XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED,
+        .name = "apply",
+        .function = xc_xsplice_apply,
+    },
+    {   .allow = XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED,
+        .expected = XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED,
+        .name = "revert",
+        .function = xc_xsplice_revert,
+    },
+    {   .allow = XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED | XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED | XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED,
+        .expected = ENOENT,
+        .name = "unload",
+        .function = xc_xsplice_unload,
+    },
+    {   .allow = XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED | XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED,
+        .expected = XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED,
+        .name = "check",
+        .function = xc_xsplice_check
+    },
+};
+
+int action_func(int argc, char *argv[], unsigned int idx)
+{
+    char id[40];
+    int rc;
+    xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t summary;
+    unsigned int retry = 0;
+
+    if ( argc != 1 )
+    {
+        show_help();
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if ( get_id(argc, argv, id) )
+        return EINVAL;
+
+    do {
+        rc = xc_xsplice_get(xch, id, &summary);
+        /* N.B. Successfull unload will return ENOENT. */
+        if ( rc )
+        {
+            rc = errno; /* rc is just -1 and we want proper EXX. */
+            break;
+        }
+
+        if ( summary.status < 0 )
+        { /* We report it outside the loop. */
+            rc = summary.status;
+            break;
+        }
+        if ( summary.status == XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS )
+        {
+            if ( !action_options[idx].executed )
+            {
+                printf("%s is in progress and we didn't initiate it!\n", id);
+                errno = EBUSY;
+                rc = -1;
+                break;
+            }
+            if ( retry++ < 30 )
+            {
+                printf(".");
+                sleep(1);
+                continue;
+            }
+            printf("%s: Waited more than 30 seconds! Bailing out.\n", id);
+            errno = EBUSY;
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+        /* We use rc outside loop to deal with EXX type expected values. */
+        rc = summary.status;
+        if ( action_options[idx].expected == rc ) /* Yeey! */
+            break;
+
+        if ( action_options[idx].allow & rc )
+        {
+            if ( action_options[idx].executed )
+            {
+                printf(" (0x%x vs 0x%x) state not reached!?\n",
+                       action_options[idx].expected, rc);
+                errno = EINVAL;
+                break;
+            }
+            printf("%s: State is 0x%x, ok are 0x%x. Commencing %s:",
+                   id, rc, action_options[idx].allow,
+                   action_options[idx].name);
+
+            rc = action_options[idx].function(xch, id);
+            if ( rc ) /* We report it outside the loop. */
+                break;
+
+            action_options[idx].executed = 1;
+            rc = 1; /* Loop again so we can display the dots. */
+        } else {
+            printf("%s: in wrong state (0x%x), expected 0x%x\n",
+                   id, rc, action_options[idx].expected);
+            errno = EINVAL;
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
+    } while ( rc > 0 );
+
+    if ( action_options[idx].expected == rc )
+    {
+            printf("completed!\n");
+            rc = 0;
+    } else
+        printf("%s failed with %d(%s)\n", id, errno, strerror(errno));
+
+    return rc;
+}
+struct {
+    const char *name;
+    int (*function)(int argc, char *argv[]);
+} main_options[] = {
+    { "help", help_func },
+    { "list", list_func },
+    { "upload", upload_func },
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    int i, j, ret;
+
+    if ( argc  <= 1 )
+    {
+        show_help();
+        return 0;
+    }
+    for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(main_options); i++ )
+        if (!strncmp(main_options[i].name, argv[1], strlen(argv[1])))
+            break;
+
+    if ( i == ARRAY_SIZE(main_options) )
+    {
+        for ( j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(action_options); j++ )
+            if (!strncmp(action_options[j].name, argv[1], strlen(argv[1])))
+                break;
+
+        if ( j == ARRAY_SIZE(action_options) )
+        {
+            fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command '%s' -- try "
+                   "'xen-xsplice help'\n", argv[1]);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    xch = xc_interface_open(0,0,0);
+    if ( !xch )
+    {
+        fprintf(stderr, "failed to get the handler\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ( i == ARRAY_SIZE(main_options) )
+        ret = action_func(argc -2, argv + 2, j);
+    else
+        ret = main_options[i].function(argc -2, argv + 2);
+
+    xc_interface_close(xch);
+
+    return !!ret;
+}
diff --git a/xen/common/Makefile b/xen/common/Makefile
index 3fdf931..7769e5c 100644
--- a/xen/common/Makefile
+++ b/xen/common/Makefile
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ obj-y += vmap.o
 obj-y += vsprintf.o
 obj-y += wait.o
 obj-y += xmalloc_tlsf.o
+obj-y += xsplice.o
 
 obj-bin-$(CONFIG_X86) += $(foreach n,decompress bunzip2 unxz unlzma unlzo unlz4 earlycpio,$(n).init.o)
 
diff --git a/xen/common/keyhandler.c b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
index 5d21e48..1d4574a 100644
--- a/xen/common/keyhandler.c
+++ b/xen/common/keyhandler.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <xen/mm.h>
 #include <xen/watchdog.h>
 #include <xen/init.h>
+#include <xen/xsplice.h>
 #include <asm/debugger.h>
 #include <asm/div64.h>
 
@@ -455,6 +456,11 @@ static struct keyhandler spinlock_reset_keyhandler = {
     .desc = "reset lock profile info"
 };
 #endif
+static struct keyhandler xsplice_printall_keyhandler = {
+    .diagnostic = 1,
+    .u.fn = xsplice_printall,
+    .desc = "print splicing information"
+};
 
 static void run_all_nonirq_keyhandlers(unsigned long unused)
 {
@@ -567,7 +573,7 @@ void __init initialize_keytable(void)
     register_keyhandler('l', &spinlock_printall_keyhandler);
     register_keyhandler('L', &spinlock_reset_keyhandler);
 #endif
-
+    register_keyhandler('x', &xsplice_printall_keyhandler);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/xen/common/sysctl.c b/xen/common/sysctl.c
index f1c0c76..641bb25 100644
--- a/xen/common/sysctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/sysctl.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <xsm/xsm.h>
 #include <xen/pmstat.h>
 #include <xen/gcov.h>
+#include <xen/xsplice.h>
 
 long do_sysctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_sysctl_t) u_sysctl)
 {
@@ -399,6 +400,10 @@ long do_sysctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_sysctl_t) u_sysctl)
         ret = sysctl_coverage_op(&op->u.coverage_op);
         break;
 #endif
+    case XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op:
+        ret = xsplice_control(&op->u.xsplice);
+        copyback = 1;
+        break;
 
 #ifdef HAS_PCI
     case XEN_SYSCTL_pcitopoinfo:
diff --git a/xen/common/xsplice.c b/xen/common/xsplice.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e816394
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/common/xsplice.c
@@ -0,0 +1,405 @@
+/*
+ * xSplice - Copyright Oracle Corp. Inc 2015.
+ *
+ * Author: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+ */
+
+/* TODO: Sort includes .*/
+#include <xen/smp.h>
+#include <xen/keyhandler.h>
+#include <xen/spinlock.h>
+#include <xen/mm.h>
+#include <xen/list.h>
+#include <xen/guest_access.h>
+#include <xen/stdbool.h>
+#include <xen/sched.h>
+#include <xen/lib.h>
+#include <xen/xsplice.h>
+#include <public/sysctl.h>
+
+#include <asm/event.h>
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(payload_list_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(payload_list);
+static unsigned int payload_cnt;
+static unsigned int payload_version = 1;
+static int _debug = 1;
+#define where() { if (_debug) printk("%s:%d\n", __func__, __LINE__); }
+
+struct payload {
+    char  id[XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE]; /* Unique id. */
+    int32_t    status; /* XSPLICE_STATUS_* or Exx type value. */
+    int32_t    old_status; /* XSPLICE_STATUS_* or Exx type value. */
+
+    uint32_t    cmd; /* Action request. XSPLICE_ACTION_* */
+    struct spinlock cmd_lock; /* Lock against the action. */
+
+    uint8_t     *raw;   /* Pointer to Elf file. */
+    ssize_t     size;   /* Size of 'raw'. */
+
+    struct tasklet tasklet;
+    struct list_head   list;   /* Linked to 'payload_list'. */
+};
+
+static const char *status2str(int64_t status)
+{
+#define STATUS(x) [XSPLICE_STATUS_##x] = #x
+    static const char *const names[] = {
+            STATUS(LOADED),
+            STATUS(PROGRESS),
+            STATUS(CHECKED),
+            STATUS(APPLIED),
+            STATUS(REVERTED),
+    };
+
+    if (status >= ARRAY_SIZE(names))
+        return "unknown";
+
+    if (status < 0)
+        return "-EXX";
+
+    if (!names[status])
+        return "unknown";
+
+    return names[status];
+}
+
+void xsplice_printall(unsigned char key)
+{
+    struct payload *data;
+
+    spin_lock(&payload_list_lock);
+
+    list_for_each_entry ( data, &payload_list, list )
+    {
+        printk(" id=%s status=%s(%d,old=%d): \n", data->id,
+               status2str(data->status), data->status, data->old_status);
+    }
+    spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+}
+
+struct payload *find_payload(const char *id, bool_t need_lock)
+{
+    struct payload *data, *found = NULL;
+
+    if ( need_lock )
+        spin_lock(&payload_list_lock);
+
+    list_for_each_entry ( data, &payload_list, list )
+    {
+        if ( !strncmp(data->id, id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE) )
+        {
+            found = data;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( need_lock )
+        spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+
+    return found;
+}
+
+static int verify_payload(xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload_t *upload)
+{
+    if ( upload->id[0] == '\0' )
+    {
+        where();
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+    if ( upload->size == 0 )
+    {
+        where();
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+    if ( !guest_handle_okay(upload->payload, upload->size) )
+    {
+        where();
+        return -EFAULT;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We MUST be holding the spinlock.
+ */
+static void __free_payload(struct payload *data)
+{
+
+    free_xenheap_pages(data->raw, get_order_from_bytes(data->size));
+    list_del(&data->list);
+    payload_cnt --;
+    payload_version ++;
+    tasklet_kill(&data->tasklet);
+    xfree(data);
+}
+#include <xen/delay.h>
+static void xsplice_tasklet(unsigned long _data)
+{
+    struct payload *data = (struct payload *)_data;
+
+    /* TODO: Remove it. */
+    mdelay(1000);
+
+    spin_lock(&data->cmd_lock);
+    switch ( data->cmd ) {
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK:
+            /* Do the operation here. */
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED;
+            break;
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY:
+            /* TODO: Well, do the work :-) */
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED;
+            break;
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT:
+            /* TODO: Well, do the work :-) */
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED;
+            break;
+    default:
+            data->status = -EINVAL;
+    }
+    spin_unlock(&data->cmd_lock);
+}
+
+static int xsplice_upload(xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload_t *upload)
+{
+    struct payload *data;
+    uint8_t *raw = NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = verify_payload(upload);
+    if ( rc )
+        return rc;
+
+    /*
+     * Compute the size of the structures which need to be verified.
+     */
+
+    data = find_payload(upload->id, true);
+    if ( data )
+    {
+        where();
+        return -EEXIST;
+    }
+    rc = -ENOMEM;
+    data = xzalloc(struct payload);
+    if ( !data )
+    {
+        where();
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+    raw = alloc_xenheap_pages(get_order_from_bytes(upload->size), 0);
+    if ( !raw )
+    {
+        printk("%s: alloc for %ld bytes, %d order\n", __func__, upload->size, get_order_from_bytes(upload->size));
+        xfree(data);
+        return rc;
+    }
+    if ( copy_from_guest(raw, upload->payload, upload->size) )
+    {
+        rc = -EFAULT;
+        goto err_out;
+    }
+
+    printk("%s: size %ld %p [%02x %02x ..] \n", __func__, upload->size,
+           raw, (unsigned int)raw[0], (unsigned int)raw[1]);
+
+    /* TODO: Verify signature . */
+    memcpy(data->id, upload->id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+    data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED;
+    INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->list);
+    data->raw = raw;
+    data->size = upload->size;
+    spin_lock_init(&data->cmd_lock);
+    data->cmd = 0;
+    tasklet_init(&data->tasklet, xsplice_tasklet, (unsigned long)data);
+
+    spin_lock(&payload_list_lock);
+    list_add_tail(&data->list, &payload_list);
+    payload_cnt ++;
+    payload_version ++;
+    spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+
+    return 0;
+
+ err_out:
+    if ( raw )
+        free_xenheap_pages(raw, get_order_from_bytes(upload->size));
+    if ( data )
+        xfree(data);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int xsplice_get(xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t *summary)
+{
+    struct payload *data;
+
+    if ( summary->status )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    data = find_payload(summary->id, true);
+    if ( !data )
+        return -ENOENT;
+
+    summary->status = data->status;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int xsplice_list(xen_sysctl_xsplice_list_t *list)
+{
+    xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t summary;
+    struct payload *data;
+    unsigned int idx = 0, i = 0;
+    int rc = 0;
+    unsigned int ver = payload_version;
+
+    // TODO: Increase to 64. Leave 4 for debug.
+    if ( list->nr > 4 )
+        return -E2BIG;
+
+    if ( guest_handle_is_null(list->summary) )
+        return -EINVAL;
+
+    spin_lock(&payload_list_lock);
+    if ( list->idx > payload_cnt )
+    {
+        spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+        where();
+        return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
+    list_for_each_entry( data, &payload_list, list )
+    {
+        if ( list->idx > i++ )
+            continue;
+
+        /* Copy all of the bytes avoid leaking stack data. */
+        memcpy(summary.id, data->id, XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE);
+        summary.status = data->status;
+
+        /* N.B. 'idx' != 'i'. */
+        if ( copy_to_guest_offset(list->summary, idx++, &summary, 1) )
+        {
+            rc = -EFAULT;
+            break;
+        }
+        if ( hypercall_preempt_check() || (idx + 1 > list->nr) )
+        {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    list->nr = payload_cnt - i; /* Remaining amount. */
+    spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+    list->version = ver;
+
+    /* And how many we have processed. */
+    return rc ? rc : idx;
+}
+
+static int xsplice_action(xen_sysctl_xsplice_action_t *action)
+{
+    struct payload *data;
+    int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+    if ( action->id[0] == '\0' )
+        return rc;
+
+    spin_lock(&payload_list_lock);
+    data = find_payload(action->id, false /* we are holding the lock. */);
+    if ( !data )
+    {
+        rc = -ENOENT;
+        goto out;
+    }
+    if ( action->cmd != XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD )
+        spin_lock(&data->cmd_lock);
+
+    switch ( action->cmd )
+    {
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK:
+        if ( ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED ) )
+        {
+            data->old_status = data->status;
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS;
+            data->cmd = action->cmd;
+            tasklet_schedule(&data->tasklet);
+            rc = 0;
+        } else if ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED )
+        {
+            rc = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD:
+        if ( ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED ) ||
+             ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED ) ||
+             ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED ) )
+        {
+            __free_payload(data);
+            /* No touching 'data' from here on! */
+            rc = 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT:
+        if ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED )
+        {
+            data->old_status = data->status;
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS;
+            data->cmd = action->cmd;
+            rc = 0;
+            /* TODO: Tasklet is not good for this. We need a different vehicle. */
+            tasklet_schedule(&data->tasklet);
+        }
+        break;
+    case XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY:
+        if ( ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED ) ||
+             ( data->status == XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED ))
+        {
+            data->old_status = data->status;
+            data->status = XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS;
+            data->cmd = action->cmd;
+            rc = 0;
+            /* TODO: Tasklet is not good for this. We need a different vehicle. */
+            tasklet_schedule(&data->tasklet);
+        }
+        break;
+    default:
+        rc = -ENOSYS;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if ( action->cmd != XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD )
+        spin_unlock(&data->cmd_lock);
+ out:
+    spin_unlock(&payload_list_lock);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int xsplice_control(xen_sysctl_xsplice_op_t *xsplice)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    switch ( xsplice->cmd )
+    {
+    case XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD:
+        rc = xsplice_upload(&xsplice->u.upload);
+        break;
+    case XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET:
+        rc = xsplice_get(&xsplice->u.get);
+        break;
+    case XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST:
+        rc = xsplice_list(&xsplice->u.list);
+        break;
+    case XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION:
+        rc = xsplice_action(&xsplice->u.action);
+        break;
+    default:
+        rc = -ENOSYS;
+        break;
+   }
+
+    return rc;
+}
diff --git a/xen/include/public/sysctl.h b/xen/include/public/sysctl.h
index 58c9be2..48dd511 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/sysctl.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/sysctl.h
@@ -710,6 +710,70 @@ struct xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op {
 typedef struct xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op_t;
 DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op_t);
 
+/*
+ * XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_op
+ *
+ */
+#define XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_UPLOAD 0
+#define XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE 40
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload {
+    char        id[XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE];    /* IN, name of the patch. */
+    uint64_t    size;                       /* IN, size of the ELF file. */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(uint8) payload;     /* IN, the ELF file. */
+};
+typedef struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload_t);
+
+#define XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_GET 1
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary {
+    char        id[XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE];    /* IN, name of the patch. */
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_LOADED       0x01
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_PROGRESS     0x02
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_CHECKED      0x04
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_APPLIED      0x08
+#define XSPLICE_STATUS_REVERTED     0x10
+ /* Any negative value is an error. The error would be in -EXX format. */
+	int32_t status;   /* OUT, On IN has to be zero. */
+};
+typedef struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t);
+
+#define XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_LIST 2
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_list {
+    uint32_t version;           /* OUT. */
+    uint32_t idx;               /* IN/OUT */
+    uint32_t nr;                /* IN/OUT */
+    XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t) summary;  /* OUT */
+};
+typedef struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_list xen_sysctl_xsplice_list_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_xsplice_list_t);
+
+#define XEN_SYSCTL_XSPLICE_ACTION 3
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_action {
+    char        id[XEN_XSPLICE_ID_SIZE];    /* IN, name of the patch. */
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_CHECK        1
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_UNLOAD       2
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_REVERT       3
+#define XSPLICE_ACTION_APPLY        4
+    uint32_t    cmd; /* IN */
+    uint64_aligned_t time;  /* IN */
+};
+typedef struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_action xen_sysctl_xsplice_action_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_xsplice_action_t);
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op {
+    uint32_t cmd; /* IN */
+    union {
+        xen_sysctl_xsplice_upload_t upload;
+        xen_sysctl_xsplice_list_t list;
+        xen_sysctl_xsplice_summary_t get;
+        xen_sysctl_xsplice_action_t action;
+    } u;
+};
+typedef struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op xen_sysctl_xsplice_op_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_sysctl_xsplice_op_t);
+
 struct xen_sysctl {
     uint32_t cmd;
 #define XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole                    1
@@ -734,6 +798,7 @@ struct xen_sysctl {
 #define XEN_SYSCTL_psr_cmt_op                    21
 #define XEN_SYSCTL_pcitopoinfo                   22
 #define XEN_SYSCTL_psr_cat_op                    23
+#define XEN_SYSCTL_xsplice_op                    24
     uint32_t interface_version; /* XEN_SYSCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION */
     union {
         struct xen_sysctl_readconsole       readconsole;
@@ -758,6 +823,7 @@ struct xen_sysctl {
         struct xen_sysctl_coverage_op       coverage_op;
         struct xen_sysctl_psr_cmt_op        psr_cmt_op;
         struct xen_sysctl_psr_cat_op        psr_cat_op;
+        struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op        xsplice;
         uint8_t                             pad[128];
     } u;
 };
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/xsplice.h b/xen/include/xen/xsplice.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41e28da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/include/xen/xsplice.h
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#ifndef __XEN_XSPLICE_H__
+#define __XEN_XSPLICE_H__
+
+struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op;
+int xsplice_control(struct xen_sysctl_xsplice_op *);
+
+extern void xsplice_printall(unsigned char key);
+
+#endif /* __XEN_XSPLICE_H__ */
-- 
2.1.0


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