From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 155 (CVE-2015-8550) - paravirtualized drivers incautious about shared memory Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 10:00:24 -0500 Message-ID: <20160104150024.GE9269@char.us.oracle.com> References: <20160104130632.GF4892@mail-itl> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20160104130632.GF4892@mail-itl> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Marek =?iso-8859-1?Q?Marczykowski-G=F3recki?= Cc: security@xen.org, "xen-devel@lists.xen.org" , Stefano Stabellini , Eric Shelton List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 02:06:32PM +0100, Marek Marczykowski-G=F3recki wrot= e: > On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 10:06:25AM -0500, Eric Shelton wrote: > > The XSA mentions that "PV frontend patches will be developed and > > released (publicly) after the embargo date." Has anything been done > > towards this that should also be incorporated into MiniOS? On a > > system utilizing a "driver domain," where a backend is running on a > > domain that is considered unprivileged and untrusted (such as the > > example described in http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Driver_Domain), > > it seems XSA-155-style double fetch vulnerabilities in the frontends > > are also a potential security concern, and should be eliminated. > > However, perhaps that does not include pcifront, since pciback would > > always be running in dom0. > = > And BTW the same applies to Linux frontends, for which also I haven't seen > any public development. In attachment my email to > xen-security-issues-discuss list (sent during embargo), with patches > attached there. I haven't got any response. Could you post it using git-send-email please? I took a quick glance at them but didn't get a chance to do an indepth look.