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From: "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: security@xen.org,
	"xen-devel@lists.xen.org" <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>,
	Eric Shelton <eshelton@pobox.com>
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 155 (CVE-2015-8550) - paravirtualized drivers incautious about shared memory
Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2016 17:56:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160104165628.GU4892@mail-itl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <568A9C48.6000904@citrix.com>


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On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 04:22:32PM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 04/01/16 13:06, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> > On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 10:06:25AM -0500, Eric Shelton wrote:
> >> The XSA mentions that "PV frontend patches will be developed and
> >> released (publicly) after the embargo date."  Has anything been done
> >> towards this that should also be incorporated into MiniOS?  On a
> >> system utilizing a "driver domain," where a backend is running on a
> >> domain that is considered unprivileged and untrusted (such as the
> >> example described in http://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Driver_Domain),
> >> it seems XSA-155-style double fetch vulnerabilities in the frontends
> >> are also a potential security concern, and should be eliminated.
> >> However, perhaps that does not include pcifront, since pciback would
> >> always be running in dom0.
> > 
> > And BTW the same applies to Linux frontends, for which also I haven't seen
> > any public development. In attachment my email to
> > xen-security-issues-discuss list (sent during embargo), with patches
> > attached there. I haven't got any response.
> 
> There are no similar security concerns with frontends since they trust
> the backend.
> 
> I note that you say:
> 
>   "But in some cases (namely: if driver domains are in use), frontends
>    may be more trusted/privileged than backends."
> 
> But this cannot be the case since the backend can always trivially DoS
> the frontend by (for example) not unmapping grant references when
> required by the protocol.

DoS is one thing, code execution is another.

-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-04 16:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-21 23:10 Xen Security Advisory 155 (CVE-2015-8550) - paravirtualized drivers incautious about shared memory Eric Shelton
2015-12-22 12:24 ` Stefano Stabellini
2015-12-22 13:19   ` Samuel Thibault
2015-12-22 15:06   ` Eric Shelton
2016-01-04 13:06     ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2016-01-04 15:00       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-01-04 16:22       ` David Vrabel
2016-01-04 16:56         ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki [this message]
2016-01-04 17:37           ` David Vrabel

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