From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>,
Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
Xen-devel List <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [xen-unstable bisection] complete test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 15:00:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161031150005.GY30231@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <641c016e-0f64-8a27-2d20-459d7fec80ab@citrix.com>
On Sun, Oct 30, 2016 at 04:53:33PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 30/10/16 04:29, osstest service owner wrote:
> > branch xen-unstable
> > xenbranch xen-unstable
> > job test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm
> > testid debian-hvm-install
> >
> > Tree: linux git://xenbits.xen.org/linux-pvops.git
> > Tree: linuxfirmware git://xenbits.xen.org/osstest/linux-firmware.git
> > Tree: qemu git://xenbits.xen.org/qemu-xen-traditional.git
> > Tree: qemuu git://xenbits.xen.org/qemu-xen.git
> > Tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
> >
> > *** Found and reproduced problem changeset ***
> >
> > Bug is in tree: xen git://xenbits.xen.org/xen.git
> > Bug introduced: 0897514b4b376a167f968f79c6ea0dee1061458e
> > Bug not present: 4000a7c7d7b0e01837abd3918e393f289c07d68c
> > Last fail repro: http://logs.test-lab.xenproject.org/osstest/logs/101803/
> >
> >
> > commit 0897514b4b376a167f968f79c6ea0dee1061458e
> > Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> > Date: Wed Oct 26 10:34:21 2016 +0100
> >
> > tools/oxenstored: Avoid allocating invalid transaction ids
>
> I have to admit that I am staring at this report in belief, but it is
> apparently deterministic. It is very strange that only this job is
> affected; if there was actually a problem with xenstore transactions, I
> would have thought that there to be collateral damage everywhere.
>
> Looking through the logs, there are several concerning things happening
> even in the success cases.
>
> First:
>
> (XEN) HVM1 restore: CPU 0
> (XEN) avc: denied { getvcpucontext } for domid=0 target=2
> scontext=system_u:system_r:dom0_t tcontext=system_u:system_r:dm_dom_t
> tclass=domain
>
> The toolstack calls getvcpucontext as part of domain creation, and the
> XSM policy disallows this on dm_dom_t's. Interestingly, this failure
> doesn't appear to be fatal to domain creation, and it really ought to
> be. I expect there is also another bug lurking in the lower levels of
> the toolstack.
>
No idea about this at the moment.
> Second:
>
> (XEN) Assertion '!in_irq()' failed at xmalloc_tlsf.c:577
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.8.0-rc x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
> <snip>
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08013cf20>] _xmalloc+0x2f/0x313
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08016a6f9>] services.c#context_struct_to_string+0x98/0x16d
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08016c0c2>] security_sid_to_context+0xd3/0xe7
> (XEN) [<ffff82d080162596>] hooks.c#flask_show_security_evtchn+0x6f/0x87
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08010819a>] event_channel.c#dump_evtchn_info+0x246/0x2cb
> (XEN) [<ffff82d080116271>] handle_keypress+0x8c/0xac
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08014600b>] console.c#__serial_rx+0x38/0x73
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801467ea>] console.c#serial_rx+0x8a/0x8f
> (XEN) [<ffff82d080148b17>] serial_rx_interrupt+0x90/0xac
> (XEN) [<ffff82d08014756a>] ns16550.c#ns16550_interrupt+0x57/0x71
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801839fb>] do_IRQ+0x56e/0x60f
> (XEN) [<ffff82d080254d67>] common_interrupt+0x67/0x70
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801cd586>] mwait-idle.c#mwait_idle+0x2af/0x2f9
>
> The 'e' debugkey isn't safe to use when XSM is compiled in, as
> security_sid_to_context() allocates memory.
>
This can not be easily fixed without reworking the XSM framework API. I
propose we just disable the offending snippet.
> Furthermore, any unexpected host crashes should cause a failure of the
> test. This appears to have gone unnoticed because it happens in the
> capture-logs phase, with presumably sufficient timeouts that OSSTest
> doesn't notice that the host rebooted in the middle of log collection.
>
> Third:
>
> (d2) **************************
> (d2) blk_open(/local/domain/2/device/vbd/5632) -> 6
> (d2) xs_watch(device-model/1/logdirty/cmd, logdirty)
> (d2) xs_watch(device-model/1/command, dm-command)
> (d2) xs_watch(/local/domain/1/cpu, vcpu-set)
> (d2) xs_read(/local/domain/0/backend/pci/1/0/msitranslate): ENOENT
> (d2) xs_read(/local/domain/0/backend/pci/1/0/power_mgmt): ENOENT
> (d2) open(/var/log/dm-serial.log) -> 7
> (d2) fcntl(-1, 3, 3ffbc8/17775710)
> (d2) fcntl(-1, 4, ffffffff/37777777777)
> (d2) fcntl(7, 3, ffffffff/37777777777)
> (d2) fcntl(7, 4, ffffffff/37777777777)
> (d2) xs_watch(/local/domain/0/backend/console/1, be:0x14b1a7:1:0x186800)
> (d2) xs_directory(/local/domain/0/backend/console/1): EACCES
> (d2) xs_watch(/local/domain/0/backend/vkbd/1, be:0x1479ff:1:0x1867c0)
> (d2) xs_directory(/local/domain/0/backend/vkbd/1): EACCES
> (d2) xs_read(device-model/1/disable_pf): ENOENT
> (d2) xs_watch(/local/domain/1/log-throttling,
> /local/domain/1/log-throttling)
> (d2) Thread "kbdfront": pointer: 0x0xb0182570, stack: 0x0xaa0000
> (d2) ******************* FBFRONT for /local/domain/2/device/vfb/0 **********
>
> The stub qemu attempts to read d1's backends. It probably shouldn't be
> doing that.
>
This is (supposedly) harmless, so a low priority bug.
Wei.
>
> Comparing the xenstored-access logs, between the success and failure
> cases, it does appear that in the failing case, all transactions have
> the id 1. I am trying to debug why.
>
> ~Andrew
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-31 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-30 4:29 [xen-unstable bisection] complete test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-stubdom-debianhvm-amd64-xsm osstest service owner
2016-10-30 16:53 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-10-31 15:00 ` Wei Liu [this message]
2016-10-30 17:31 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-10-31 10:31 ` Ian Jackson
2016-10-31 10:37 ` Andrew Cooper
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-12-10 19:11 osstest service owner
2022-11-20 8:28 osstest service owner
2021-08-21 23:29 osstest service owner
2020-11-12 12:29 osstest service owner
2020-04-10 1:43 osstest service owner
2018-04-04 9:19 osstest service owner
2017-03-01 23:53 osstest service owner
2017-03-02 10:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2017-03-02 10:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-03-02 11:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2016-01-15 1:42 osstest service owner
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