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From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/18] x86/pv: clean up emulate_ops.c
Date: Fri, 5 May 2017 15:48:23 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170505144836.8612-6-wei.liu2@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170505144836.8612-1-wei.liu2@citrix.com>

Replace bool_t with bool.

Change check_stack_limit to return bool.

Fix some coding style issues.

Undef TOGGLE_MODE when it is no longer needed.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate_ops.c | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate_ops.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate_ops.c
index 5f0965e05b..97c8d14859 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate_ops.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate_ops.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static int read_descriptor(unsigned int sel,
                            unsigned long *base,
                            unsigned long *limit,
                            unsigned int *ar,
-                           bool_t insn_fetch)
+                           bool insn_fetch)
 {
     struct desc_struct desc;
 
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static int priv_op_read_segment(enum x86_segment seg,
 }
 
 /* Perform IOPL check between the vcpu's shadowed IOPL, and the assumed cpl. */
-static bool_t iopl_ok(const struct vcpu *v, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static bool iopl_ok(const struct vcpu *v, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     unsigned int cpl = guest_kernel_mode(v, regs) ?
         (VM_ASSIST(v->domain, architectural_iopl) ? 0 : 1) : 3;
@@ -318,9 +318,8 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
 }
 
 /* Has the guest requested sufficient permission for this I/O access? */
-static int guest_io_okay(
-    unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
-    struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static int guest_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
+                         struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     /* If in user mode, switch to kernel mode just to read I/O bitmap. */
     int user_mode = !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
@@ -353,11 +352,13 @@ static int guest_io_okay(
             return 1;
     }
 
+#undef TOGGLE_MODE
     return 0;
 }
 
 static unsigned int check_guest_io_breakpoint(struct vcpu *v,
-    unsigned int port, unsigned int len)
+                                              unsigned int port,
+                                              unsigned int len)
 {
     unsigned int width, i, match = 0;
     unsigned long start;
@@ -392,8 +393,8 @@ static unsigned int check_guest_io_breakpoint(struct vcpu *v,
 }
 
 /* Has the administrator granted sufficient permission for this I/O access? */
-static bool_t admin_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
-                            const struct domain *d)
+static bool admin_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
+                          const struct domain *d)
 {
     /*
      * Port 0xcf8 (CONFIG_ADDRESS) is only visible for DWORD accesses.
@@ -409,8 +410,8 @@ static bool_t admin_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
     return ioports_access_permitted(d, port, port + bytes - 1);
 }
 
-static bool_t pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
-                         unsigned int size, uint32_t *write)
+static bool pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
+                       unsigned int size, uint32_t *write)
 {
     uint32_t machine_bdf;
 
@@ -518,7 +519,8 @@ void guest_io_write(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes, uint32_t data,
 {
     if ( admin_io_okay(port, bytes, currd) )
     {
-        switch ( bytes ) {
+        switch ( bytes )
+        {
         case 1:
             outb((uint8_t)data, port);
             if ( pv_post_outb_hook )
@@ -1587,8 +1589,8 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned int gate_sel,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_stack_limit(unsigned int ar, unsigned int limit,
-                                    unsigned int esp, unsigned int decr)
+static inline bool check_stack_limit(unsigned int ar, unsigned int limit,
+                                     unsigned int esp, unsigned int decr)
 {
     return (((esp - decr) < (esp - 1)) &&
             (!(ar & _SEGMENT_EC) ? (esp - 1) <= limit : (esp - decr) > limit));
-- 
2.11.0


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-05-05 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-05 14:48 [PATCH v2 00/18] Refactor x86 trap handling code Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] x86/traps: factor out pv_percpu_traps_init Wei Liu
2017-05-05 16:12   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-12 12:00     ` Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] x86/traps: export trapstr Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] x86/traps: lift do_guest_trap to domain.h Wei Liu
2017-05-12 18:16   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-12 18:26     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-15  7:50     ` Jan Beulich
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] x86/traps: move all PV emulation code to pv/emulate_ops.h Wei Liu
2017-05-11 10:18   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-12 12:00     ` Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` Wei Liu [this message]
2017-05-11 11:22   ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86/pv: clean up emulate_ops.c Andrew Cooper
2017-05-12 12:02     ` Wei Liu
2017-05-12 12:03       ` Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86/traps: move PV hypercall handlers to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] x86/traps: move pv_inject_event " Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] x86/traps: move set_guest_{machinecheck, nmi}_trapbounce Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] x86/traps: move {un, }register_guest_nmi_callback Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] x86/traps: delcare percpu softirq_trap Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] x86/traps: move guest_has_trap_callback to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] x86/traps: move send_guest_trap " Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] x86/traps: move PV specific code in x86_64/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] x86/traps: merge x86_64/compat/traps.c into pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] x86: clean up pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] x86: guest_has_trap_callback should return bool Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] x86: fix coding style issues in asm-x86/traps.h Wei Liu
2017-05-05 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] x86: clean up traps.c Wei Liu
2017-05-09 10:50 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] Refactor x86 trap handling code Andrew Cooper

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