xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 06/27] x86: clean up PV emulation code
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 18:11:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170608171203.20416-7-wei.liu2@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170608171203.20416-1-wei.liu2@citrix.com>

Replace bool_t with bool. Fix coding style issues. Add spaces around
binary ops. Use 1U for shifting. Eliminate TOGGLE_MODE.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c |  5 ++-
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
index 97a4b31a56..cdf3b308f2 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-gate-op.c
@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned int gate_sel,
     struct desc_struct desc;
     const struct desc_struct *pdesc;
 
-
     pdesc = (const struct desc_struct *)
         (!(gate_sel & 4) ? GDT_VIRT_START(v) : LDT_VIRT_START(v))
         + (gate_sel >> 3);
@@ -97,8 +96,8 @@ static int read_gate_descriptor(unsigned int gate_sel,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_stack_limit(unsigned int ar, unsigned int limit,
-                                    unsigned int esp, unsigned int decr)
+static inline bool check_stack_limit(unsigned int ar, unsigned int limit,
+                                     unsigned int esp, unsigned int decr)
 {
     return (((esp - decr) < (esp - 1)) &&
             (!(ar & _SEGMENT_EC) ? (esp - 1) <= limit : (esp - decr) > limit));
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
index fd5fd74bd1..85185b6b29 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct priv_op_ctxt {
 #define TSC_AUX 2
 };
 
-/* I/O emulation support. Helper routines for, and type of, the stack stub.*/
+/* I/O emulation support. Helper routines for, and type of, the stack stub. */
 void host_to_guest_gpr_switch(struct cpu_user_regs *);
 unsigned long guest_to_host_gpr_switch(unsigned long);
 
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
 
 
 /* Perform IOPL check between the vcpu's shadowed IOPL, and the assumed cpl. */
-static bool_t iopl_ok(const struct vcpu *v, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static bool iopl_ok(const struct vcpu *v, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     unsigned int cpl = guest_kernel_mode(v, regs) ?
         (VM_ASSIST(v->domain, architectural_iopl) ? 0 : 1) : 3;
@@ -112,16 +112,14 @@ static bool_t iopl_ok(const struct vcpu *v, const struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 }
 
 /* Has the guest requested sufficient permission for this I/O access? */
-static int guest_io_okay(
-    unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
-    struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+static bool guest_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
+                          struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     /* If in user mode, switch to kernel mode just to read I/O bitmap. */
-    int user_mode = !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
-#define TOGGLE_MODE() if ( user_mode ) toggle_guest_mode(v)
+    const bool user_mode = !(v->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
 
     if ( iopl_ok(v, regs) )
-        return 1;
+        return true;
 
     if ( v->arch.pv_vcpu.iobmp_limit > (port + bytes) )
     {
@@ -131,7 +129,9 @@ static int guest_io_okay(
          * Grab permission bytes from guest space. Inaccessible bytes are
          * read as 0xff (no access allowed).
          */
-        TOGGLE_MODE();
+        if ( user_mode )
+            toggle_guest_mode(v);
+
         switch ( __copy_from_guest_offset(x.bytes, v->arch.pv_vcpu.iobmp,
                                           port>>3, 2) )
         {
@@ -141,43 +141,45 @@ static int guest_io_okay(
             /* fallthrough */
         case 0:  break;
         }
-        TOGGLE_MODE();
 
-        if ( (x.mask & (((1<<bytes)-1) << (port&7))) == 0 )
-            return 1;
+        if ( user_mode )
+            toggle_guest_mode(v);
+
+        if ( (x.mask & (((1 << bytes) - 1) << (port & 7))) == 0 )
+            return true;
     }
 
-    return 0;
+    return false;
 }
 
 /* Has the administrator granted sufficient permission for this I/O access? */
-static bool_t admin_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
-                            const struct domain *d)
+static bool admin_io_okay(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
+                          const struct domain *d)
 {
     /*
      * Port 0xcf8 (CONFIG_ADDRESS) is only visible for DWORD accesses.
      * We never permit direct access to that register.
      */
     if ( (port == 0xcf8) && (bytes == 4) )
-        return 0;
+        return false;
 
     /* We also never permit direct access to the RTC/CMOS registers. */
     if ( ((port & ~1) == RTC_PORT(0)) )
-        return 0;
+        return false;
 
     return ioports_access_permitted(d, port, port + bytes - 1);
 }
 
-static bool_t pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
-                         unsigned int size, uint32_t *write)
+static bool pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
+                       unsigned int size, uint32_t *write)
 {
     uint32_t machine_bdf;
 
     if ( !is_hardware_domain(currd) )
-        return 0;
+        return false;
 
     if ( !CF8_ENABLED(currd->arch.pci_cf8) )
-        return 1;
+        return true;
 
     machine_bdf = CF8_BDF(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
     if ( write )
@@ -185,7 +187,7 @@ static bool_t pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
         const unsigned long *ro_map = pci_get_ro_map(0);
 
         if ( ro_map && test_bit(machine_bdf, ro_map) )
-            return 0;
+            return false;
     }
     start |= CF8_ADDR_LO(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
     /* AMD extended configuration space access? */
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ static bool_t pci_cfg_ok(struct domain *currd, unsigned int start,
         uint64_t msr_val;
 
         if ( rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG, msr_val) )
-            return 0;
+            return false;
         if ( msr_val & (1ULL << AMD64_NB_CFG_CF8_EXT_ENABLE_BIT) )
             start |= CF8_ADDR_HI(currd->arch.pci_cf8);
     }
@@ -273,7 +275,8 @@ uint32_t guest_io_read(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes,
 }
 
 static unsigned int check_guest_io_breakpoint(struct vcpu *v,
-    unsigned int port, unsigned int len)
+                                              unsigned int port,
+                                              unsigned int len)
 {
     unsigned int width, i, match = 0;
     unsigned long start;
@@ -301,7 +304,7 @@ static unsigned int check_guest_io_breakpoint(struct vcpu *v,
         }
 
         if ( (start < (port + len)) && ((start + width) > port) )
-            match |= 1 << i;
+            match |= 1u << i;
     }
 
     return match;
@@ -342,7 +345,8 @@ void guest_io_write(unsigned int port, unsigned int bytes, uint32_t data,
 {
     if ( admin_io_okay(port, bytes, currd) )
     {
-        switch ( bytes ) {
+        switch ( bytes )
+        {
         case 1:
             outb((uint8_t)data, port);
             if ( pv_post_outb_hook )
@@ -741,7 +745,7 @@ static int priv_op_write_cr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long val,
         if ( (val ^ read_cr0()) & ~X86_CR0_TS )
         {
             gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
-                    "Attempt to change unmodifiable CR0 flags\n");
+                     "Attempt to change unmodifiable CR0 flags\n");
             break;
         }
         do_fpu_taskswitch(!!(val & X86_CR0_TS));
@@ -948,16 +952,16 @@ static int priv_op_read_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t *val,
             *val |= MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING;
         return X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
-    case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0)...MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
-    case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(0)...MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(3):
-    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0...MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2:
-    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL...MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
+    case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0) ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
+    case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(0) ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(3):
+    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 ... MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2:
+    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL ... MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
         if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
         {
             vpmu_msr = true;
             /* fall through */
-    case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
-    case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0...MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+    case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
+    case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
             if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
             {
                 if ( vpmu_do_rdmsr(reg, val) )
@@ -1153,15 +1157,15 @@ static int priv_op_write_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t val,
         curr->arch.cpuid_faulting = !!(val & MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING);
         return X86EMUL_OKAY;
 
-    case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0)...MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
-    case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(0)...MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(3):
-    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0...MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2:
-    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL...MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
+    case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0) ... MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
+    case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(0) ... MSR_P6_EVNTSEL(3):
+    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 ... MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2:
+    case MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL ... MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL:
         if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
         {
             vpmu_msr = true;
-    case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0...MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
-    case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0...MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
+    case MSR_AMD_FAM15H_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_AMD_FAM15H_PERFCTR5:
+    case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
             if ( vpmu_msr || (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) )
             {
                 if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) &&
-- 
2.11.0


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-08 17:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-08 17:11 [PATCH v4 00/27] x86: refactor trap handling code Wei Liu
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 01/27] x86: factor out common PV emulation code Wei Liu
2017-06-20 16:00   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 02/27] x86: move PV privileged instruction " Wei Liu
2017-06-20 16:03   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 03/27] x86: move PV gate op " Wei Liu
2017-06-20 16:05   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 04/27] x86: move PV invalid " Wei Liu
2017-06-20 16:21   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-20 16:25     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-21  6:15       ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-21  8:57         ` Wei Liu
2017-06-21  9:09           ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-21  9:14             ` Wei Liu
2017-06-21  9:26               ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-21  9:29                 ` Wei Liu
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 05/27] x86/traps: remove now unused inclusion of emulate.h Wei Liu
2017-06-20 16:21   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-08 17:11 ` Wei Liu [this message]
2017-06-23 10:56   ` [PATCH v4 06/27] x86: clean up PV emulation code Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 07/27] x86: move do_set_trap_table to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 11:00   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 13:59     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-23 13:59       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 08/27] x86: move some misc PV hypercalls to misc-hypercalls.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 11:02   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 09/27] x86/traps: move pv_inject_event to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 11:04   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 10/27] x86/traps: move set_guest_{machine, nmi}_trapbounce Wei Liu
2017-06-23 11:05   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 11/27] x86:/traps: move {un, }register_guest_nmi_callback Wei Liu
2017-06-23 11:38   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 12:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 12/27] x86/traps: move guest_has_trap_callback to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:01   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 13/27] x86: move toggle_guest_mode to pv/domain.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:10   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 14/27] x86: move do_iret to pv/iret.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:12   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 14:17     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-23 14:17       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 15/27] x86: move callback_op code to pv/callback.c Wei Liu
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 16/27] x86/traps: factor out pv_trap_init Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 13:55     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 17/27] x86/traps: move some PV specific functions and struct to pv/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:36   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 18/27] x86/traps: move init_int80_direct_trap " Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:37   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 19/27] x86: move hypercall_page_initialise_ring3_kernel to pv/hypercall.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:41   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 14:49     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-23 14:53       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 20/27] x86: move hypercall_page_initialise_ring1_kernel Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:41   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 13:56     ` Wei Liu
2017-06-23 13:56       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 21/27] x86: move compat_set_trap_table along side the non-compat variant Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:43   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 22/27] x86: move compat_iret along side its " Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:44   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:11 ` [PATCH v4 23/27] x86: move the compat callback ops next to the " Wei Liu
2017-06-23 13:40   ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 24/27] x86: move compat_show_guest_statck near its " Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:47   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 25/27] x86: remove the now empty x86_64/compat/traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:47   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 26/27] x86: fix coding a style issue in asm-x86/traps.h Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:48   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-08 17:12 ` [PATCH v4 27/27] x86: clean up traps.c Wei Liu
2017-06-23 12:50   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-06-23 13:45     ` Jan Beulich

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170608171203.20416-7-wei.liu2@citrix.com \
    --to=wei.liu2@citrix.com \
    --cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).