[PATCH v5 12/23] x86/mm: move and rename map_ldt_shadow_page

[Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>]

Add pv prefix to it. Move it to pv/mm.c. Fix call sites.

Take the chance to change v to curr and d to currd.

Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c           | 73 -------------------------------------------
 xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c        | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c        |  4 +--
 xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h    |  2 --
 xen/include/asm-x86/pv/mm.h |  4 +++
 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index bfdba34468..8e25d15631 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -526,27 +526,6 @@ void update_cr3(struct vcpu *v)
     make_cr3(v, cr3_mfn);
 }
 
-/*
- * Read the guest's l1e that maps this address, from the kernel-mode
- * page tables.
- */
-static l1_pgentry_t guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(unsigned long linear)
-{
-    struct vcpu *curr = current;
-    const bool user_mode = !(curr->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
-    l1_pgentry_t l1e;
-
-    if ( user_mode )
-        toggle_guest_mode(curr);
-
-    l1e = guest_get_eff_l1e(linear);
-
-    if ( user_mode )
-        toggle_guest_mode(curr);
-
-    return l1e;
-}
-
 static inline void page_set_tlbflush_timestamp(struct page_info *page)
 {
     /*
@@ -615,58 +594,6 @@ static int alloc_segdesc_page(struct page_info *page)
     return i == 512 ? 0 : -EINVAL;
 }
 
-
-/*
- * Map a guest's LDT page (covering the byte at @offset from start of the LDT)
- * into Xen's virtual range.  Returns true if the mapping changed, false
- * otherwise.
- */
-bool map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int offset)
-{
-    struct vcpu *v = current;
-    struct domain *d = v->domain;
-    struct page_info *page;
-    l1_pgentry_t gl1e, *pl1e;
-    unsigned long linear = v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base + offset;
-
-    BUG_ON(unlikely(in_irq()));
-
-    /*
-     * Hardware limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
-     * safe as updates to the LDT can only be made by MMUEXT_SET_LDT to the
-     * current vcpu, and vcpu_reset() will block until this vcpu has been
-     * descheduled before continuing.
-     */
-    ASSERT((offset >> 3) <= v->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents);
-
-    if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(d) )
-        linear = (uint32_t)linear;
-
-    gl1e = guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(linear);
-    if ( unlikely(!(l1e_get_flags(gl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT)) )
-        return false;
-
-    page = get_page_from_gfn(d, l1e_get_pfn(gl1e), NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
-    if ( unlikely(!page) )
-        return false;
-
-    if ( unlikely(!get_page_type(page, PGT_seg_desc_page)) )
-    {
-        put_page(page);
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    pl1e = &pv_ldt_ptes(v)[offset >> PAGE_SHIFT];
-    l1e_add_flags(gl1e, _PAGE_RW);
-
-    spin_lock(&v->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_lock);
-    l1e_write(pl1e, gl1e);
-    v->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_mapcnt++;
-    spin_unlock(&v->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_lock);
-
-    return true;
-}
-
 static int get_page_and_type_from_mfn(
     mfn_t mfn, unsigned long type, struct domain *d,
     int partial, int preemptible)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
index 4bfa322788..6890e80efd 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/mm.c
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 #include <xen/guest_access.h>
 
 #include <asm/current.h>
+#include <asm/p2m.h>
+
+#include "mm.h"
 
 /* Override macros from asm/page.h to make them work with mfn_t */
 #undef mfn_to_page
@@ -58,6 +61,78 @@ l1_pgentry_t *map_guest_l1e(unsigned long linear, mfn_t *gl1mfn)
     return (l1_pgentry_t *)map_domain_page(*gl1mfn) + l1_table_offset(linear);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Read the guest's l1e that maps this address, from the kernel-mode
+ * page tables.
+ */
+static l1_pgentry_t guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(unsigned long linear)
+{
+    struct vcpu *curr = current;
+    const bool user_mode = !(curr->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode);
+    l1_pgentry_t l1e;
+
+    if ( user_mode )
+        toggle_guest_mode(curr);
+
+    l1e = guest_get_eff_l1e(linear);
+
+    if ( user_mode )
+        toggle_guest_mode(curr);
+
+    return l1e;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Map a guest's LDT page (covering the byte at @offset from start of the LDT)
+ * into Xen's virtual range.  Returns true if the mapping changed, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int offset)
+{
+    struct vcpu *curr = current;
+    struct domain *currd = curr->domain;
+    struct page_info *page;
+    l1_pgentry_t gl1e, *pl1e;
+    unsigned long linear = curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_base + offset;
+
+    BUG_ON(unlikely(in_irq()));
+
+    /*
+     * Hardware limit checking should guarantee this property.  NB. This is
+     * safe as updates to the LDT can only be made by MMUEXT_SET_LDT to the
+     * current vcpu, and vcpu_reset() will block until this vcpu has been
+     * descheduled before continuing.
+     */
+    ASSERT((offset >> 3) <= curr->arch.pv_vcpu.ldt_ents);
+
+    if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(currd) )
+        linear = (uint32_t)linear;
+
+    gl1e = guest_get_eff_kern_l1e(linear);
+    if ( unlikely(!(l1e_get_flags(gl1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT)) )
+        return false;
+
+    page = get_page_from_gfn(currd, l1e_get_pfn(gl1e), NULL, P2M_ALLOC);
+    if ( unlikely(!page) )
+        return false;
+
+    if ( unlikely(!get_page_type(page, PGT_seg_desc_page)) )
+    {
+        put_page(page);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    pl1e = &pv_ldt_ptes(curr)[offset >> PAGE_SHIFT];
+    l1e_add_flags(gl1e, _PAGE_RW);
+
+    spin_lock(&curr->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_lock);
+    l1e_write(pl1e, gl1e);
+    curr->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_mapcnt++;
+    spin_unlock(&curr->arch.pv_vcpu.shadow_ldt_lock);
+
+    return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * Local variables:
  * mode: C
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index d84db4acda..d8feef2942 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(unsigned long offset,
     /*
      * If the fault is in another vcpu's area, it cannot be due to
      * a GDT/LDT descriptor load. Thus we can reasonably exit immediately, and
-     * indeed we have to since map_ldt_shadow_page() works correctly only on
+     * indeed we have to since pv_map_ldt_shadow_page() works correctly only on
      * accesses to a vcpu's own area.
      */
     if ( vcpu_area != curr->vcpu_id )
@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ static int handle_gdt_ldt_mapping_fault(unsigned long offset,
     if ( likely(is_ldt_area) )
     {
         /* LDT fault: Copy a mapping from the guest's LDT, if it is valid. */
-        if ( likely(map_ldt_shadow_page(offset)) )
+        if ( likely(pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(offset)) )
         {
             if ( guest_mode(regs) )
                 trace_trap_two_addr(TRC_PV_GDT_LDT_MAPPING_FAULT,
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
index a48d75d434..8a56bed454 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h
@@ -562,8 +562,6 @@ long subarch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg);
 int compat_arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void));
 int compat_subarch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void));
 
-bool map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int);
-
 #define NIL(type) ((type *)-sizeof(type))
 #define IS_NIL(ptr) (!((uintptr_t)(ptr) + sizeof(*(ptr))))
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/pv/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/pv/mm.h
index 3ca24cc70a..47223e38eb 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/pv/mm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/pv/mm.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ int pv_ro_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 long pv_set_gdt(struct vcpu *d, unsigned long *frames, unsigned int entries);
 void pv_destroy_gdt(struct vcpu *d);
 
+bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int off);
+
 #else
 
 #include <xen/errno.h>
@@ -43,6 +45,8 @@ static inline long pv_set_gdt(struct vcpu *d, unsigned long *frames,
 { return -EINVAL; }
 static inline void pv_destroy_gdt(struct vcpu *d) {}
 
+static inline bool pv_map_ldt_shadow_page(unsigned int off) { return false; }
+
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __X86_PV_MM_H__ */
-- 
2.11.0


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