From: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>,
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v11 11/11] tools/libxenctrl: use new xenforeignmemory API to seed grant table
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:26:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171012162603.3016-12-paul.durrant@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171012162603.3016-1-paul.durrant@citrix.com>
A previous patch added support for priv-mapping guest resources directly
(rather than having to foreign-map, which requires P2M modification for
HVM guests).
This patch makes use of the new API to seed the guest grant table unless
the underlying infrastructure (i.e. privcmd) doesn't support it, in which
case the old scheme is used.
NOTE: The call to xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed() in hvm_build_set_params() was
actually unnecessary, as the grant table has already been seeded
by a prior call to xc_dom_gnttab_init() made by libxl__build_dom().
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
v10:
- Use new id constant for grant table.
v4:
- Minor cosmetic fix suggested by Roger.
v3:
- Introduced xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry() to avoid duplicated code.
---
tools/libxc/include/xc_dom.h | 8 +--
tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_hvm.c | 10 ++--
tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_pv.c | 2 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 1 -
tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c | 6 +-
6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/libxc/include/xc_dom.h b/tools/libxc/include/xc_dom.h
index 6e06ef1dec..4216d63462 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/include/xc_dom.h
+++ b/tools/libxc/include/xc_dom.h
@@ -325,12 +325,8 @@ void *xc_dom_boot_domU_map(struct xc_dom_image *dom, xen_pfn_t pfn,
int xc_dom_boot_image(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
int xc_dom_compat_check(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
int xc_dom_gnttab_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom);
-int xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
- xen_pfn_t console_gmfn,
- xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn,
- domid_t console_domid,
- domid_t xenstore_domid);
-int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
+int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t guest_domid,
+ bool is_hvm,
xen_pfn_t console_gmfn,
xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn,
domid_t console_domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
index 8a376d097c..0fe94aa255 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_dom_boot.c
@@ -282,11 +282,29 @@ static xen_pfn_t xc_dom_gnttab_setup(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid)
return gmfn;
}
-int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
- xen_pfn_t console_gmfn,
- xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn,
- domid_t console_domid,
- domid_t xenstore_domid)
+static void xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry(xc_interface *xch,
+ grant_entry_v1_t *gnttab,
+ unsigned int idx,
+ domid_t guest_domid,
+ domid_t backend_domid,
+ xen_pfn_t backend_gmfn)
+{
+ if ( guest_domid == backend_domid || backend_gmfn == -1)
+ return;
+
+ xc_dom_printf(xch, "%s: [%u] -> 0x%"PRI_xen_pfn,
+ __FUNCTION__, idx, backend_gmfn);
+
+ gnttab[idx].flags = GTF_permit_access;
+ gnttab[idx].domid = backend_domid;
+ gnttab[idx].frame = backend_gmfn;
+}
+
+static int compat_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
+ xen_pfn_t console_gmfn,
+ xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn,
+ domid_t console_domid,
+ domid_t xenstore_domid)
{
xen_pfn_t gnttab_gmfn;
@@ -310,18 +328,10 @@ int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
return -1;
}
- if ( domid != console_domid && console_gmfn != -1)
- {
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_CONSOLE].flags = GTF_permit_access;
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_CONSOLE].domid = console_domid;
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_CONSOLE].frame = console_gmfn;
- }
- if ( domid != xenstore_domid && xenstore_gmfn != -1)
- {
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE].flags = GTF_permit_access;
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE].domid = xenstore_domid;
- gnttab[GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE].frame = xenstore_gmfn;
- }
+ xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry(xch, gnttab, GNTTAB_RESERVED_CONSOLE,
+ domid, console_domid, console_gmfn);
+ xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry(xch, gnttab, GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE,
+ domid, xenstore_domid, xenstore_gmfn);
if ( munmap(gnttab, PAGE_SIZE) == -1 )
{
@@ -339,11 +349,11 @@ int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
return 0;
}
-int xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
- xen_pfn_t console_gpfn,
- xen_pfn_t xenstore_gpfn,
- domid_t console_domid,
- domid_t xenstore_domid)
+static int compat_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
+ xen_pfn_t console_gpfn,
+ xen_pfn_t xenstore_gpfn,
+ domid_t console_domid,
+ domid_t xenstore_domid)
{
int rc;
xen_pfn_t scratch_gpfn;
@@ -382,7 +392,7 @@ int xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
return -1;
}
- rc = xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xch, domid,
+ rc = compat_gnttab_seed(xch, domid,
console_gpfn, xenstore_gpfn,
console_domid, xenstore_domid);
if (rc != 0)
@@ -407,18 +417,56 @@ int xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t domid,
return 0;
}
-int xc_dom_gnttab_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
+int xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xc_interface *xch, domid_t guest_domid,
+ bool is_hvm, xen_pfn_t console_gmfn,
+ xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn, domid_t console_domid,
+ domid_t xenstore_domid)
{
- if ( xc_dom_translated(dom) ) {
- return xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
- dom->console_pfn, dom->xenstore_pfn,
- dom->console_domid, dom->xenstore_domid);
- } else {
- return xc_dom_gnttab_seed(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid,
- xc_dom_p2m(dom, dom->console_pfn),
- xc_dom_p2m(dom, dom->xenstore_pfn),
- dom->console_domid, dom->xenstore_domid);
+ xenforeignmemory_handle* fmem = xch->fmem;
+ xenforeignmemory_resource_handle *fres;
+ void *addr = NULL;
+
+ fres = xenforeignmemory_map_resource(
+ fmem, guest_domid, XENMEM_resource_grant_table,
+ XENMEM_resource_grant_table_id_grant, 0, 1, &addr,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, 0);
+ if ( !fres )
+ {
+ if ( errno == EOPNOTSUPP )
+ return is_hvm ?
+ compat_gnttab_hvm_seed(xch, guest_domid,
+ console_gmfn, xenstore_gmfn,
+ console_domid, xenstore_domid) :
+ compat_gnttab_seed(xch, guest_domid,
+ console_gmfn, xenstore_gmfn,
+ console_domid, xenstore_domid);
+
+ xc_dom_panic(xch, XC_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ "%s: failed to acquire grant table "
+ "[errno=%d]\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, errno);
+ return -1;
}
+
+ xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry(xch, addr, GNTTAB_RESERVED_CONSOLE,
+ guest_domid, console_domid, console_gmfn);
+ xc_dom_set_gnttab_entry(xch, addr, GNTTAB_RESERVED_XENSTORE,
+ guest_domid, xenstore_domid, xenstore_gmfn);
+
+ xenforeignmemory_unmap_resource(fmem, fres);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int xc_dom_gnttab_init(struct xc_dom_image *dom)
+{
+ bool is_hvm = xc_dom_translated(dom);
+ xen_pfn_t console_gmfn = xc_dom_p2m(dom, dom->console_pfn);
+ xen_pfn_t xenstore_gmfn = xc_dom_p2m(dom, dom->xenstore_pfn);
+
+ return xc_dom_gnttab_seed(dom->xch, dom->guest_domid, is_hvm,
+ console_gmfn, xenstore_gmfn,
+ dom->console_domid, dom->xenstore_domid);
}
/*
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_hvm.c b/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_hvm.c
index 1dca85354a..a5c661da8f 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_hvm.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_hvm.c
@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ static int x86_hvm_stream_complete(struct xc_sr_context *ctx)
return rc;
}
- rc = xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(xch, ctx->domid,
- ctx->restore.console_gfn,
- ctx->restore.xenstore_gfn,
- ctx->restore.console_domid,
- ctx->restore.xenstore_domid);
+ rc = xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xch, ctx->domid, true,
+ ctx->restore.console_gfn,
+ ctx->restore.xenstore_gfn,
+ ctx->restore.console_domid,
+ ctx->restore.xenstore_domid);
if ( rc )
{
PERROR("Failed to seed grant table");
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_pv.c b/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_pv.c
index 50e25c162c..10635d436b 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_pv.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_sr_restore_x86_pv.c
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static int x86_pv_stream_complete(struct xc_sr_context *ctx)
if ( rc )
return rc;
- rc = xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xch, ctx->domid,
+ rc = xc_dom_gnttab_seed(xch, ctx->domid, false,
ctx->restore.console_gfn,
ctx->restore.xenstore_gfn,
ctx->restore.console_domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
index ef834e652d..86f562549e 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -903,7 +903,6 @@ static int hvm_build_set_params(xc_interface *handle, uint32_t domid,
*store_mfn = str_mfn;
*console_mfn = cons_mfn;
- xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(handle, domid, *console_mfn, *store_mfn, console_domid, store_domid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
index f501764100..51dc2afb1e 100644
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
@@ -800,9 +800,9 @@ static PyObject *pyxc_gnttab_hvm_seed(XcObject *self,
&console_domid, &xenstore_domid) )
return NULL;
- if ( xc_dom_gnttab_hvm_seed(self->xc_handle, dom,
- console_gmfn, xenstore_gmfn,
- console_domid, xenstore_domid) != 0 )
+ if ( xc_dom_gnttab_seed(self->xc_handle, dom, true,
+ console_gmfn, xenstore_gmfn,
+ console_domid, xenstore_domid) != 0 )
return pyxc_error_to_exception(self->xc_handle);
return Py_None;
--
2.11.0
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-12 16:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-12 16:25 [PATCH v11 00/11] x86: guest resource mapping Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 01/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: maintain an array of ioreq servers rather than a list Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 02/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: simplify code and use consistent naming Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 03/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: use gfn_t in struct hvm_ioreq_page Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 04/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: defer mapping gfns until they are actually requsted Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 05/11] x86/mm: add HYPERVISOR_memory_op to acquire guest resources Paul Durrant
2017-10-16 13:53 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-16 14:07 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-16 14:23 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-17 12:28 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-17 12:52 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-17 12:53 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 06/11] x86/hvm/ioreq: add a new mappable resource type Paul Durrant
2017-10-16 14:07 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-16 14:17 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-16 15:52 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-12 16:25 ` [PATCH v11 07/11] x86/mm: add an extra command to HYPERVISOR_mmu_update Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:26 ` [PATCH v11 08/11] tools/libxenforeignmemory: add support for resource mapping Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:26 ` [PATCH v11 09/11] tools/libxenforeignmemory: reduce xenforeignmemory_restrict code footprint Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:26 ` [PATCH v11 10/11] common: add a new mappable resource type: XENMEM_resource_grant_table Paul Durrant
2017-10-17 6:42 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-17 8:30 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-17 9:06 ` Jan Beulich
2017-10-17 9:08 ` Paul Durrant
2017-10-12 16:26 ` Paul Durrant [this message]
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