From: Andy Smith <andy@strugglers.net>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Clarification regarding Meltdown and 64-bit PV guests
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 06:42:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180113064223.GT29360@bitfolk.com> (raw)
Hi,
In
<https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/04/xen-project-spectremeltdown-faq/>:
"On Intel processors, only 64-bit PV mode guests can attack Xen
using Variant 3. Guests running in 32-bit PV mode, HVM mode, and
PVH mode (both v1 and v2) cannot attack the hypervisor using
Variant 3. However, in 32-bit PV mode, HVM mode, and PVH mode
(both v1 and v2), guest userspaces can attack guest kernels
using Variant 3; so updating guest kernels is advisable.
Interestingly, guest kernels running in 64-bit PV mode are not
vulnerable to attack using Variant 3, because 64-bit PV guests
already run in a KPTI-like mode."
However, in multiple other places, including
<https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa254/README.comet> and
<https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/xsa254/README.vixen>:
"Note that both of these shim-based approaches prevent attacks on
the host, but leave the guest vulnerable to Meltdown attacks by
its own unprivileged processes; this is true even if the guest
OS has KPTI or similar Meltdown mitigation."
These seem to contradict each other.
The FAQ seems to suggest that:
- 32-bit PV guest userland processes can use Variant 3 against their
own kernels and that the KPTI patch would protect against that.
- Without Comet/Vixen, 64-bit PV guests can't use Variant 3 on
themselves but can use it on the hypervisor, and KPTI patches in
the guest do not prevent that.
- Running PV guests inside Comet or Vixen prevents them making use
of Variant 3, they still cannot use Variant 3 against their own
kernels, and KPTI patches in the guest are not necessary.
The Comet and Vixen READMEs seem to suggest that:
- Use of Comet/Vixen prevents PV guests from using Variant 3 against
the hypervisor (and thus other guests as well).
- The guest itself remains able to use Variant 3 on its own kernel
and KPTI patches inside the guest cannot prevent this.
Which is correct, or have I misunderstood and they are somehow both
correct?
Cheers,
Andy
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-13 6:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-13 6:42 Andy Smith [this message]
2018-01-13 9:43 ` Clarification regarding Meltdown and 64-bit PV guests Hans van Kranenburg
2018-01-13 10:08 ` Andy Smith
2018-01-13 11:12 ` Hans van Kranenburg
2018-01-14 14:00 ` Dongli Zhang
2018-01-14 14:15 ` Hans van Kranenburg
2018-01-15 17:48 ` Stefano Stabellini
2018-01-14 14:05 ` Dongli Zhang
2018-01-14 14:41 ` What about dom0? (was: Re: Clarification regarding Meltdown and 64-bit PV guests) Hans van Kranenburg
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180113064223.GT29360@bitfolk.com \
--to=andy@strugglers.net \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).