From: Noboru Iwamatsu <n_iwamatsu@jp.fujitsu.com>
To: weidong.han@intel.com
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, linux@eikelenboom.it,
joseph.cihula@intel.com, allen.m.kay@intel.com,
keir.fraser@eu.citrix.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 18:22:08 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4B5D62C0.7060404@jp.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4B5D4EA8.4000206@intel.com>
Hi,
> No, we cannot ignore it if iommu=force. The invisible device may be
> disabled, not really non-existent. it is possibly that it is re-enabled
> by malfunctional s/w. So when iommu=force, we should not ignore any
> DRHD. We ignores it just to workaround the BIOS issue you encountered.
OK, I return to the same question as Pasi asked.
You mean even ignoring the DRHD that has no existent devices is
insecure, right?
In other word, iommu=1 might be insecure while working with workaround.
We might have to consider security and BIOS workaround separately.
I believe default action must be secure and enabled with strictly
checked values.
If "force" or some workaround options (e.g ignore_bogus_rmrr,
ignore_bogus_drhd, force_enable_with_bogus_drhd, ...)
specified, VT-d enabled with some special workaround, with
uncertain values, but these mode should be considered
"not always secure".
What do you think?
Regards,
Noboru.
> Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:
>> Weidong,
>>
>> I read the patch and the following thread.
>>
>> I understood what you mean, but I think it's better to
>> limit the scope of "force_iommu".
>> And I believe RMRR should be checked as same as DRHD.
>>
>> What I thought about DRHD is:
>> If all devices under the scope of the DRHD are non-existent,
>> this DRHD is invalid but safely ignorable, so ignore it.
> No, we cannot ignore it if iommu=force. The invisible device may be
> disabled, not really non-existent. it is possibly that it is re-enabled
> by malfunctional s/w. So when iommu=force, we should not ignore any
> DRHD. We ignores it just to workaround the BIOS issue you encountered.
>> If some devices under the scope of the DRHD are non-existent,
>> this DRHD is invalid, so disable VT-d unless "iommu=force"
>> option is specified.
>> When "iommu=force" option is specified, even the invalid DRHD
>> will be registered, because DRHD that has some existent devices
>> must not be ignored due to security reasons.
>>
>> About the RMRR:
>> If all devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent,
>> this RMMR is invalid but ignorable, so ignore it.
>> If some devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent,
>> this RMRR is invalid, so disable VT-d unless "iommu=force"
> RMRR is much different from DRHD, it's just reversed memories for
> specific devices (now only Intel IGD and USB contollers need RMRR), it's
> no security issue like described above.
> if "all" devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, we can
> ignore the RMRR because no devices will use it.
> if some" devices under the scope of the RMRR are non-existent, we cannot
> ignore the RMRR, because there are still some devices want to use it. I
> think we needn't to disable VT-d because it won't cause any issues. Of
> course, we also can disable VT-d for this case strictly.
>> option is specified. When "iommu=force" option is specified,
>> the invalid RMRR is ignored (it's safe).
>>
>> I attach the patch.
>>
>> What do you think?
>
> Noboru,
>
> I think it need not to change current code. BTW, your patch is not based
> on latest Xen.
>
> Regards,
> Weidong
>
>
>> Regards,
>> Noboru.
>>
>>> I implemented a patch and attached.
>>>
>>> patch description:
>>> In order to make Xen more defensive to VT-d related BIOS issue, this
>>> patch ignores a DRHD if all devices under its scope are not pci
>>> discoverable, and regards a DRHD as invalid and then disable whole VT-d
>>> if some devices under its scope are not pci discoverable. But if
>>> iommu=force is set, it will enable all DRHDs reported by BIOS, to avoid
>>> any security vulnerability with malicious s/s re-enabling "supposed
>>> disabled" devices. Pls note that we don't know the devices under the
>>> "Include_all" DRHD are existent or not, because the scope of
>>> "Include_all" DRHD won't enumerate common pci device, it only enumerates
>>> I/OxAPIC and HPET devices.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Noboru Iwamatsu <n_iwamatsu@jp.fujitsu.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
>>>
>>>
>>> Noboru, pls test the patch on your machine?
>>>
>>> Joe, could you review the patch? and pls ACK it if it's fine for you.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Weidong
>>>
>>> Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:
>>>> Thanks,
>>>>
>>>> I understood.
>>>>
>>>>> Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:
>>>>>> Hi Weidong,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not sure why the security problem is caused by ignoring
>>>>>> the DRHD that has only non-existent devices.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Could you explain details or where to read the spec?
>>>>> It's requested from security experts. The device that is not pci
>>>>> discoverable may be re-enabled by malicious software. If its DRHD
>>>>> is not
>>>>> enabled, the re-enabled device is not protected by VT-d. It will cause
>>>>> security issue.
>>>>>
>>>>>> As you saying, security is the top-priority.
>>>>>> However, when iommu=force is specified, we should enable vt-d
>>>>>> if there are some potential issues.
>>>>>> Because users want to "force" anyway.
>>>>> iommu=force was introduced to enable VT-d anyway for security
>>>>> purpose. I
>>>>> plan to still enable those DRHDs that includes non-existed device when
>>>>> iommu=force, otherwise ignore them.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Weidong
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Noboru.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Keir Fraser wrote:
>>>>>>>> If we want to keep iommu=1 as default, then it is unacceptable to
>>>>>>>> fail to
>>>>>>>> boot on a fairly wide range of modern systems. We have to
>>>>>>>> warn-and-disable,
>>>>>>>> partially or completely, unless iommu=force is specified. Or we
>>>>>>>> need to
>>>>>>>> revert to iommu=0 as the default.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What do you think, Weidong?
>>>>>>> Yes. I agree to warn-and-disable for these BIOS issues, and consider
>>>>>>> security more when iommu=force. Therefore I will implement a patch
>>>>>>> based
>>>>>>> on Nororu's patch.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Weidong
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -- Keir
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 21/01/2010 14:17, "Sander Eikelenboom" <linux@eikelenboom.it>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Hello Weidong,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The problem is most vendor's just don't fix it and ignore the
>>>>>>>>> problem
>>>>>>>>> completely.
>>>>>>>>> Most often hiding them selves behind: come back when it's a
>>>>>>>>> problem
>>>>>>>>> with
>>>>>>>>> Microsoft Windows, that the only single thing we support (and no
>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>> software, so no vmware, no xen, no linux, perhaps even no
>>>>>>>>> hypervisor)
>>>>>>>>> Well I don't know if the virtual pc in windows 7 supports an iommu
>>>>>>>>> now, but it
>>>>>>>>> didn't in the past as far as i know, so any complain bounces off,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> there it
>>>>>>>>> all seems to end for them.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Besides that i don't know if they do know what the problems with
>>>>>>>>> there
>>>>>>>>> implementation in BIOS is when someone reports it.
>>>>>>>>> I think some behind the scenes pressure from Intel to vendors
>>>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>>>> help to
>>>>>>>>> solve some of them.
>>>>>>>>> (my Q35 chipset, "Intel V-PRO" marketed motherboard (so much for
>>>>>>>>> that) also
>>>>>>>>> suffers RMRR problem when another graphics card is inserted which
>>>>>>>>> switches off
>>>>>>>>> the IGD).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Although i think in my case your patch will work around that
>>>>>>>>> for me.
>>>>>>>>> Perhaps a
>>>>>>>>> third option is needed, which does all the workarounds possible
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> warns
>>>>>>>>> about potential security problem when requested ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>> Sander
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thursday, January 21, 2010, 1:46:39 PM, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Noboru Iwamatsu wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Weidong,
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I re-send the DRHD-fix patch.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If DRHD does not have existent devices, ignore it.
>>>>>>>>>>> If DRHD has both existent and non-existent devices, consider it
>>>>>>>>>>> invalid
>>>>>>>>>>> and not register.
>>>>>>>>>> Although you patch workarounds your buggy BIOS, but we still
>>>>>>>>>> need to
>>>>>>>>>> enable it for security purpose as I mentioned in previous
>>>>>>>>>> mail. We
>>>>>>>>>> needn't workaround / fix all BIOS issues in software. I think
>>>>>>>>>> security
>>>>>>>>>> is more important for this specific BIOS issue. Did you report
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> BIOS
>>>>>>>>>> issue to your OEM vendor? maybe it's better to get it fixed in
>>>>>>>>>> BIOS.
>>>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>>> Weidong
>>>>>>>>>>> According to this patch and yours, my machine successfully
>>>>>>>>>>> booted
>>>>>>>>>>> with vt-d enabled.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Noboru Iwamatsu <n_iwamatsu@jp.fujitsu.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Keir Fraser wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 21/01/2010 10:19, "Weidong Han" <weidong.han@intel.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry this is typo.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I mean:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, I think RMRR that has no-existent device is "invalid"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and whole RMRR should be ignored.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> looks reasonable.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Keir, I Acks Noboru's rmrr patch. Or do you want us to merge
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> them to one
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> patch?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Merge them up, re-send with both sign-off and acked-by all in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> one
>>>>>>>>>>>>> email.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Keir
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry, I disagree with Noboru after thinking it again. If the
>>>>>>>>>>>> RMRR
>>>>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>>>>> both no-existent device and also has existent devices in its
>>>>>>>>>>>> scope, we
>>>>>>>>>>>> should not ignore it because the existent devices under its
>>>>>>>>>>>> scope
>>>>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>>>>> be impacted without the RMRR. so I suggest to print a warning
>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignore it. Attached a patch for it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Weidong Han <weidong.han@intel.com>
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-01-25 9:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-01-21 2:46 [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking Han, Weidong
2010-01-21 8:25 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 8:38 ` Han, Weidong
2010-01-21 10:03 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 10:08 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 10:19 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 10:27 ` Keir Fraser
2010-01-21 10:49 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 12:19 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 12:46 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 14:01 ` Keir Fraser
2010-01-21 14:17 ` Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-21 14:33 ` Keir Fraser
2010-01-22 2:12 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-22 2:38 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-22 2:53 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-22 3:16 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-22 8:47 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-22 9:19 ` Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-22 12:15 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-22 12:32 ` Pasi Kärkkäinen
2010-01-23 12:40 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-23 13:08 ` Pasi Kärkkäinen
2010-01-23 14:33 ` Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-23 14:54 ` [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking, documenting boot options Pasi Kärkkäinen
2010-01-25 16:40 ` Stephen Spector
2010-01-25 16:58 ` Documentation Xen-hypervisor and Dom0 xen-related boot options (was Re: [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking, documenting boot options) Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-25 20:56 ` Stephen Spector
2010-01-27 11:33 ` Pasi Kärkkäinen
2010-01-25 7:06 ` [PATCH] VT-d: improve RMRR validity checking Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-25 7:56 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-25 9:02 ` Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-25 9:11 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-25 9:22 ` Noboru Iwamatsu [this message]
2010-01-25 10:08 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-25 10:45 ` Sander Eikelenboom
2010-01-25 13:43 ` Keir Fraser
2010-01-25 13:57 ` Christian Tramnitz
2010-01-25 14:10 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-26 1:16 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-26 5:51 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-26 6:38 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-26 6:42 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-25 14:12 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-25 14:13 ` Han, Weidong
2010-03-09 21:39 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-09 21:30 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2010-03-09 21:57 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-09 22:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2010-03-09 23:05 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-09 23:25 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 2:13 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 2:40 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-10 3:18 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 3:28 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-10 3:37 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 4:25 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-10 4:47 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 7:03 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-10 13:56 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-10 18:06 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-11 2:11 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-11 2:32 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-11 3:44 ` Weidong Han
2010-03-11 4:52 ` Alex Williamson
2010-03-11 8:30 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 15:28 ` Andrew Lyon
2010-01-21 15:04 ` Keir Fraser
2010-01-22 1:35 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 10:13 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 12:09 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 12:38 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-22 0:23 ` Noboru Iwamatsu
2010-01-21 8:45 ` Andrew Lyon
2010-01-21 10:03 ` Weidong Han
2010-01-21 9:15 ` Keir Fraser
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