From: Paul Durrant <Paul.Durrant@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <Stefano.Stabellini@citrix.com>,
Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls
Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 14:32:07 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4bb76cf725844b92929bd6e10f9cc9dd@AMSPEX02CL03.citrite.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1452520774-16794-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org [mailto:xen-devel-
> bounces@lists.xen.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Cooper
> Sent: 11 January 2016 14:00
> To: Xen-devel
> Cc: Andrew Cooper; Stefano Stabellini; Ian Campbell; Jan Beulich
> Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of
> userspace hypercalls
>
> Currently, hypercalls issued from HVM userspace will unconditionally fail with
> -EPERM.
>
> This is inflexible, and a guest may wish to allow userspace to make
> hypercalls.
>
> Introduce HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl which allows the guest to alter the
> permissions check for hypercalls. It behaves exactly like the dpl field for
> GDT/LDT/IDT entries.
>
> As the dpl is initialised to 0, hypercalls are restricted to cpl0 code until
> the OS explicitly chooses an alternative.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> --
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> CC: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>
>
> Arm folks: Is something like this sufficiently generic to be useful on Arm,
> perhaps with more generic naming?
>
> PV guest support for userspace hypercalls is substantially more involved, and
> will take longer to complete.
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h | 2 ++
> xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h | 8 ++++++++
> 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index 21470ec..e5a08db 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -5228,7 +5228,8 @@ int hvm_do_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
> case 4:
> case 2:
> hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_ss, &sreg);
> - if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl) )
> + if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl <
> + currd->arch.hvm_domain.hypercall_dpl) )
Either I'm going mad, or that check should be '>' shouldn't it? (After all the test is currently effectively a test for > 0)
> {
> default:
> regs->eax = -EPERM;
> @@ -6839,6 +6840,28 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op,
> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
> rc = do_altp2m_op(arg);
> break;
>
> + case HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl:
> + {
> + xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t a;
> + struct domain *d;
> +
> + if ( copy_from_guest(&a, arg, 1 ) )
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(a.domid, &d);
> + if ( rc != 0 )
> + return rc;
> +
> + if ( current->domain != d )
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || a.dpl > 3 )
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + d->arch.hvm_domain.hypercall_dpl = a.dpl;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> default:
> {
> gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "Bad HVM op %ld.\n", op);
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-
> x86/hvm/domain.h
> index a8cc2ad..006a142 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/domain.h
> @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct hvm_domain {
> bool_t qemu_mapcache_invalidate;
> bool_t is_s3_suspended;
>
> + uint32_t hypercall_dpl;
> +
Why burn 32-bits for a value that's only 2 bits wide?
Paul
> /*
> * TSC value that VCPUs use to calculate their tsc_offset value.
> * Used during initialization and save/restore.
> diff --git a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> index 1606185..f8247db 100644
> --- a/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> +++ b/xen/include/public/hvm/hvm_op.h
> @@ -489,6 +489,14 @@ struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op {
> typedef struct xen_hvm_altp2m_op xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t;
> DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_altp2m_op_t);
>
> +#define HVMOP_set_hypercall_dpl 26
> +struct xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl {
> + domid_t domid;
> + uint16_t dpl; /* IN[1:0] cpl required to make hypercalls. */
> +};
> +typedef struct xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t;
> +DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_hvm_hypercall_dpl_t);
> +
> #endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_HVM_HVM_OP_H__ */
>
> /*
> --
> 2.1.4
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-11 14:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-11 13:59 [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2016-01-11 14:32 ` Paul Durrant [this message]
2016-01-11 14:44 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-11 17:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-11 18:26 ` David Vrabel
2016-01-11 18:32 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-11 18:40 ` David Vrabel
2016-01-11 18:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-12 12:07 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-12 15:06 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-12 17:05 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-12 17:10 ` Juergen Gross
2016-01-12 17:23 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-13 5:12 ` Juergen Gross
2016-01-13 10:41 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-13 11:14 ` Juergen Gross
2016-01-13 11:26 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-13 11:32 ` Juergen Gross
2016-01-13 11:42 ` David Vrabel
2016-01-13 12:51 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-12 7:33 ` Jan Beulich
2016-01-12 10:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2016-01-12 11:03 ` George Dunlap
2016-01-14 10:50 ` Ian Campbell
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