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From: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>,
	xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 19/22] arch/x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2012 10:25:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5051ECC7.7050901@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <50520634020000780009B162@nat28.tlf.novell.com>

On 09/13/2012 10:13 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 13.09.12 at 15:46, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>> On 09/13/2012 04:00 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 12.09.12 at 17:59, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>>>> When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the
>>>> iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain,
>>>> potentially allowing the current domain to bypass its more restrictive
>>>> iomem_access policy using another domain that it has access to.
>>>
>>> Are you sure about this? I ask because ...
>>>
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>>> @@ -754,6 +754,18 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
>>>>              return -EINVAL;
>>>>          }
>>>>  
>>>> +        if ( pg_owner != curr->domain &&
>>>> +             !iomem_access_permitted(curr->domain, mfn, mfn) )
>>>> +        {
>>>> +            if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
>>>> +            {
>>>> +                MEM_LOG("Domain %u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in 
>> domain %u",
>>>> +                        curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id);
>>>> +                return -EPERM;
>>>> +            }
>>>> +            return -EINVAL;
>>>> +        }
>>>> +
>>>
>>> ... the place you insert this is after non-RAM pages got filtered
>>> out already, so you're applying an IOMEM permission check to a
>>> RAM page.
>>>
>>> Jan
>>>
>>>>          if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) ||
>>>>               !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
>>>>              return 0;
>>
>> If that's true, then the check a few lines above is also applying IOMEM
>> checks to RAM pages. I can see non-privileged attempts being filtered
>> above,

"above" refers to "if ( !iomem_access_permitted(pg_owner, mfn, mfn) )"
 
> I can't see how that would happen given this primary conditional
> 
>     if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ||
>          (real_pg_owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page)) == dom_io )
> 
> Please clarify what you're observing.

As I understand it, the contents of this block will be executed if the MFN is
invalid (interpreted as MMIO space) or if the page's owner is DOMID_IO, which
is how MMIO space is marked.

>> but successful mappings will continue to the check I added.
> 
> Of course. I would think that if anything, you would want to add
> a second call to iomem_access_permitted() with "curr->domain"
> right at the place where the current one is (in particular inside
> the above quoted conditional).
> 
> Jan

I was emulating the existing iomem_access_permitted check being run on pg_owner;
moving the curr->domain check up into this first conditional would end up
treating the MMIO mapping as a regular RAM mapping if the iomem_access_permitted
fails. Unless you're talking about a different quoted conditional?

-- 
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency

  reply	other threads:[~2012-09-13 14:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-12 15:59 [PATCH v3] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 01/22] xsm/flask: remove inherited class attributes Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 02/22] xsm/flask: remove unneeded create_sid field Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 03/22] xen: Add versions of rcu_lock_*_domain without IS_PRIV checks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 04/22] xsm/flask: add domain relabel support Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 05/22] libxl: introduce XSM relabel on build Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 06/22] flask/policy: Add domain relabel example Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 07/22] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 08/22] xsm/flask: Add checks on the domain performing the set_target operation Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 09/22] xsm: Use the dummy XSM module if XSM is disabled Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13  7:46   ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-13 13:40     ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 10/22] xen: use XSM instead of IS_PRIV where duplicated Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 11/22] xen: avoid calling rcu_lock_*target_domain when an XSM hook exists Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 12/22] arch/x86: convert platform_hypercall to use XSM Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 13/22] xen: lock target domain in do_domctl common code Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 14/22] xen: convert do_domctl to use XSM Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 15/22] xen: convert do_sysctl " Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 16/22] xsm/flask: add missing hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 17/22] xsm/flask: add distinct SIDs for self/target access Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 18/22] arch/x86: Add missing mem_sharing XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 19/22] arch/x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13  8:00   ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-13 13:46     ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13 14:13       ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-13 14:25         ` Daniel De Graaf [this message]
2012-09-13 15:04           ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-13 16:46             ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-14  8:54               ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-14 13:37                 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-14 14:21                   ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 20/22] arch/x86: use XSM hooks for get_pg_owner access checks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13  8:13   ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-13 13:55     ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13 14:15       ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 21/22] xen: Add XSM hook for XENMEM_exchange Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-12 15:59 ` [PATCH 22/22] tmem: add XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13 14:37 ` [PATCH v3] Merge IS_PRIV checks into " Ian Jackson
2012-09-13 15:08   ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-13 15:29     ` Ian Jackson

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