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From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
To: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [Hackathon minutes] PV network improvements
Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 09:31:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <519B30CB.4010909@eu.citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1369124555.21246.21.camel@zakaz.uk.xensource.com>

On 05/21/2013 09:22 AM, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 19:33 +0100, Wei Liu wrote:
>> On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 03:49:32PM +0100, George Dunlap wrote:
>> [...]
>>>> J) Map the whole physical memory of the machine in dom0
>>>> If mapping/unmapping or copying slows us down, could we just keep the
>>>> whole physical memory of the machine mapped in dom0 (with corresponding
>>>> IOMMU entries)?
>>>> At that point the frontend could just pass mfn numbers to the backend,
>>>> and the backend would already have them mapped.
>>>> >From a security perspective it doesn't change anything when running
>>>> the backend in dom0, because dom0 is already capable of mapping random
>>>> pages of any guests. QEMU instances do that all the time.
>>>> But it would take away one of the benefits of deploying driver domains:
>>>> we wouldn't be able to run the backends at a lower privilege level.
>>>> However it might still be worth considering as an option? The backend is
>>>> still trusted and protected from the frontend, but the frontend wouldn't
>>>> be protected from the backend.
>>>
>>> What's missing from this was my side of the discussion:
>>>
>>> I was saying that if TLB flushes from grant-unmap is indeed the
>>> problem, then maybe we could have the *front-end* in charge of
>>> requesting a TLB flush for its pages.  The strict TLB flushing is to
>>> protect a frontend from rogue back-ends from reading sensitive data;
>>> if the front-end were willing to just not use the pages for a short
>>> amount of time, and issue a flush say every second or so, that would
>>> reduce the TLB flushes greatly while maintaining the safety advantages
>>> of driver domains.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure I get what you mean here. Are you saying DomU flushes
>> Dom0's TLB entries?
>
> The gnt_unmap made by dom0 needs to flush the TLB of any physical
> processor which may have seen the mapping, which means approximately all
> dom0 vcpus.

That's what I was getting at.  It's Xen that does any actual TLB 
flushes, and for now the "promise" to the front-end is that the page is 
safe from the backend* after the transaction is done.  But it would be 
nicer if we could batch these flushes to happen once every few hundred 
milliseconds, or even one a second.  If we allowed the front-end to 
choose a new the interface, that said "the page is safe from the backend 
once you have made this hypercall", then guests could choose the 
"window" size based on their own parameters.

* Remember that the point of grant maps isn't to allow *dom0* access to 
the guests; dom0 already has all the access it needs.  It's to allow 
driver domains access to the guests.

  -George

  reply	other threads:[~2013-05-21  8:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-05-20 14:08 [Hackathon minutes] PV network improvements Stefano Stabellini
2013-05-20 14:49 ` George Dunlap
2013-05-20 18:33   ` Wei Liu
2013-05-21  8:22     ` Ian Campbell
2013-05-21  8:31       ` George Dunlap [this message]
2013-05-20 18:31 ` Wei Liu
2013-05-21  8:31   ` Ian Campbell
2013-05-21  9:26   ` Tim Deegan
2013-05-21  9:39     ` Wei Liu
2013-05-21 10:11       ` Tim Deegan
2013-05-21 10:01     ` George Dunlap
2013-05-21 10:06       ` Wei Liu
2013-05-21 10:51     ` Stefano Stabellini
2013-05-21 12:52       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2013-05-21 13:32         ` Stefano Stabellini
2013-05-21 13:42       ` Tim Deegan
2013-05-21 16:58         ` Stefano Stabellini
2013-05-22  9:52           ` Tim Deegan
2013-05-22  9:55           ` Ian Campbell
2013-05-20 19:36 ` annie li

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