From: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
To: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"xen-devel@lists.xensource.com" <xen-devel@lists.xensource.com>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
mattjd@gmail.com, security@xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2013 17:08:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <51B89D18.4020405@eu.citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20920.40058.635699.510629@mariner.uk.xensource.com>
On 12/06/13 17:06, Ian Jackson wrote:
> George Dunlap writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest"):
>> On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> wrote:
>>> These functions take guest pfns and look them up in the p2m. They did
>>> no range checking.
>>>
>>> However, some callers, notably xc_dom_boot.c:setup_hypercall_page want
>>> to pass untrusted guest-supplied value(s). It is most convenient to
>>> detect this here and return INVALID_MFN.
>>>
>>> This is part of the fix to a security issue, XSA-55.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
>>> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
>> I've taken a look at where things get returned here, and it seems like
>> they should all be OK with INVALID_MFN.
> Good. Does that mean that we should promote the check to be done in
> the shadow_enabled case too ?
Oh sorry, missed that question.
I think it's safe, but you should get an ack from Tim to be sure.
-George
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-06-12 16:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-06-11 18:20 [PATCH v7 00/22] XSA55 libelf fixes for unstable Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 01/22] libelf: abolish libelf-relocate.c Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 02/22] libxc: introduce xc_dom_seg_to_ptr_pages Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 03/22] libxc: Fix range checking in xc_dom_pfn_to_ptr etc Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 04/22] libelf: add `struct elf_binary*' parameter to elf_load_image Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 05/22] libelf: abolish elf_sval and elf_access_signed Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 06/22] libelf: move include of <asm/guest_access.h> to top of file Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 07/22] libelf/xc_dom_load_elf_symtab: Do not use "syms" uninitialised Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 08/22] libelf: introduce macros for memory access and pointer handling Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 09/22] tools/xcutils/readnotes: adjust print_l1_mfn_valid_note Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 10/22] libelf: check nul-terminated strings properly Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 11/22] libelf: check all pointer accesses Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 12/22] libelf: Check pointer references in elf_is_elfbinary Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 13/22] libelf: Make all callers call elf_check_broken Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 14/22] libelf: use C99 bool for booleans Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:04 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 15/22] libelf: use only unsigned integers Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:20 ` [PATCH 16/22] libelf: check loops for running away Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:28 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 17/22] libelf: abolish obsolete macros Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 18/22] libxc: Add range checking to xc_dom_binloader Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 19/22] libxc: check failure of xc_dom_*_to_ptr, xc_map_foreign_range Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:10 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 20/22] libxc: check return values from malloc Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-12 16:02 ` George Dunlap
2013-06-12 16:06 ` Ian Jackson
2013-06-12 16:08 ` George Dunlap [this message]
2013-06-12 18:26 ` Tim Deegan
2013-06-11 18:21 ` [PATCH 22/22] libxc: check blob size before proceeding in xc_dom_check_gzip Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 19:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 19:30 ` [PATCH v7 00/22] XSA55 libelf fixes for unstable Andrew Cooper
2013-06-12 13:45 ` Ian Jackson
2013-06-12 14:02 ` Ian Jackson
2013-06-12 14:19 ` Andrew Cooper
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-06-11 18:22 [PATCH v7 00/22] XSA55 libelf fixes for Xen 4.2 Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 18:22 ` [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest Ian Jackson
2013-06-07 18:35 [PATCH v6 00/22] XSA55 libelf fixes for Xen 4.2 Ian Jackson
2013-06-07 18:35 ` [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest Ian Jackson
2013-06-07 18:27 [PATCH v6 00/22] XSA55 libelf fixes for unstable Ian Jackson
2013-06-07 18:27 ` [PATCH 21/22] libxc: range checks in xc_dom_p2m_host and _guest Ian Jackson
2013-06-07 18:33 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-08 12:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-06-11 15:58 ` Ian Jackson
2013-06-11 16:19 ` Tim Deegan
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