From: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
To: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>,
Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
Daniel Kiper <dkiper@net-space.pl>,
xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv9 0/9] Xen: extend kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 12:59:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52728C76.8040501@terremark.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52713A86.3050102@citrix.com>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 7445 bytes --]
On 10/30/13 12:57, David Vrabel wrote:
> On 21/10/13 21:20, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 01:56:09PM +0100, David Vrabel wrote:
>>> On 21/10/13 13:19, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>>> On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 12:14:24AM +0100, David Vrabel wrote:
>>>>> On 18/10/2013 19:40, Daniel Kiper wrote:
>>>>>> On Tue, Oct 08, 2013 at 05:55:01PM +0100, David Vrabel wrote:
>>>>>>> The series (for Xen 4.4) improves the kexec hypercall by making Xen
>>>>>>> responsible for loading and relocating the image. This allows kexec
>>>>>>> to be usable by pv-ops kernels and should allow kexec to be usable
>>>>>>> from a HVM or PVH privileged domain.
>>>>>> I could not load panic image because Xen crashes in following way:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.4-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>> (XEN) Xen call trace:
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d080114ef2>] kimage_free+0x67/0xd2
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801151f9>] do_kimage_alloc+0x29c/0x2f0
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801152fe>] kimage_alloc+0xb1/0xe6
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801144c0>] do_kexec_op_internal+0x68e/0x789
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0801145c9>] do_kexec_op+0xe/0x12
>>>>>> (XEN) [<ffff82d0802268cb>] syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145
I get the same thing.
>>>>> The appended patch should fix this crash which only occurs if there's an
>>>>> error in do_kimage_alloc().
>>>> Patch had wrapped lines. I hope that I fixed it properly.
>>>> I cannot load panic kernel. kexec fails with following message:
My version of this patch is attached (0001...). It has both crashed right away and not:
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ----[ Xen-4.4-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] CPU: 7
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08012fd72>] xmem_pool_free+0x6f/0x2e9
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] RFLAGS: 0000000000010286 CONTEXT: hypervisor
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] rax: ffff8308df5a5e90 rbx: ffff83083f48f9f0 rcx: 000000000001b410
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] rdx: 00000000a01164a0 rsi: ffff83083a1ae000 rdi: ffff83083a1af86c
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] rbp: ffff830823fbfd88 rsp: ffff830823fbfd68 r8: 000000000000000c
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] r9: 0000000010000000 r10: ffff83083f4904f0 r11: 00000000004c6000
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] r12: ffff83083a1ae000 r13: ffff83083a1af868 r14: 00007fff5a9b7fc0
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] r15: 0000000000000003 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000426f0
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] cr3: 000000066b482000 cr2: ffff8308df5a5e98
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e010 cs: e008
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] Xen stack trace from rsp=ffff830823fbfd68:
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 00000000000000e0 00000000ffffff9d ffff83083f4904f0 ffff83083f48f9f0
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfdc8 ffff82d0801304fe ffff830823fbfdc8 00000000ffffff9d
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff83083f4904f0 ffff8800870bb5e8 00007fff5a9b7fc0 0000000000000003
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfee8 ffff82d08011450c ffff830823fbfef8 0000000000000000
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000002 ffff830823fb10b8 ffff830823fbfe18 ffff82d08012b104
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff8300bf2f4060 000000000066a0cb 0000000000000000 ffff8300bf2f4000
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff82004001f000 00007ff000000003 00000007003e0001 00007f84d993b004
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 000000001ff53720 ffff830823fb1000 ffff830823fbfe68 ffff82d08016fb23
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfe88 ffff82d080221348 ffff830823fb1000 ffff830823fbff18
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfef8 ffff82d0802214a8 00000000d69204a7 0000000000000000
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000217 0000003564eee0a7 0000000000000100 0000003564eee0a7
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfed8 ffff82d08016fb23 ffff8300bf2f4000 00007fff5a9b7fc0
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffff830823fbfef8 ffff82d0801145d9 00007cf7dc0400c7 ffff82d0802268cb
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] ffffffff810014aa 0000000000000025 0000001efd525f9a 0000001efd60d300
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000000 00000021d69204a7 ffff880087debe88 ffff880005d9a500
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000286 00007fff5a9b8180 ffff880087191480 000000001ff53720
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000025 ffffffff810014aa 0000003564a148e5 00007f84d8f3f004
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000004 0001010000000000 ffffffff810014aa 000000000000e033
(XEN) [2013-10-30 21:26:39] 0000000000000286 ffff880087debde0 000000000000e02b d53835942492fce9
...
The auto reboot overwrote the rest. When it did not crash right away, the next day I got error messages about page table issues. (I forgot that the request to write hypervisor console data to a file is not the default.) I hope to still have the data at home.
Best guess at this point is that the error handling still has issues.
>>>> kexec_load failed: Cannot assign requested address
>>> This is -EADDRINVALID which means one of
>>>
>>> a) the entry point isn't within a segment.
>>> b) one of the segments is not page aligned.
>>> c) one of the segments is not within the crash region.
>>>
>>> But the segments kexec has constructed all looked fine to me (and
>>> similar to the segments I see).
I have tracked this down to in kexec-tools:
+ if (info->kexec_flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) {
+ set_xen_guest_handle(xen_segs[s].buf.h, HYPERCALL_BUFFER_NULL);
+ xen_segs[s].buf_size = 0;
+ xen_segs[s].dest_maddr = info->backup_src_start;
+ xen_segs[s].dest_size = info->backup_src_size;
+ nr_segments++;
+ }
Which in some cases passes the 1st e820 line which for me is:
(XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map:
(XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009b800 (usable)
(XEN) 000000000009b800 - 00000000000a0000 (reserved)
(XEN) 00000000000e0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved)
(XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000bf63f000 (usable)
...
000000000009b800 is not page aligned and so the test:
if ( (mstart & ~PAGE_MASK) || (mend & ~PAGE_MASK) )
goto out;
Fails.
A possible fix is attached as (0002...) this does allow me to get into the crash kernel.
-Don Slutz
>>> I'm afraid I cannot reproduce either of your failures. Are you sure
>>> you've built everything correctly? In particular has kexec-tools been
>>> built against the correct version of Xen headers?
>> It looks that I build it correctly but I will double check it.
>> Could you send me your Xen/Linux boot command lines and kexec
>> command lines for normal and panic kernel? Could you tell me
>> what is your RAM size?
> AMD Opteron 4264 with 8 GiB RAM.
>
> Xen 4.4-unstable debug=y:
>
> com1=115200,8n1 console=com1 crashkernel=256M@64M
>
> Linux 3.12-rc4
>
> root=/dev/mapper/cam--st09-root ro console=hvc0
>
> Normal image:
>
> build/sbin/kexec --debug --console-serial --serial-baud=115200
> --command-line="console=ttyS0,115200n8 maxcpus=1" -l
> /boot/vmlinuz-3.11.0.davidvr
>
> Panic image:
>
> build/sbin/kexec --debug --console-serial --serial-baud=115200
> --command-line="console=ttyS0,115200n8 maxcpus=1" -p
> /boot/vmlinuz-3.11.0.davidvr
>
> David
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
[-- Attachment #1.2: Type: text/html, Size: 11977 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #2: 0001-kexec-v9a-Fix-error-handling-if-do_kimage_alloc-repo.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 2281 bytes --]
>From bb2407bb2b712b33355d8c3df751bd1ecde1f971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2013 17:17:24 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] kexec: v9a -- Fix error handling if do_kimage_alloc()
reports an error
Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
---
xen/common/kimage.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/common/kimage.c b/xen/common/kimage.c
index 6bee9cf..f2b331e 100644
--- a/xen/common/kimage.c
+++ b/xen/common/kimage.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
page_to_maddr(image->control_code_page),
page_to_maddr(image->control_code_page));
if ( result < 0 )
- return result;
+ goto out;
/* Add an empty indirection page. */
image->entry_page = kimage_alloc_control_page(image, 0);
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
result = machine_kexec_add_page(image, page_to_maddr(image->entry_page),
page_to_maddr(image->entry_page));
if ( result < 0 )
- return result;
+ goto out;
image->head = page_to_maddr(image->entry_page);
@@ -510,15 +510,14 @@ static void kimage_free_entry(kimage_entry_t entry)
free_domheap_page(page);
}
-void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image)
+static void kimage_free_all_entries(struct kexec_image *image)
{
kimage_entry_t *ptr, entry;
kimage_entry_t ind = 0;
- if ( !image )
+ if ( !image->head )
return;
- kimage_free_extra_pages(image);
for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry)
{
if ( entry & IND_INDIRECTION )
@@ -537,8 +536,15 @@ void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image)
/* Free the final indirection page. */
if ( ind & IND_INDIRECTION )
kimage_free_entry(ind);
+}
- /* Free the kexec control pages. */
+void kimage_free(struct kexec_image *image)
+{
+ if ( !image )
+ return;
+
+ kimage_free_extra_pages(image);
+ kimage_free_all_entries(image);
kimage_free_page_list(&image->control_pages);
xfree(image->segments);
xfree(image);
--
1.7.11.7
[-- Attachment #3: 0002-kexec-Skip-checking-of-info-backup_src_start-info-ba.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1913 bytes --]
>From a4eb6108908c65559d4b3997949fb41f0b2828a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 11:31:06 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] kexec: Skip checking of info->backup_src_start &
info->backup_src_size.
Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
---
xen/common/kimage.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xen/common/kimage.c b/xen/common/kimage.c
index f2b331e..92c6ebf 100644
--- a/xen/common/kimage.c
+++ b/xen/common/kimage.c
@@ -124,6 +124,9 @@ static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
{
paddr_t mstart, mend;
+ if ( guest_handle_is_null(segments[i].buf.h) )
+ continue;
+
mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
if ( (mstart & ~PAGE_MASK) || (mend & ~PAGE_MASK) )
@@ -142,11 +145,18 @@ static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
paddr_t mstart, mend;
unsigned long j;
+ if ( guest_handle_is_null(segments[i].buf.h) )
+ continue;
+
mstart = image->segments[i].dest_maddr;
mend = mstart + image->segments[i].dest_size;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++ )
{
paddr_t pstart, pend;
+
+ if ( guest_handle_is_null(segments[i].buf.h) )
+ continue;
+
pstart = image->segments[j].dest_maddr;
pend = pstart + image->segments[j].dest_size;
/* Do the segments overlap? */
@@ -163,6 +173,9 @@ static int do_kimage_alloc(struct kexec_image **rimage, paddr_t entry,
result = -EINVAL;
for ( i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++ )
{
+ if ( guest_handle_is_null(segments[i].buf.h) )
+ continue;
+
if ( image->segments[i].buf_size > image->segments[i].dest_size )
goto out;
}
--
1.7.11.7
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-31 16:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-10-08 16:55 [PATCHv9 0/9] Xen: extend kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86: give FIX_EFI_MPF its own fixmap entry David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 2/9] kexec: add public interface for improved load/unload sub-ops David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 3/9] kexec: add infrastructure for handling kexec images David Vrabel
2013-11-05 22:39 ` Don Slutz
2013-11-06 8:12 ` Jan Beulich
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 4/9] kexec: extend hypercall with improved load/unload ops David Vrabel
2013-11-05 22:43 ` Don Slutz
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 5/9] xen: kexec crash image when dom0 crashes David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 6/9] libxc: add hypercall buffer arrays David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 7/9] libxc: add API for kexec hypercall David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86: check kexec relocation code fits in a page David Vrabel
2013-10-08 16:55 ` [PATCH 9/9] MAINTAINERS: Add KEXEC maintainer David Vrabel
2013-10-08 17:03 ` [PATCHv9 0/9] Xen: extend kexec hypercall for use with pv-ops kernels Andrew Cooper
2013-10-09 15:26 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-09 15:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-10-09 16:03 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-10 15:45 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-10 16:35 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-10 21:24 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-11 6:49 ` Jan Beulich
2013-10-11 8:58 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-11 9:56 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-11 11:15 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-11 14:06 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-14 13:53 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-14 14:14 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-14 18:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-16 21:09 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-11-14 11:20 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-11-14 11:27 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-18 18:40 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-18 23:14 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-21 12:19 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-21 12:56 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-21 20:20 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-25 9:13 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-10-25 23:04 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-30 16:57 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-31 16:59 ` Don Slutz [this message]
2013-10-31 18:30 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-31 20:23 ` Don Slutz
2013-10-31 22:21 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-11-05 17:41 ` Daniel Kiper
2013-11-05 18:01 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-18 23:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-10-21 3:11 ` Xu, YongweiX
2013-10-21 10:21 ` David Vrabel
2013-10-21 12:26 ` David Vrabel
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