From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jeff_Zimmerman@McAfee.com
Cc: lars.kurth.xen@gmail.com, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
lars.kurth@xen.org, Ian.Campbell@citrix.com, JBeulich@suse.com
Subject: Re: Intermittent fatal page fault with XEN 4.3.1 (Centos 6.3 DOM0 with linux kernel 3.10.16.)
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2013 15:54:18 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <527BB7AA.4080801@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <24B7017F-1AC7-4900-93EB-F54C11002491@McAfee.com>
On 07/11/13 15:41, Jeff_Zimmerman@McAfee.com wrote:
> On Nov 7, 2013, at 1:30 AM, Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, 2013-11-07 at 09:10 +0000, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> On 06.11.13 at 18:07, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>>> On 06/11/13 17:06, Ian Campbell wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 2013-11-06 at 16:54 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>>> I looked over the xl code and thought that nestedhvm should default to
>>>>>> false, but I would prefer someone more familar with libxl and the idl to
>>>>>> confirm what the default should be.
>>>>> libxl thinks the default is false and will set HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM to 0
>>>>> in that case. Is there some way to query the hypervisor for what it
>>>>> thinks the setting is?
>>>> A get hvmparam hypercall will retrieve the value, but it is initialised
>>>> to 0 and only ever set by a set hvmparam hypercall.
>>> Which makes me start suspecting that the guest might be deriving
>>> its information on VMX being available from something other than
>>> CPUID. Of course we ought to confirm that we don't unintentionally
>>> return the VMX flag set (and that the config file doesn't override it
>>> in this way - I think we shouldn't be suppressing user overrides
>>> here, but I didn't go check whether we do).
>> I was also wondering about the behaviour of using vmx instructions in a
>> guest despite vmx not being visible in cpuid...
>>
>> Ian.
>>
>>
> We have found in our situation this is exactly the case. To verify we wrote some
> test code that makes vmx calls without checking cupid. On bare hardware the program
> executes as expected. In a VM on Xen it causes the hypervisor to panic.
>
> From a security standpoint this is very very bad. It might be a good idea to provide either
> a run-time or build-time option to disable nestedhvm. Just turning off the vmx bit is not enough
> as malicious or badly written code can cause a system crash.
>
> For us it looks like we can disable these instructions and avoid the crash.
>
> Jeff.
Hmm - that is very concerning that.
And there does look to be a bug.
Can you try the following patch and see whether it helps?
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index c9afb56..7b1a349 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
#define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(_v) \
(~((unsigned long) \
- (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD | \
+ (X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_TSD | \
X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE | \
X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \
X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-07 15:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-11-04 19:54 Intermittent fatal page fault with XEN 4.3.1 (Centos 6.3 DOM0 with linux kernel 3.10.16.) Lars Kurth
2013-11-04 20:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-05 9:53 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-05 10:04 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-05 15:46 ` Lars Kurth
2013-11-05 21:55 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
[not found] ` <5E2B3362-4D93-4FEF-987A-E477B0DCEE51@mcafee.com>
2013-11-06 14:09 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-06 16:05 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-06 16:16 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-06 16:18 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-06 16:48 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-06 16:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-06 17:06 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-06 17:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-07 9:10 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-07 9:30 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-07 15:41 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-07 15:54 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2013-11-07 16:00 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-07 16:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-07 16:12 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-07 15:57 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-07 16:02 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-07 16:53 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-07 17:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-08 7:50 ` Jan Beulich
2013-11-07 18:13 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-07 18:33 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
[not found] <CE9EAEF6.59305%asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
2013-11-05 22:46 ` Jeff_Zimmerman
2013-11-05 23:17 ` Mallick, Asit K
2013-11-06 0:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-11-06 10:05 ` Ian Campbell
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