From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 11/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op hypercall
Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2013 11:27:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <52987A35.3090403@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1385724344.25763.24.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com>
On 29/11/13 11:25, Ian Campbell wrote:
> On Thu, 2013-11-28 at 18:56 +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> And some of the sub-subops. It is a little hacky given the legacy way of
>> having several methods of enabling/disbling LOG_DIRTY mode.
> Does the hypervisor still support all those methods. For valgrind
> purposes we only care as far back as 4.1 I think?
Sadly yes, and xc_domain_save() I believe makes use of both of them.
(Most of these patches are from 6 months ago, so I don't remember for
certain)
While it is not explicitly deprecated in the ABI, it is still fair game
to use either method.
~Andrew
>
> Regardless, I intend to send this patch upstream.
>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>> ---
>> coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>> 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c b/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
>> index ea4a7c0..056f2b8 100644
>> --- a/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
>> +++ b/coregrind/m_syswrap/syswrap-xen.c
>> @@ -696,6 +696,49 @@ PRE(domctl)
>> __PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(getvcpuextstate, vcpuextstate, buffer);
>> break;
>>
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
>> + PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, op);
>> +
>> + switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.op)
>> + {
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF:
>> + /* No further inputs */
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE:
>> + PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, mode);
>> + switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.mode)
>> + {
>> + case XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_LOG_DIRTY:
>> + goto domctl_shadow_op_enable_logdirty;
>> +
>> +
>> + default:
>> + bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
>> + "__HYPERVISOR_domctl shadowop mode",
>> + domctl->u.shadow_op.mode);
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_LOGDIRTY:
>> + domctl_shadow_op_enable_logdirty:
>> + /* No further inputs */
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN:
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK:
>> + PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, dirty_bitmap);
>> + PRE_XEN_DOMCTL_READ(shadow_op, pages);
>> + break;
>> +
>> + default:
>> + bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
>> + "__HYPERVISOR_domctl shadow(10)",
>> + domctl->u.shadow_op.op);
>> + break;
>> + }
>> + break;
>> +
>> default:
>> bad_subop(tid, layout, arrghs, status, flags,
>> "__HYPERVISOR_domctl", domctl->cmd);
>> @@ -1212,6 +1255,27 @@ POST(domctl){
>> domctl->u.vcpuextstate.size);
>> break;
>>
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op:
>> + switch(domctl->u.shadow_op.op)
>> + {
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF:
>> + /* No outputs */
>> + break;
>> +
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN:
>> + case VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK:
>> + POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, pages);
>> + POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, stats.fault_count);
>> + POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE(shadow_op, stats.dirty_count);
>> + if(domctl->u.shadow_op.dirty_bitmap.p)
>> + POST_MEM_WRITE((Addr)domctl->u.shadow_op.dirty_bitmap.p,
>> + domctl->u.shadow_op.pages * sizeof(vki_uint8_t));
>> + break;
>> +
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>> + break;
>> }
>> #undef POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE
>> #undef __POST_XEN_DOMCTL_WRITE
>> diff --git a/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h b/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
>> index 67dc2ef..7cce4af 100644
>> --- a/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
>> +++ b/include/vki/vki-xen-domctl.h
>> @@ -173,6 +173,40 @@ struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity {
>> struct vki_xenctl_bitmap cpumap; /* IN/OUT */
>> };
>>
>> +struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op_stats {
>> + vki_uint32_t fault_count;
>> + vki_uint32_t dirty_count;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op.op is an utter mess for compatibily reasons. */
>> +
>> +struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op {
>> + vki_uint32_t op; /* IN */
>> +
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_OFF 0
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE 32
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_CLEAN 11
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_PEEK 12
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_GET_ALLOCATION 30
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_SET_ALLOCATION 31
>> +
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_TEST 1
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_LOGDIRTY 2
>> +#define VKI_XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_OP_ENABLE_TRANSLATE 3
>> +
>> + vki_uint32_t mode;
>> +
>> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_REFCOUNT (1 << 1)
>> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_LOG_DIRTY (1 << 2)
>> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_TRANSLATE (1 << 3)
>> +#define XEN_DOMCTL_SHADOW_ENABLE_EXTERNAL (1 << 4)
>> +
>> + vki_uint32_t mb;
>> + VKI_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_64(vki_uint8) dirty_bitmap;
>> + vki_xen_uint64_aligned_t pages;
>> + struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op_stats stats;
>> +};
>> +
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_max_mem {
>> /* IN variables. */
>> vki_xen_uint64_aligned_t max_memkb;
>> @@ -285,7 +319,7 @@ struct vki_xen_domctl {
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_getpageframeinfo3 getpageframeinfo3;
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_nodeaffinity nodeaffinity;
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpuaffinity vcpuaffinity;
>> - //struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op shadow_op;
>> + struct vki_xen_domctl_shadow_op shadow_op;
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_max_mem max_mem;
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_vcpucontext vcpucontext;
>> struct vki_xen_domctl_getvcpuinfo getvcpuinfo;
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-29 11:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-11-28 18:56 [PATCH 00/13] Valgrind patches for hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 01/13] xen: Fix XEN_SYSCTL_getdomaininfolist for version 0xa Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 02/13] xen: Infratructure for XEN_TMEM_* hypercalls Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 03/13] xen: XENMEM_maximum_ram_page hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 04/13] xen: XENMEM_maximum_gpfn hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 05/13] xen: XENMEM_machphys_mfn_list hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 06/13] xen: XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:17 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 07/13] xen: XENMEM_remove_from_physmap hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 08/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_gethvmcontext hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 09/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_getpageframeinfo3 hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 10/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_sethvmcontext hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:22 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-28 18:56 ` [PATCH 11/13] xen: XEN_DOMCTL_shadow_op hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:25 ` Ian Campbell
2013-11-29 11:27 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2013-11-28 18:57 ` [PATCH 12/13] xen: XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-28 18:57 ` [PATCH 13/13] xen: XEN_SYSCTL_debugkeys hypercall Andrew Cooper
2013-11-29 11:45 ` [PATCH 00/13] Valgrind patches for hypercalls Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:37 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-12-02 10:49 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 10:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2013-12-02 11:16 ` Ian Campbell
2013-12-02 14:25 ` Ian Campbell
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