From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>,
Asit K Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Donald D Dugger <donald.d.dugger@intel.com>,
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
xiantao.zhang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] VT-d: suppress UR signaling for desktop chipsets
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2014 13:21:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5342983C.6050102@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <533D48AA0200007800005124@nat28.tlf.novell.com>
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On 03/04/14 10:40, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Unsupported Requests can be signaled for malformed writes to the MSI
> address region, e.g. due to buggy or malicious DMA set up to that
> region. These should normally result in IOMMU faults, but don't on
> the desktop chipsets dealt with here.
>
> This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
> @@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev
> int func = PCI_FUNC(pdev->devfn);
> int pos;
> u32 val;
> + u64 bar;
> + paddr_t pa;
>
> if ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_VENDOR_ID) != 0x8086 )
> return;
> @@ -452,5 +454,33 @@ void __init pci_vtd_quirk(struct pci_dev
> printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked UR signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
> seg, bus, dev, func);
> break;
> +
> + case 0x100: case 0x104: case 0x108: /* Sandybridge */
> + case 0x150: case 0x154: case 0x158: /* Ivybridge */
> + case 0xa04: /* Haswell ULT */
> + case 0xc00: case 0xc04: case 0xc08: /* Haswell */
> + bar = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x6c);
> + bar = (bar << 32) | pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x68);
> + pa = bar & 0x7fffff000; /* bits 12...38 */
> + if ( (bar & 1) && pa &&
> + page_is_ram_type(paddr_to_pfn(pa), RAM_TYPE_RESERVED) )
> + {
> + u32 __iomem *va = ioremap(pa, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + if ( va )
> + {
> + __set_bit(0x1c8 * 8 + 20, va);
> + iounmap(va);
> + printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked UR signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
> + seg, bus, dev, func);
> + }
> + else
> + printk(XENLOG_ERR "Could not map %"PRIpaddr" for %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
> + pa, seg, bus, dev, func);
> + }
> + else
> + printk(XENLOG_WARNING "Bogus DMIBAR %#"PRIx64" on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
> + bar, seg, bus, dev, func);
> + break;
> }
> }
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-04-07 12:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-04-03 9:33 [PATCH 0/3] fixes (read: workarounds) for XSA-59 Jan Beulich
2014-04-03 9:39 ` [PATCH 1/3] VT-d: suppress UR signaling for server chipsets Jan Beulich
2014-04-07 12:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-07 13:11 ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-03 9:40 ` [PATCH 2/3] VT-d: suppress UR signaling for desktop chipsets Jan Beulich
2014-04-07 12:21 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-04-03 9:41 ` [PATCH 3/3] passthrough: allow to suppress SERR and PERR signaling altogether Jan Beulich
2014-04-07 10:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-07 10:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-07 12:47 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-07 13:05 ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-07 13:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-07 13:43 ` Jan Beulich
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