* [PATCH v5 1/2] implement is_hardware_domain using hardware_domain global
@ 2014-04-16 18:56 Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0 Daniel De Graaf
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel De Graaf @ 2014-04-16 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Stefano Stabellini,
Jan Beulich, Daniel De Graaf
This requires setting the hardware_domain variable earlier in
domain_create so that functions called from it (primarily in
arch_domain_create) observe the correct results when they call
is_hardware_domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@citrix.com>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
---
No changes since previous (and first) posting; marked v5 to match patch 2.
xen/arch/arm/setup.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 2 +-
xen/common/domain.c | 5 ++++-
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
index 358eafb..6b77a4c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/setup.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ void __init start_xen(unsigned long boot_phys_offset,
do_initcalls();
/* Create initial domain 0. */
- hardware_domain = dom0 = domain_create(0, 0, 0);
+ dom0 = domain_create(0, 0, 0);
if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0(dom0) == NULL) )
panic("Error creating domain 0");
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 11c95fc..2e30701 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ void __init noreturn __start_xen(unsigned long mbi_p)
panic("Could not protect TXT memory regions");
/* Create initial domain 0. */
- hardware_domain = dom0 = domain_create(0, DOMCRF_s3_integrity, 0);
+ dom0 = domain_create(0, DOMCRF_s3_integrity, 0);
if ( IS_ERR(dom0) || (alloc_dom0_vcpu0(dom0) == NULL) )
panic("Error creating domain 0");
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index c4720a9..3c05711 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -237,10 +237,11 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
- if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
+ if ( domid == 0 )
{
d->is_pinned = opt_dom0_vcpus_pin;
d->disable_migrate = 1;
+ hardware_domain = d;
}
rangeset_domain_initialise(d);
@@ -319,6 +320,8 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
fail:
d->is_dying = DOMDYING_dead;
+ if ( hardware_domain == d )
+ hardware_domain = NULL;
atomic_set(&d->refcnt, DOMAIN_DESTROYED);
xfree(d->mem_event);
xfree(d->pbuf);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index b080c9e..734f7a9 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -795,9 +795,9 @@ void watchdog_domain_destroy(struct domain *d);
* Use this check when the following are both true:
* - Using this feature or interface requires full access to the hardware
* (that is, this would not be suitable for a driver domain)
- * - There is never a reason to deny dom0 access to this
+ * - There is never a reason to deny the hardware domain access to this
*/
-#define is_hardware_domain(_d) ((_d)->domain_id == 0)
+#define is_hardware_domain(_d) ((_d) == hardware_domain)
/* This check is for functionality specific to a control domain */
#define is_control_domain(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
--
1.9.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-16 18:56 [PATCH v5 1/2] implement is_hardware_domain using hardware_domain global Daniel De Graaf
@ 2014-04-16 18:56 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-16 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-17 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel De Graaf @ 2014-04-16 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Jan Beulich,
Daniel De Graaf
This adds a hypervisor command line option "hardware_dom=" which takes a
domain ID. When the domain with this ID is created, it will be used
as the hardware domain.
This is intended to be used when domain 0 is a dedicated stub domain for
domain building, allowing the hardware domain to be de-privileged and
act only as a driver domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
---
Changes since v4:
- Use user-visible XSM_ENABLE configuration option in documentation
- Guard arch.ioport_caps reference with #ifdef CONFIG_X86
- Explicitly BUG if reserved domain IDs are set as the hardware domain
- Fix lock ordering conditional in rangeset_swap
- Move late_hwdom_init call above domlist update to better handle errors
docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 10 ++++++
xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 4 ++-
xen/common/domain.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
xen/common/rangeset.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/rangeset.h | 3 ++
xen/include/xen/sched.h | 6 ++++
xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 6 ++++
xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++
xen/xsm/dummy.c | 2 ++
xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 ++++
xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 2 ++
11 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index 87de2dc..e8d23b4 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -590,6 +590,16 @@ Paging (HAP).
Flag to enable 2 MB host page table support for Hardware Assisted
Paging (HAP).
+### hardware\_dom
+> `= <domid>`
+
+> Default: `0`
+
+Enable late hardware domain creation using the specified domain ID. This is
+intended to be used when domain 0 is a stub domain which builds a disaggregated
+system including a hardware domain with the specified domain ID. This option is
+supported only when compiled with XSM\_ENABLE=y on x86.
+
### hpetbroadcast
> `= <boolean>`
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
index f75f6e7..10fcd43 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
@@ -1150,7 +1150,9 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n",
elf_check_broken(&elf));
- iommu_hwdom_init(hardware_domain);
+ if ( d->domain_id == hardware_domid )
+ iommu_hwdom_init(d);
+
return 0;
out:
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 3c05711..2d2cdbe 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@ struct domain *domain_list;
struct domain *hardware_domain __read_mostly;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+domid_t hardware_domid __read_mostly;
+integer_param("hardware_dom", hardware_domid);
+#endif
+
struct vcpu *idle_vcpu[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly;
vcpu_info_t dummy_vcpu_info;
@@ -178,6 +183,51 @@ struct vcpu *alloc_vcpu(
return v;
}
+static int late_hwdom_init(struct domain *d)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+ struct domain *dom0;
+ int rv;
+
+ if ( d != hardware_domain || d->domain_id == 0 )
+ return 0;
+
+ rv = xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_HOOK, d);
+ if ( rv )
+ return rv;
+
+ printk("Initialising hardware domain %d\n", hardware_domid);
+
+ dom0 = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(0);
+ ASSERT(dom0 != NULL);
+ /*
+ * Hardware resource ranges for domain 0 have been set up from
+ * various sources intended to restrict the hardware domain's
+ * access. Apply these ranges to the actual hardware domain.
+ *
+ * Because the lists are being swapped, a side effect of this
+ * operation is that Domain 0's rangesets are cleared. Since
+ * domain 0 should not be accessing the hardware when it constructs
+ * a hardware domain, this should not be a problem. Both lists
+ * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex
+ * device model is desired.
+ */
+ rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps);
+ rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+ rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps);
+#endif
+
+ rcu_unlock_domain(dom0);
+
+ iommu_hwdom_init(d);
+
+ return rv;
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
@@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
struct domain *domain_create(
domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
{
- struct domain *d, **pd;
+ struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
int err, init_status = 0;
@@ -237,10 +287,12 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
- if ( domid == 0 )
+ if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
{
+ BUG_ON(domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
d->is_pinned = opt_dom0_vcpus_pin;
d->disable_migrate = 1;
+ old_hwdom = hardware_domain;
hardware_domain = d;
}
@@ -302,6 +354,9 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
if ( (err = sched_init_domain(d)) != 0 )
goto fail;
+ if ( (err = late_hwdom_init(d)) != 0 )
+ goto fail;
+
if ( !is_idle_domain(d) )
{
spin_lock(&domlist_update_lock);
@@ -321,7 +376,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
fail:
d->is_dying = DOMDYING_dead;
if ( hardware_domain == d )
- hardware_domain = NULL;
+ hardware_domain = old_hwdom;
atomic_set(&d->refcnt, DOMAIN_DESTROYED);
xfree(d->mem_event);
xfree(d->pbuf);
diff --git a/xen/common/rangeset.c b/xen/common/rangeset.c
index f09c0c4..9a4d277 100644
--- a/xen/common/rangeset.c
+++ b/xen/common/rangeset.c
@@ -380,6 +380,46 @@ void rangeset_domain_destroy(
}
}
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b)
+{
+ struct list_head tmp;
+ if ( a < b )
+ {
+ spin_lock(&a->lock);
+ spin_lock(&b->lock);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ spin_lock(&b->lock);
+ spin_lock(&a->lock);
+ }
+ memcpy(&tmp, &a->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
+ memcpy(&a->range_list, &b->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
+ memcpy(&b->range_list, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if ( a->range_list.next == &b->range_list )
+ {
+ a->range_list.next = &a->range_list;
+ a->range_list.prev = &a->range_list;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ a->range_list.next->prev = &a->range_list;
+ a->range_list.prev->next = &a->range_list;
+ }
+ if ( b->range_list.next == &a->range_list )
+ {
+ b->range_list.next = &b->range_list;
+ b->range_list.prev = &b->range_list;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ b->range_list.next->prev = &b->range_list;
+ b->range_list.prev->next = &b->range_list;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&a->lock);
+ spin_unlock(&b->lock);
+}
+
/*****************************
* Pretty-printing functions
*/
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
index 1e16a6b..2c122c1 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int __must_check rangeset_remove_singleton(
int __must_check rangeset_contains_singleton(
struct rangeset *r, unsigned long s);
+/* swap contents */
+void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b);
+
/* Rangeset pretty printing. */
void rangeset_printk(
struct rangeset *r);
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
index 734f7a9..44851ae 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
@@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_compat_t);
/* A global pointer to the hardware domain (usually DOM0). */
extern struct domain *hardware_domain;
+#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM
+extern domid_t hardware_domid;
+#else
+#define hardware_domid 0
+#endif
+
#ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT
#define BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) BITS_PER_XEN_ULONG
#else
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index e722155..8ca1117 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -299,6 +299,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct
return NULL;
}
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
+{
+ XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK);
+ return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
+}
+
static XSM_INLINE int xsm_get_pod_target(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d)
{
XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV);
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 2cd3a3b..ef1c584 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct xsm_operations {
int (*alloc_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn);
void (*free_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn);
char *(*show_security_evtchn) (struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *chn);
+ int (*init_hardware_domain) (struct domain *d);
int (*get_pod_target) (struct domain *d);
int (*set_pod_target) (struct domain *d);
@@ -311,6 +312,11 @@ static inline char *xsm_show_security_evtchn (struct domain *d, const struct evt
return xsm_ops->show_security_evtchn(d, chn);
}
+static inline int xsm_init_hardware_domain (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
+{
+ return xsm_ops->init_hardware_domain(d);
+}
+
static inline int xsm_get_pod_target (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d)
{
return xsm_ops->get_pod_target(d);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
index b79e10f..c2804f2 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, alloc_security_evtchn);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, free_security_evtchn);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, show_security_evtchn);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, init_hardware_domain);
+
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_pod_target);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, set_pod_target);
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 4ce31c9..f1a4a2d 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -327,6 +327,11 @@ static char *flask_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *c
return ctx;
}
+static int flask_init_hardware_domain(struct domain *d)
+{
+ return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__CREATE_HARDWARE_DOMAIN);
+}
+
static int flask_grant_mapref(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2,
uint32_t flags)
{
@@ -1500,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = {
.alloc_security_evtchn = flask_alloc_security_evtchn,
.free_security_evtchn = flask_free_security_evtchn,
.show_security_evtchn = flask_show_security_evtchn,
+ .init_hardware_domain = flask_init_hardware_domain,
.get_pod_target = flask_get_pod_target,
.set_pod_target = flask_set_pod_target,
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
index a0ed13d..32371a9 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ class domain2
set_max_evtchn
# XEN_DOMCTL_cacheflush
cacheflush
+# Creation of the hardware domain when it is not dom0
+ create_hardware_domain
}
# Similar to class domain, but primarily contains domctls related to HVM domains
--
1.9.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0 Daniel De Graaf
@ 2014-04-16 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-16 19:13 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-17 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Cooper @ 2014-04-16 19:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel De Graaf
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Jan Beulich
On 16/04/14 19:56, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
> static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
> @@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
> struct domain *domain_create(
> domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
> {
> - struct domain *d, **pd;
> + struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
> enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
> INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
> int err, init_status = 0;
> @@ -237,10 +287,12 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
> else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
> d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
>
> - if ( domid == 0 )
> + if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
> {
> + BUG_ON(domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
Domid is a signed type.
You also need ensure it is not negative, as assign_integer_param() from
the command line parsing writes all values as unsigned.
~Andrew
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-16 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
@ 2014-04-16 19:13 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-17 7:24 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel De Graaf @ 2014-04-16 19:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Cooper
Cc: Keir Fraser, Ian Campbell, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, xen-devel,
Jan Beulich
On 04/16/2014 03:06 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 16/04/14 19:56, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
>> static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
>> @@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
>> struct domain *domain_create(
>> domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
>> {
>> - struct domain *d, **pd;
>> + struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
>> enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
>> INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
>> int err, init_status = 0;
>> @@ -237,10 +287,12 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
>> else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
>> d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
>>
>> - if ( domid == 0 )
>> + if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
>> {
>> + BUG_ON(domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
>
> Domid is a signed type.
>
> You also need ensure it is not negative, as assign_integer_param() from
> the command line parsing writes all values as unsigned.
>
> ~Andrew
While this is true, the domain ID has already been validated by the caller
of domain_create and so there is no need to check for domid < 0 here. If
someone assigns an out-of-range domain ID to the hardware_domid field, the
system will act the same as if any other unused domain ID is specified: a
technically working but realistically unusable system.
--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-16 19:13 ` Daniel De Graaf
@ 2014-04-17 7:24 ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-17 14:19 ` Daniel De Graaf
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2014-04-17 7:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Cooper, Daniel De Graaf
Cc: Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
>>> On 16.04.14 at 21:13, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> On 04/16/2014 03:06 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 16/04/14 19:56, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
>>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
>>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
>>> static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
>>> @@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
>>> struct domain *domain_create(
>>> domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
>>> {
>>> - struct domain *d, **pd;
>>> + struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
>>> enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
>>> INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
>>> int err, init_status = 0;
>>> @@ -237,10 +287,12 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
>>> else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
>>> d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
>>>
>>> - if ( domid == 0 )
>>> + if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
>>> {
>>> + BUG_ON(domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
>>
>> Domid is a signed type.
>>
>> You also need ensure it is not negative, as assign_integer_param() from
>> the command line parsing writes all values as unsigned.
>
> While this is true, the domain ID has already been validated by the caller
> of domain_create and so there is no need to check for domid < 0 here. If
> someone assigns an out-of-range domain ID to the hardware_domid field, the
> system will act the same as if any other unused domain ID is specified: a
> technically working but realistically unusable system.
The thing is that you check the wrong entity: domid is always valid
(as it is being picked by the caller) - you really want to BUG_ON() or
panic() upon seeing hardware_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED (and
indeed I think in this case panic() would be the better option, as it
gives a descriptive message for bad user input rather than a crash
the reason for which one needs to look up in sources).
As that's the only (non-cosmetic) change request, I'd be fine doing
that change while committing, unless I hear to the contrary.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-17 7:24 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2014-04-17 14:19 ` Daniel De Graaf
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Daniel De Graaf @ 2014-04-17 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper
Cc: Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
On 04/17/2014 03:24 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 16.04.14 at 21:13, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>> On 04/16/2014 03:06 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 16/04/14 19:56, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
>>>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_dom0_irqs = 256;
>>>> static unsigned int __read_mostly extra_domU_irqs = 32;
>>>> static void __init parse_extra_guest_irqs(const char *s)
>>>> @@ -192,7 +242,7 @@ custom_param("extra_guest_irqs", parse_extra_guest_irqs);
>>>> struct domain *domain_create(
>>>> domid_t domid, unsigned int domcr_flags, uint32_t ssidref)
>>>> {
>>>> - struct domain *d, **pd;
>>>> + struct domain *d, **pd, *old_hwdom = NULL;
>>>> enum { INIT_xsm = 1u<<0, INIT_watchdog = 1u<<1, INIT_rangeset = 1u<<2,
>>>> INIT_evtchn = 1u<<3, INIT_gnttab = 1u<<4, INIT_arch = 1u<<5 };
>>>> int err, init_status = 0;
>>>> @@ -237,10 +287,12 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
>>>> else if ( domcr_flags & DOMCRF_pvh )
>>>> d->guest_type = guest_type_pvh;
>>>>
>>>> - if ( domid == 0 )
>>>> + if ( domid == 0 || domid == hardware_domid )
>>>> {
>>>> + BUG_ON(domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
>>>
>>> Domid is a signed type.
>>>
>>> You also need ensure it is not negative, as assign_integer_param() from
>>> the command line parsing writes all values as unsigned.
>>
>> While this is true, the domain ID has already been validated by the caller
>> of domain_create and so there is no need to check for domid < 0 here. If
>> someone assigns an out-of-range domain ID to the hardware_domid field, the
>> system will act the same as if any other unused domain ID is specified: a
>> technically working but realistically unusable system.
>
> The thing is that you check the wrong entity: domid is always valid
> (as it is being picked by the caller) - you really want to BUG_ON() or
> panic() upon seeing hardware_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED (and
> indeed I think in this case panic() would be the better option, as it
> gives a descriptive message for bad user input rather than a crash
> the reason for which one needs to look up in sources).
>
> As that's the only (non-cosmetic) change request, I'd be fine doing
> that change while committing, unless I hear to the contrary.
>
> Jan
That change is fine with me.
--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0
2014-04-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0 Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-16 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
@ 2014-04-17 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2014-04-17 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Daniel De Graaf
Cc: Keir Fraser, Tim Deegan, Ian Jackson, Ian Campbell, xen-devel
>>> On 16.04.14 at 20:56, <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
Actually when preparing to commit this I realized this is done rather
badly:
> +void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b)
> +{
> + struct list_head tmp;
Blank line missing here.
> + if ( a < b )
> + {
> + spin_lock(&a->lock);
> + spin_lock(&b->lock);
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + spin_lock(&b->lock);
> + spin_lock(&a->lock);
> + }
> + memcpy(&tmp, &a->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
> + memcpy(&a->range_list, &b->range_list, sizeof(tmp));
> + memcpy(&b->range_list, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
> + if ( a->range_list.next == &b->range_list )
> + {
> + a->range_list.next = &a->range_list;
> + a->range_list.prev = &a->range_list;
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + a->range_list.next->prev = &a->range_list;
> + a->range_list.prev->next = &a->range_list;
> + }
> + if ( b->range_list.next == &a->range_list )
> + {
> + b->range_list.next = &b->range_list;
> + b->range_list.prev = &b->range_list;
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + b->range_list.next->prev = &b->range_list;
> + b->range_list.prev->next = &b->range_list;
> + }
I think all this can be replaced with two list_splice_init() and one
final list_splice(); no need to open code any list manipulation.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2014-04-17 15:00 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2014-04-16 18:56 [PATCH v5 1/2] implement is_hardware_domain using hardware_domain global Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] allow hardware domain != dom0 Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-16 19:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-16 19:13 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-17 7:24 ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-17 14:19 ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-04-17 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).