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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Donald D Dugger <donald.d.dugger@intel.com>,
	xiantao.zhang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 10:34:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <535E208D.2080805@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <535E2702020000780000CACC@nat28.tlf.novell.com>


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On 28/04/14 09:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Add two more PCI IDs to the set that has been taken care of with a
> different workaround long before XSA-59, and (for constency with the
> newer workarounds) log a message here too.
>
> Also move the function wide comment to the cases it applies to; this
> should really have been done by d061d200 ("VT-d: suppress UR signaling
> for server chipsets").
>
> This is CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

As before, this would probably be better being a conditional message.

~Andrew

>
> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
> +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/quirks.c
> @@ -379,12 +379,6 @@ void me_wifi_quirk(struct domain *domain
>      }
>  }
>  
> -/*
> - * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic:
> - *   - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors 
> - *   - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults
> - *   - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults
> - */
>  void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
>  {
>      int seg = pdev->seg;
> @@ -402,10 +396,20 @@ void pci_vtd_quirk(const struct pci_dev 
>  
>      switch ( pci_conf_read16(seg, bus, dev, func, PCI_DEVICE_ID) )
>      {
> +    /*
> +     * Mask reporting Intel VT-d faults to IOH core logic:
> +     *   - Some platform escalates VT-d faults to platform errors.
> +     *   - This can cause system failure upon non-fatal VT-d faults.
> +     *   - Potential security issue if malicious guest trigger VT-d faults.
> +     */
> +    case 0x0e28: /* Xeon-E5v2 (IvyBridge) */
>      case 0x342e: /* Tylersburg chipset (Nehalem / Westmere systems) */
> +    case 0x3728: /* Xeon C5500/C3500 (JasperForest) */
>      case 0x3c28: /* Sandybridge */
>          val = pci_conf_read32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC);
>          pci_conf_write32(seg, bus, dev, func, 0x1AC, val | (1 << 31));
> +        printk(XENLOG_INFO "Masked VT-d error signaling on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u\n",
> +               seg, bus, dev, func);
>          break;
>  
>      /* Tylersburg (EP)/Boxboro (MP) chipsets (NHM-EP/EX, WSM-EP/EX) */
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel


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  reply	other threads:[~2014-04-28  9:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-04-28  7:54 [PATCH 0/2] VT-d: further XSA-59 workaround adjustments Jan Beulich
2014-04-28  8:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] VT-d: apply quirks at device setup time rather than only at boot Jan Beulich
2014-04-28  9:30   ` Andrew Cooper
2014-04-28  9:55     ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-28 10:01       ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-20  0:46   ` Zhang, Xiantao
2014-04-28  8:01 ` [PATCH 2/2] VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets Jan Beulich
2014-04-28  9:34   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-04-28  9:56     ` Jan Beulich
2014-04-28  9:57       ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-20  0:47   ` Zhang, Xiantao
2014-05-08  8:07 ` Ping: [PATCH 0/2] VT-d: further XSA-59 workaround adjustments Jan Beulich
2014-05-16  9:30   ` Ping II: " Jan Beulich
     [not found] <A9667DDFB95DB7438FA9D7D576C3D87E0AACE649@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com>
2014-05-20 13:39 ` [PATCH 2/2] VT-d: extend error report masking workaround to newer chipsets Zhang, Yang Z

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