From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: TimDeegan <tim@xen.org>, Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/9] x86/traps: Make panic and reboot paths safe during early boot
Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 13:12:56 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5374CB680200007800012A1F@mail.emea.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53749CB1.3010008@citrix.com>
>>> On 15.05.14 at 12:53, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
> On 15/05/14 11:19, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 15.05.14 at 11:48, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>> Make use of SYS_STATE_smp_boot to help machine_{halt,restart}() know if/when
>>> it is safe to enable interrupts and access the local apic to send IPIs.
>>> Before system_state == SYS_STATE_smp_boot, we can be certain that only the
> BSP
>>> is running.
>> Hmm, tying SMP boot and IRQ enabling together seems a little
>> problematic, even if on x86 the former happens soon after the latter
>> right now. Perhaps these ought to be distinct states?
>
> Which states would you suggest then?
Perhaps "IRQs enabled" and "SMP boot"?
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> @@ -5246,7 +5246,7 @@ static l3_pgentry_t *virt_to_xen_l3e(unsigned long v)
>>> pl4e = &idle_pg_table[l4_table_offset(v)];
>>> if ( !(l4e_get_flags(*pl4e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) )
>>> {
>>> - bool_t locking = system_state > SYS_STATE_boot;
>>> + bool_t locking = system_state >= SYS_STATE_active;
>> Did you just mechanically adjust occurrences like this one, to (as the
>> description says) have their semantics remain identical? I ask because
>> it would seem to me that here you'd likely better change the semantics
>> by keeping the code unchanged.
>>
>>> --- a/xen/common/symbols.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/symbols.c
>>> @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static unsigned int get_symbol_offset(unsigned long pos)
>>> bool_t is_active_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
>>> {
>>> return (is_kernel_text(addr) ||
>>> - (system_state == SYS_STATE_boot && is_kernel_inittext(addr)));
>>> + (system_state < SYS_STATE_active && is_kernel_inittext(addr)));
>> And here, contrary to the description, you actually do a semantic
>> (but correct!) change.
>
> I attempted to change each of them such that SYS_STATE_boot and
> SYS_STATE_smp_boot acted the same, and that further insertions of new
> states wouldn't require changes quite this wide.
For the former, I think if the locking is okay at that point (which I
think it is) you should drop the change and just mention the semantic
change. For the latter, all I was after is that you make the patch
description match it implementation.
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-05-15 12:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-05-15 9:48 [PATCH RFC 0/9] x86: Improvements to trap handling Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 1/9] x86/traps: Names for system descriptor types Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 9:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:08 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 10:26 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 12:10 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 2/9] x86/traps: Make panic and reboot paths safe during early boot Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:19 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 10:53 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 12:12 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2014-05-15 15:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 15:59 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/traps: Make the main trap handlers safe for use early during Xen boot Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:20 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 4/9] x86/misc: Early cleanup Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:32 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 10:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86/traps: Functional prep work Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:36 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 10:45 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 12:15 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 12:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 6/9] x86/boot: Install trap handlers much earlier on boot Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 10:53 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 11:05 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 12:21 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 7/9] x86/boot: Drop pre-C IDT patching Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 8/9] x86/irqs: Move interrupt-stub generation out of C Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 13:06 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 9:48 ` [PATCH RFC 9/9] x86/misc: Post cleanup Andrew Cooper
2014-05-15 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2014-05-15 13:17 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-05-16 8:49 ` [PATCH RFC 0/9] x86: Improvements to trap handling Wu, Feng
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