From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: mdontu@bitdefender.com, tim@xen.org, JBeulich@suse.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 18:03:55 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53C018FB.3080307@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405093418-23481-3-git-send-email-rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
On 11/07/14 16:43, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> Vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() will now refuse to disable interception of
> MSRs needed for memory introspection. It is not possible to gate this on
> mem_access being active for the domain, since by the time mem_access does
> become active the interception for the interesting MSRs has already been
> disabled (vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() runs very early on).
>
> Changes since V1:
> - Replaced printk() with gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, ...).
>
> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
> index 8ffc562..35fcfcc 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
> @@ -700,6 +700,24 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
> if ( msr_bitmap == NULL )
> return;
>
> + /* Filter out MSR-s needed for memory introspection */
> + switch ( msr )
This absolutely must be gated on mem_events being enabled for the domain.
It is too much of a performance penalty to apply to domains which are
not being introspected.
> + {
> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL:
> + case MSR_STAR:
> + case MSR_LSTAR:
> +
> + gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "MSR 0x%08x needed for "
> + "memory introspection, still intercepted\n", msr);
I you are going to split this line then do it at the %08x so the string
is still grepable.
How often do these messages trigger? It seems like it could be
contribute to a lot of logspam.
> + return;
> +
> + default:
> + break;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
> * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-11 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-11 15:43 [PATCH RFC V2 1/6] xen: Emulate with no writes Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 2/6] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 16:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 16:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:03 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 17:03 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-07-11 18:09 ` Razvan Cojocaru
[not found] ` <CAGU+ausrcu=L7Kf30gZJXRnnxrKe7EMYXTGByOY4agwoK0nXeA@mail.gmail.com>
2014-07-11 18:18 ` Aravindh Puthiyaparambil (aravindp)
2014-07-11 18:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:22 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:29 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 4/6] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 17:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:15 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 13:50 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2015-03-17 14:07 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 14:20 ` Jan Beulich
2015-03-17 14:33 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 5/6] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-17 11:53 ` Ian Campbell
2014-07-17 12:07 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-17 12:22 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-17 12:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 6/6] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:41 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 19:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 16:23 ` [PATCH RFC V2 1/6] xen: Emulate with no writes Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:00 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-14 8:37 ` Razvan Cojocaru
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