From: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: mdontu@bitdefender.com, tim@xen.org, JBeulich@suse.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 21:09:29 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53C02859.10208@bitdefender.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53C018FB.3080307@citrix.com>
On 07/11/2014 08:03 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 11/07/14 16:43, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
>> Vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() will now refuse to disable interception of
>> MSRs needed for memory introspection. It is not possible to gate this on
>> mem_access being active for the domain, since by the time mem_access does
>> become active the interception for the interesting MSRs has already been
>> disabled (vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() runs very early on).
>>
>> Changes since V1:
>> - Replaced printk() with gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, ...).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
>> ---
>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
>> index 8ffc562..35fcfcc 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
>> @@ -700,6 +700,24 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 msr, int type)
>> if ( msr_bitmap == NULL )
>> return;
>>
>> + /* Filter out MSR-s needed for memory introspection */
>> + switch ( msr )
>
> This absolutely must be gated on mem_events being enabled for the domain.
>
> It is too much of a performance penalty to apply to domains which are
> not being introspected.
I understand, but it really runs very early on, and the mem_event part
comes in after the MSR interception is disabled. This effectively
renders a lot of memory introspection functionality useless.
>> + {
>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
>> + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
>> + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL:
>> + case MSR_STAR:
>> + case MSR_LSTAR:
>> +
>> + gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "MSR 0x%08x needed for "
>> + "memory introspection, still intercepted\n", msr);
>
> I you are going to split this line then do it at the %08x so the string
> is still grepable.
>
> How often do these messages trigger? It seems like it could be
> contribute to a lot of logspam.
As far as I've seen, never more than a handful of them (maybe 5-6 lines)
when the domain starts, never to be seen again. Definitely not log spam
material.
Thanks,
Razvan Cojocaru
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-11 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-11 15:43 [PATCH RFC V2 1/6] xen: Emulate with no writes Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 2/6] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 16:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 16:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:03 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 17:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:09 ` Razvan Cojocaru [this message]
[not found] ` <CAGU+ausrcu=L7Kf30gZJXRnnxrKe7EMYXTGByOY4agwoK0nXeA@mail.gmail.com>
2014-07-11 18:18 ` Aravindh Puthiyaparambil (aravindp)
2014-07-11 18:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:22 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:29 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 4/6] xen: Support for VMCALL mem_events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 17:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:15 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 13:50 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2015-03-17 14:07 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2015-03-17 14:20 ` Jan Beulich
2015-03-17 14:33 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 5/6] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-17 11:53 ` Ian Campbell
2014-07-17 12:07 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-17 12:22 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-17 12:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 15:43 ` [PATCH RFC V2 6/6] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 18:36 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:41 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-11 19:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 16:23 ` [PATCH RFC V2 1/6] xen: Emulate with no writes Andrew Cooper
2014-07-11 18:00 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-07-14 8:37 ` Razvan Cojocaru
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=53C02859.10208@bitdefender.com \
--to=rcojocaru@bitdefender.com \
--cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=mdontu@bitdefender.com \
--cc=tim@xen.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).