xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: "Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>
Cc: Andrei LUTAS <vlutas@bitdefender.com>,
	xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, keir@xen.org, jbeulich@suse.com
Subject: Re: xen: generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2014 09:35:55 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <540EBBEB.7030708@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140909060111.0d888575@bitdefender.com>

On 09/09/2014 04:01, Mihai Donțu wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This is another patch from which we stepped back for a while in order
> to give it a better thought:
>
> http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2014-07/msg00309.html
>
> Our argument for it is that memory introspection technologies can cause
> a VMEXIT practically at any point during the guest execution, even
> without any 'malicious' activity going on in it. If the instruction
> that caused the exit is well within a protected page, we would need to:
>
>   a) emulate it
>   b) single step it
>
> The emulation part would be the desired option, but unfortunately it
> requires a full blown emulator which I believe is beyond the scope of
> Xen.

As I said on the thread before, the current emulator in Xen is all Xen
has needed in the past.

I think it is perfectly reasonable to extend the emulator if a plausible
use (such as this) arises, but we would specifically want to avoid is
having multiple emulators in Xen.

>  One would rather have to somehow tap into qemu (if at all
> possible).

It is technically possible, but the overheads would be massive.

>
> The other option, which is permanent in that it does not need to be
> maintained like an emulator, is to suspend all vCPU's, grant
> permissions to the fault page, single step the guest, return to Xen and
> then resume. It has a bit of overhead, but the fact that this code path
> is seldom taken and cumulated with the efficiency of latest hardware
> makes it the better choice. Also, the tests we have conducted show no
> observable slowdown.

No observable slowdown from whose point of view? How often are
instructions trapped and replayed like this?

>
> In conclusion: is there any way we can bring this idea (either in the
> proposed form by the patch or any other) into Xen?

A proposition email like this with a clear high level goal is certainly
a good start.

~Andrew


_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

      reply	other threads:[~2014-09-09  8:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-09  3:01 xen: generic instruction re-execution mechanism for execute faults Mihai Donțu
2014-09-09  8:35 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=540EBBEB.7030708@citrix.com \
    --to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=keir@xen.org \
    --cc=mdontu@bitdefender.com \
    --cc=vlutas@bitdefender.com \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xensource.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).