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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>,
	Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@zentific.com>
Cc: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	"Dong, Eddie" <eddie.dong@intel.com>,
	George Dunlap <dunlapg@umich.edu>, Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 09:48:07 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <54101047.4060901@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <54100722.1090604@bitdefender.com>

On 10/09/2014 09:09, Razvan Cojocaru wrote:
> On 09/09/2014 09:38 PM, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
>>     > But ultimately, as Tim said, you're basically just *hoping* that it
>>     > won't take too long to happen to be at the hypervisor when the proper
>>     > condition happens.  If the process in question isn't getting many
>>     > interrupts, or is spending the vast majority of its time in the
>>     > kernel, you may end up waiting an unbounded amount of time to be able
>>     > to "catch" it in user mode.  It seems like it would be better to find
>>     > a reliable way to trap on the return into user mode, in which case you
>>     > wouldn't need to have a special "wait for this complicated event to
>>     > happen" call at all, would you?
>>
>>     Indeed, but it is assumed that the trap injection request is being made
>>     by the caller in the proper context (when it knows that the condition
>>     will be true sooner rather than later).
>>
>>
>> How is it known that the condition will be true soon? Some more
>> information on what you consider 'proper context' would be valuable.
> It's actually pretty simple for us: the application always requests an
> injection when the guest is already in the address space of the
> interesting application, and in user mode.

Does this mean that you always request a pagefault as a direct result of
a mem_event, when the vcpu is in blocked the correct context?

If so, how about extending the mem_event response mechanism with
trap/fault information?

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-10  8:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-08-28 11:47 [PATCH RFC V9 1/5] xen: Emulate with no writes Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 11:47 ` [PATCH RFC V9 2/5] xen: Optimize introspection access to guest state Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC V9 3/5] xen, libxc: Force-enable relevant MSR events Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 12:03   ` Jan Beulich
2014-08-28 12:08     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 12:11       ` Jan Beulich
2014-08-28 12:23         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 12:37         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-29  7:44         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-29  9:27           ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-01  7:36             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-01  9:08               ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-01 11:54                 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-01 12:05                   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-02  9:18                     ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-02  9:33                       ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-02  9:44                         ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-02 10:08                           ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-02 13:24                       ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-09 16:57                         ` George Dunlap
2014-09-09 17:39                           ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-09 18:38                             ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10  8:09                               ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-10  8:48                                 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2014-09-10  8:55                                   ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-10  9:34                                     ` Andrew Cooper
2014-09-10 10:39                                     ` George Dunlap
2014-09-10 10:49                                       ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-09 20:14                           ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-10  9:30                             ` Razvan Cojocaru
2014-09-10  9:59                               ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-10 10:44                               ` Tim Deegan
2014-08-28 11:48 ` [PATCH RFC V9 5/5] xen: Handle resumed instruction based on previous mem_event reply Razvan Cojocaru
2014-08-28 12:09   ` Jan Beulich

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