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From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: kevin.tian@intel.com, keir@xen.org, jbeulich@suse.com,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, tim@xen.org,
	dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com, suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 16/20] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for PV guests
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 14:57:45 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5421C2A9.6010701@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140923183139.GR3007@laptop.dumpdata.com>

On 09/23/2014 02:31 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>   int vpmu_do_interrupt(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>   {
>> -    struct vcpu *v = current;
>> -    struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(v);
>> +    struct vcpu *sampled = current, *sampling;
>> +    struct vpmu_struct *vpmu;
>> +
>> +    /* dom0 will handle interrupt for special domains (e.g. idle domain) */
>> +    if ( sampled->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
>> +    {
>> +        sampling = choose_hwdom_vcpu();
>> +        if ( !sampling )
>> +            return 0;
>> +    }
>> +    else
>> +        sampling = sampled;
>> +
>> +    vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(sampling);
>> +    if ( !is_hvm_domain(sampling->domain) )
>> +    {
>> +        /* PV(H) guest */
>> +        const struct cpu_user_regs *cur_regs;
>> +
>> +        if ( !vpmu->xenpmu_data )
>> +            return 0;
>> +
>> +        if ( vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu_flags & PMU_CACHED )
>> +            return 1;
>> +
>> +        if ( is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) &&
>> +             !vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->do_interrupt(regs) )
>> +            return 0;
>> +
>> +        /* PV guest will be reading PMU MSRs from xenpmu_data */
> OK, with that nice comment I was thinking that:
>> +        vpmu_set(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
>> +        vpmu->arch_vpmu_ops->arch_vpmu_save(sampling);
> would be the one that writes the values to pmu.r.regs, but so far
> in this patchset that is not the case. It does write to the pmu.c (contexts)
> but that is not ..
>
>> +        vpmu_reset(vpmu, VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE | VPMU_CONTEXT_LOADED);
>> +
>> +        /* Store appropriate registers in xenpmu_data */
>> +        if ( is_pv_32bit_domain(sampling->domain) )
>> +        {
>> +            /*
>> +             * 32-bit dom0 cannot process Xen's addresses (which are 64 bit)
>> +             * and therefore we treat it the same way as a non-privileged
>> +             * PV 32-bit domain.
>> +             */
>> +            struct compat_pmu_regs *cmp;
>> +
>> +            cur_regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
>> +
>> +            cmp = (void *)&vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
> .. what we read from here. Did I miss a patch?
>
>> +            cmp->eip = cur_regs->rip;
>> +            cmp->esp = cur_regs->rsp;
>> +            cmp->cs = cur_regs->cs;
>> +            if ( (cmp->cs & 3) == 1 )
>> +                cmp->cs &= ~3;
>> +        }
>> +        else
>> +        {
>> +            struct xen_pmu_regs *r = &vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu.r.regs;
> Ditto here.
>
> Perhaps a comment stating _who_ (or _what_) is responsible for populating
> the 'pmu.r.regs' structure?

There are different registers --- PMU MSRs and GPRs. Comment "PV guest 
will be reading PMU MSRs from xenpmu_data" was in reference to guest 
accessing MSRs that are cached in pmu.c(ontext) as opposed to doing 
rd/wrmsr and trapping to hypervisor.. That's why we do arch_vpmu_save(): 
to save PMU MSRs into the shared page.

pmu.r(egisters) are sampled VCPU's GPRs and are filled in this routine.

Does this answer your question?

>
>> +
>> +            /* Non-privileged domains are always in XENPMU_MODE_SELF mode */
>> +            if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_SELF) ||
>> +                 (!is_hardware_domain(sampled->domain) &&
>> +                  !is_idle_vcpu(sampled)) )
>> +                cur_regs = guest_cpu_user_regs();
>> +            else
>> +                cur_regs = regs;
>> +
>> +            r->rip = cur_regs->rip;
>> +            r->rsp = cur_regs->rsp;
>> +
>> +            if ( !is_pvh_domain(sampled->domain) )
>> +            {
>> +                r->cs = cur_regs->cs;
>> +                if ( sampled->arch.flags & TF_kernel_mode )
>> +                    r->cs &= ~3;
>> +            }
>> +            else
>> +            {
>> +                struct segment_register seg_cs;
>> +
>> +                hvm_get_segment_register(sampled, x86_seg_cs, &seg_cs);
>> +                r->cs = seg_cs.sel;
>> +            }
>> +        }
>> +
>> +        vpmu->xenpmu_data->domain_id = DOMID_SELF;
>> +        vpmu->xenpmu_data->vcpu_id = sampled->vcpu_id;
>> +        vpmu->xenpmu_data->pcpu_id = smp_processor_id();
>> +
>> +        vpmu->xenpmu_data->pmu_flags |= PMU_CACHED;
>> +        vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
> Right, especially as core2_vpmu_do_interrupt (which is called earlier)
> does:
>
>    vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc = apic_read(APIC_LVTPC) & ~APIC_LVT_MASKED;
>    apic_write_around(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
>
> So here we mask it
>
>> +        apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
> Hm, so for Intel we would do _two_ apic_writes ?

Yes, this is due to Intel's masking of LVTPC during interrupt (AMD does 
not do this). So the Intel's handler will re-enable PMU interrupts.

I could have made Intel's apic_write conditional upon PV(H) vs. HVM but 
I thought that do_interrupt() should always return an unmasked PMU in 
generic code so that both Intel and AMD "look" the same.

I'll ignore the rest of your comments since I think that's what you told 
me to ;-)

-boris

>
> Anyhow,  we mask it here..
> .. snip..
>>       case XENPMU_lvtpc_set:
>> -        if ( current->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data == NULL )
>> +        curr = current;
>> +        if ( curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data == NULL )
>>               return -EINVAL;
>> -        vpmu_lvtpc_update(current->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
>> +        vpmu_lvtpc_update(curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
>> +        ret = 0;
>> +        break;
>> +
>> +    case XENPMU_flush:
>> +        curr = current;
>> +        curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu_flags &= ~PMU_CACHED;
>> +        vpmu_lvtpc_update(curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtpc);
> And this code does:
>
> +void vpmu_lvtpc_update(uint32_t val)
> +{
> +    struct vpmu_struct *vpmu = vcpu_vpmu(current);
> +
> +    vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc = PMU_APIC_VECTOR | (val & APIC_LVT_MASKED);
> +    apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc);
> +}
> +
>
> And we over-write vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc with the new value. The 'val'
> here is important as it may have APIC_LVT_MASKED or not. We get that
> from ' curr->arch.vpmu.xenpmu_data->pmu.l.lapic_lvtp ' but I am
> not seeing who sets it. I was thinking the XENPMU_lvtpc_set but that
> calls vpmu_lvtpc_update which will update the vpmu->hw_lapic_lvtpc
> with the APIC_LVT_MASKED if set.
>
> So who sets it?
>
> Anyhow, with it being zero, that means the APIC_LVT_MASKED is unset, so
> interrupts are free to go, and here:
>
>> +        vpmu_load(curr);
> We do another 'apic_write_around' with the hw_lapic_lvtpc value. So two
> apci_writes to unmask it. (Or mask it back if the l.lapic_lvtpc has
> APIC_LVT_MASKED set).
>
> Should the XENPMU_flush check if:
>
>   - The PMU_CACHED bit is set (and if not then -EAGAIN?)
>   - The APIC_LVT_MASKED was set (and if so, then unmaks it). If it is
>     not set, then no need to do apic_write?
>
> ?
>>           ret = 0;
>>           break;
>>       }
>> diff --git a/xen/include/public/pmu.h b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> index 68a5fb8..a1886a5 100644
>> --- a/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> +++ b/xen/include/public/pmu.h
>> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
>>   #define XENPMU_init            4
>>   #define XENPMU_finish          5
>>   #define XENPMU_lvtpc_set       6
>> +#define XENPMU_flush           7 /* Write cached MSR values to HW     */
>>   /* ` } */
>>   
>>   /* Parameters structure for HYPERVISOR_xenpmu_op call */
>> @@ -61,6 +62,12 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_pmu_params_t);
>>    */
>>   #define XENPMU_FEATURE_INTEL_BTS  1
>>   
>> +/*
>> + * PMU MSRs are cached in the context so the PV guest doesn't need to trap to
>> + * the hypervisor
>> + */
>> +#define PMU_CACHED 1
>> +
>>   /* Shared between hypervisor and PV domain */
>>   struct xen_pmu_data {
>>       uint32_t domain_id;
>> -- 
>> 1.8.1.4
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Xen-devel mailing list
>> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
>> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-09-23 18:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-22 23:57 [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 00/20] x86/PMU: Xen PMU PV(H) support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 01/20] common/symbols: Export hypervisor symbols to privileged guest Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:28   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 02/20] x86/VPMU: Manage VPMU_CONTEXT_SAVE flag in vpmu_save_force() Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:44   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:26       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 03/20] x86/VPMU: Set MSR bitmaps only for HVM/PVH guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 04/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu macros a bit more efficient Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 05/20] intel/VPMU: Clean up Intel VPMU code Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 06/20] vmx: Merge MSR management routines Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:48   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 07/20] x86/VPMU: Handle APIC_LVTPC accesses Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 08/20] intel/VPMU: MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL should be initialized to zero Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 09/20] x86/VPMU: Add public xenpmu.h Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 10/20] x86/VPMU: Make vpmu not HVM-specific Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 11/20] x86/VPMU: Interface for setting PMU mode and flags Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:55   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:58   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 19:24     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 20:47       ` Daniel De Graaf
2014-09-23 21:06         ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-24  8:31           ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 12/20] x86/VPMU: Initialize PMU for PV(H) guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 14:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 13/20] x86/VPMU: Save VPMU state for PV guests during context switch Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:01   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:10     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:18       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 14/20] x86/VPMU: When handling MSR accesses, leave fault injection to callers Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 15/20] x86/VPMU: Add support for PMU register handling on PV guests Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 15:08   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 15:49     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 16/20] x86/VPMU: Handle PMU interrupts for " Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 17:18   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 17:36     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:31   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:36     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 18:57     ` Boris Ostrovsky [this message]
2014-09-23 19:07       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 17/20] x86/VPMU: Merge vpmu_rdmsr and vpmu_wrmsr Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:38   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:57 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 18/20] x86/VPMU: Add privileged PMU mode Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:40   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:58 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 19/20] x86/VPMU: NMI-based VPMU support Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:52   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-23 19:18     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 19:27       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-09-22 23:58 ` [PATCH v11 for-xen-4.5 20/20] x86/VPMU: Move VPMU files up from hvm/ directory Boris Ostrovsky
2014-09-23 18:53   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk

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