From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
To: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: ian.campbell@citrix.com, tim@xen.org, ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com,
stefano.stabellini@citrix.com, andres@lagarcavilla.org,
jbeulich@suse.com, dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 18:19:09 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5424407D.70904@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1411646212-17041-16-git-send-email-tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Hello Tamas,
On 25/09/2014 13:56, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> The guestcopy helpers use the MMU to verify that the given guest has read/write
> access to a given page during hypercalls. As we may have custom mem_access
> permissions set on these pages, we temporarily disable them to allow Xen to
> finish the hypercalls. This is permissible as mem_access events are only
> reported for events when the guest directly accesses protected memory on x86
> as well.
IHMO, copying data from/to the guest could be consider as a guest access.
How does x86 handle this case?
> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
> ---
> xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> index 0173597..4aa041f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,43 @@
>
> #include <asm/mm.h>
> #include <asm/guest_access.h>
> +#include <asm/p2m.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Temporarily disable mem_access permission restrictions.
> + * Note: In the future, events generated by the hypervisor accessing
> + * protected memory regions could be added here.
> + */
> +static long temp_disable_mem_access(vaddr_t gva, unsigned long *gfn,
> + xenmem_access_t *xma)
> +{
> + long rc;
> + paddr_t gpa;
> +
> + rc = gva_to_ipa((vaddr_t) gva, &gpa);
> + if ( rc < 0 )
> + return rc;
> +
> + *gfn = paddr_to_pfn(gpa);
> +
> + rc = p2m_get_mem_access(current->domain, *gfn, xma);
> + if ( rc < 0 )
> + return rc;
> +
> + if ( *xma != XENMEM_access_rwx )
> + rc = p2m_set_mem_access(current->domain, *gfn, 1, 0, ~0,
> + XENMEM_access_rwx);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
When mem_access is not in use you are adding another translation and
therefore slowing down hypercall for everyone.
I don't think that modifying temporary the permission is the right thing
to do because:
- p2m_set_mem_access is called 2 times which means 2 TLB flush (and I'm
not counting the table mapping), ie it's very slow
- The other VCPU of the guest are still running. So you may not catch
unwanted access.
IHMO, the best solution would be smth like:
page = get_page_from_gva(...)
if ( !page )
{
check mem access and getting the page
if ( !page )
return rc;
}
copy the data
Regards,
--
Julien Grall
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-09-25 16:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-09-25 11:56 [PATCH for-4.5 v10 00/19] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 01/19] xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 02/19] xen: Relocate struct npfec definition " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 03/19] xen: Relocate p2m_access_t into common and swap the order Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 04/19] xen: Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to mem_access common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59 ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-26 14:34 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-26 19:54 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 05/19] xen: Relocate set_access_required domctl into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59 ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 07/19] xen/mem_event: Clean out superfluous white-spaces Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 08/19] xen/mem_event: Relax error condition on debug builds Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 09/19] xen/mem_event: Abstract architecture specific sanity checks Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 10/19] xen/mem_access: Abstract architecture specific sanity check Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 14:05 ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 11/19] xen/arm: p2m changes for mem_access support Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 12/19] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 13/19] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 14/19] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 16:19 ` Julien Grall [this message]
2014-09-26 8:39 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 12:43 ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:29 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 13:41 ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:45 ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 15:55 ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 16/19] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 17/19] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 18/19] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 19/19] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel
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