xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
To: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Cc: ian.campbell@citrix.com, tim@xen.org, ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com,
	stefano.stabellini@citrix.com, andres@lagarcavilla.org,
	jbeulich@suse.com, dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access
Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2014 18:19:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5424407D.70904@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1411646212-17041-16-git-send-email-tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>

Hello Tamas,

On 25/09/2014 13:56, Tamas K Lengyel wrote:
> The guestcopy helpers use the MMU to verify that the given guest has read/write
> access to a given page during hypercalls. As we may have custom mem_access
> permissions set on these pages, we temporarily disable them to allow Xen to
> finish the hypercalls. This is permissible as mem_access events are only
> reported for events when the guest directly accesses protected memory on x86
> as well.

IHMO, copying data from/to the guest could be consider as a guest access.

How does x86 handle this case?

> Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
> ---
>   xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> index 0173597..4aa041f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/guestcopy.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,43 @@
>
>   #include <asm/mm.h>
>   #include <asm/guest_access.h>
> +#include <asm/p2m.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * Temporarily disable mem_access permission restrictions.
> + * Note: In the future, events generated by the hypervisor accessing
> + * protected memory regions could be added here.
> + */
> +static long temp_disable_mem_access(vaddr_t gva, unsigned long *gfn,
> +                                    xenmem_access_t *xma)
> +{
> +    long rc;
> +    paddr_t gpa;
> +
> +    rc = gva_to_ipa((vaddr_t) gva, &gpa);
> +    if ( rc < 0 )
> +        return rc;
> +
> +    *gfn = paddr_to_pfn(gpa);
> +
> +    rc = p2m_get_mem_access(current->domain, *gfn, xma);
> +    if ( rc < 0 )
> +        return rc;
> +
> +    if ( *xma != XENMEM_access_rwx )
> +        rc = p2m_set_mem_access(current->domain, *gfn, 1, 0, ~0,
> +                                XENMEM_access_rwx);
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}

When mem_access is not in use you are adding another translation and 
therefore slowing down hypercall for everyone.

I don't think that modifying temporary the permission is the right thing 
to do because:
	- p2m_set_mem_access is called 2 times which means 2 TLB flush (and I'm 
not counting the table mapping), ie it's very slow
	- The other VCPU of the guest are still running. So you may not catch 
unwanted access.

IHMO, the best solution would be smth like:

      page = get_page_from_gva(...)
      if ( !page )
      {
         check mem access and getting the page
         if ( !page )
           return rc;
      }

      copy the data

Regards,

-- 
Julien Grall

  reply	other threads:[~2014-09-25 16:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-09-25 11:56 [PATCH for-4.5 v10 00/19] Mem_event and mem_access for ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 01/19] xen: Relocate mem_access and mem_event into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 02/19] xen: Relocate struct npfec definition " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 03/19] xen: Relocate p2m_access_t into common and swap the order Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 04/19] xen: Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to mem_access common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59   ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-26 14:34   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-26 19:54     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 05/19] xen: Relocate set_access_required domctl into common Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 06/19] xen: Relocate mem_event_op domctl and access_op memop " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 18:59   ` Tim Deegan
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 07/19] xen/mem_event: Clean out superfluous white-spaces Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 08/19] xen/mem_event: Relax error condition on debug builds Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 09/19] xen/mem_event: Abstract architecture specific sanity checks Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 10/19] xen/mem_access: Abstract architecture specific sanity check Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 14:05   ` Jan Beulich
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 11/19] xen/arm: p2m changes for mem_access support Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 12/19] xen/arm: Implement domain_get_maximum_gpfn Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 13/19] xen/arm: Add p2m_set_permission and p2m_shatter_page helpers Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 14/19] xen/arm: Data abort exception (R/W) mem_events Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 15/19] xen/arm: Temporarily disable mem_access for hypervisor access Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 16:19   ` Julien Grall [this message]
2014-09-26  8:39     ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 12:43       ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:29         ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 13:41           ` Julien Grall
2014-09-26 13:45             ` Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-26 15:55   ` Ian Campbell
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 16/19] xen/arm: Instruction prefetch abort (X) mem_event handling Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 17/19] xen/arm: Enable the compilation of mem_access and mem_event on ARM Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 18/19] tools/libxc: Allocate magic page for mem access " Tamas K Lengyel
2014-09-25 11:56 ` [PATCH for-4.5 v10 19/19] tools/tests: Enable xen-access " Tamas K Lengyel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5424407D.70904@linaro.org \
    --to=julien.grall@linaro.org \
    --cc=andres@lagarcavilla.org \
    --cc=dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=ian.campbell@citrix.com \
    --cc=ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com \
    --cc=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=stefano.stabellini@citrix.com \
    --cc=tim@xen.org \
    --cc=tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).