From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: favor function parameter over global in construct_dom0()
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 16:19:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <542D6D06.6000501@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <542D7109020000780003BFF9@mail.emea.novell.com>
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On 02/10/14 14:36, Jan Beulich wrote:
> There's no reason to use the "hardware_domain" variable anywhere here,
> making the code more cumbersome to read.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c
> @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static unsigned long __init compute_dom0
> return nr_pages;
> }
>
> -static void __init process_dom0_ioports_disable(void)
> +static void __init process_dom0_ioports_disable(struct domain *dom0)
> {
> unsigned long io_from, io_to;
> char *t, *s = opt_dom0_ioports_disable;
> @@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static void __init process_dom0_ioports_
> printk("Disabling dom0 access to ioport range %04lx-%04lx\n",
> io_from, io_to);
>
> - if ( ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, io_from, io_to) != 0 )
> + if ( ioports_deny_access(dom0, io_from, io_to) != 0 )
> BUG();
> }
> }
> @@ -1425,29 +1425,28 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> rc = 0;
>
> /* The hardware domain is initially permitted full I/O capabilities. */
> - rc |= ioports_permit_access(hardware_domain, 0, 0xFFFF);
> - rc |= iomem_permit_access(hardware_domain, 0UL, ~0UL);
> - rc |= irqs_permit_access(hardware_domain, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
> + rc |= ioports_permit_access(d, 0, 0xFFFF);
> + rc |= iomem_permit_access(d, 0UL, ~0UL);
> + rc |= irqs_permit_access(d, 1, nr_irqs_gsi - 1);
>
> /*
> * Modify I/O port access permissions.
> */
> /* Master Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x20, 0x21);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x20, 0x21);
> /* Slave Interrupt Controller (PIC). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0xA0, 0xA1);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xA0, 0xA1);
> /* Interval Timer (PIT). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x40, 0x43);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x40, 0x43);
> /* PIT Channel 2 / PC Speaker Control. */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0x61, 0x61);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0x61, 0x61);
> /* ACPI PM Timer. */
> if ( pmtmr_ioport )
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, pmtmr_ioport,
> - pmtmr_ioport + 3);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, pmtmr_ioport, pmtmr_ioport + 3);
> /* PCI configuration space (NB. 0xcf8 has special treatment). */
> - rc |= ioports_deny_access(hardware_domain, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
> + rc |= ioports_deny_access(d, 0xcfc, 0xcff);
> /* Command-line I/O ranges. */
> - process_dom0_ioports_disable();
> + process_dom0_ioports_disable(d);
>
> /*
> * Modify I/O memory access permissions.
> @@ -1456,22 +1455,22 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> if ( mp_lapic_addr != 0 )
> {
> mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_lapic_addr);
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, mfn, mfn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
> }
> /* I/O APICs. */
> for ( i = 0; i < nr_ioapics; i++ )
> {
> mfn = paddr_to_pfn(mp_ioapics[i].mpc_apicaddr);
> if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, mfn, mfn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn);
> }
> /* MSI range. */
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO),
> paddr_to_pfn(MSI_ADDR_BASE_LO +
> MSI_ADDR_DEST_ID_MASK));
> /* HyperTransport range. */
> if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, paddr_to_pfn(0xfdULL << 32),
> paddr_to_pfn((1ULL << 40) - 1));
>
> /* Remove access to E820_UNUSABLE I/O regions above 1MB. */
> @@ -1483,7 +1482,7 @@ int __init construct_dom0(
> if ( (e820.map[i].type == E820_UNUSABLE) &&
> (e820.map[i].size != 0) &&
> (sfn <= efn) )
> - rc |= iomem_deny_access(hardware_domain, sfn, efn);
> + rc |= iomem_deny_access(d, sfn, efn);
> }
>
> BUG_ON(rc != 0);
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-10-02 15:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-10-02 13:36 [PATCH] x86: favor function parameter over global in construct_dom0() Jan Beulich
2014-10-02 13:46 ` Tim Deegan
2014-10-02 15:11 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2014-10-02 15:17 ` Jan Beulich
2014-10-02 15:19 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
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