From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Don Slutz Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.5 v6 00/16] Xen VMware tools support Date: Thu, 02 Oct 2014 15:20:15 -0400 Message-ID: <542DA56F.8050400@terremark.com> References: <1411236447-7435-1-git-send-email-dslutz@verizon.com> <1411394209.18331.113.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> <54203DE9.9040307@eu.citrix.com> <1411400048.26552.10.camel@kazak.uk.xensource.com> <54204280.2030408@eu.citrix.com> <542067EC020000780003731E@mail.emea.novell.com> <20140925103712.GA92778@deinos.phlegethon.org> <5425C5E9.6010102@terremark.com> <20141002100507.GB43394@deinos.phlegethon.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20141002100507.GB43394@deinos.phlegethon.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Tim Deegan , Don Slutz Cc: Jun Nakajima , Kevin Tian , Keir Fraser , Ian Campbell , Stefano Stabellini , George Dunlap , Andrew Cooper , Eddie Dong , xen-devel@lists.xen.org, AravindGopalakrishnan , Jan Beulich , Ian Jackson , Boris Ostrovsky , Suravee Suthikulpanit List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On 10/02/14 06:05, Tim Deegan wrote: > At 16:00 -0400 on 26 Sep (1411743641), Don Slutz wrote: >> On 09/25/14 06:37, Tim Deegan wrote: >>> At 17:18 +0100 on 22 Sep (1411402700), Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>> On 22.09.14 at 17:38, wrote: >>>> That's indeed what was said so far. I wonder though whether opening >>>> this up without guest OS consent isn't gong to introduce a security >>>> issue inside the guest (depending on the exact functionality of these >>>> hypercalls). >>> Yes indeed. VMware seems to have CPL checks on some of the commands >>> (but not all). I guess Xen will be no worse than VMware if we do the >>> same, though I'd like to have an official spec to follow for that. >> Yes, VMware has CPL checks on some of the commands. Not at all >> clear the include file has the correct statement. I have not do any >> checking of CPL nor does QEMU. > That needs to be fixed somewhere. If Xen/Qemu is going to provide > this interface it _must_ copy the privilege checks, even if we don't > understand why they're there -- in fact, _especially_ if we don't > understand why they're there! :) > > If the third-party header file isn't a reliable source, you'll have to > determine the correct behaviour by experiment. I have done this. Will be adding the check. >> I could look into doing this, but with the xl.cfg flag vmware_port=0 >> turns this all off, I do not see any need for CPL checking. > I strongly disagree with this. If our implementation of this > interface makes guest OSes less secure than they would be under actual > VMware then the config option is irrelevant. Ok. -Don Slutz > Cheers, > > Tim.