From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>,
Ben Catterall <Ben.Catterall@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, keir@xen.org,
ian.campbell@citrix.com, george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com,
jbeulich@suse.com,
Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 3/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Code for switching into/out of deprivileged mode
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2015 14:29:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55CB4A56.1000600@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55CA3EF3.7090001@oracle.com>
On 11/08/15 19:29, Boris Ostrovsky wrote:
> On 08/11/2015 01:19 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 11/08/15 18:05, Tim Deegan wrote:
>>>>>> * Under this model, PV exception handlers should copy themselves
>>>>>> onto
>>>>>> the privileged execution stack.
>>>>>> * Currently, the IST handlers copy themselves onto the primary
>>>>>> stack if
>>>>>> they interrupt guest context.
>>>>>> * AMD Task Register on vmexit. (this old gem)
>>>>> Gah, this thing. :
>>>> Curious (and I can't seem find this in the manuals): What is this
>>>> thing?
>>> IIRC: AMD processors don't context switch TR on vmexit,
>> Correct
>>
>>> which makes using IST handlers tricky there.
>> (That is one way of putting it)
>>
>> IST handlers cannot be used by Xen if Xen does not switch the task
>> register before stgi, or IST exceptions (NMI, MCE and double fault) will
>> be taken with guest-supplied stack pointers.
>>
>>> We'd have to do the TR context switch ourselves, and that would be
>>> expensive.
>> It is suspected to be expensive, but I have never actually seen any
>> numbers one way or another.
>>
>>> Andrew, am I remembering that right?
>> Looks about right.
>>
>> I have been meaning to investigate this for a while, but never had
>> the time.
>>
>> Xen opts for disabling interrupt stack tables in the context of AMD HVM
>> vcpus, which interacts catastrophically with debug builds using
>> MEMORY_GUARD. MEMORY_GUARD shoots a page out of the primary stack to
>> detect stack overflows, but without an IST double fault hander, ends in
>> a triple fault rather than a host crash detailing the stack overflow.
>>
>> KVM unilaterally reloads the host task register on vmexit, and I suspect
>> this is probably the way to go, but have not had time to investigate
>> whether there is any performance impact from doing so. Given how little
>> of a TSS is actually used in long mode, I wouldn't expect an `ltr` to be
>> as expensive as it might have been in legacy modes.
>>
>> (CC'ing the AMD SVM maintainers to see if they have any information on
>> this subject)
>>
>
> I actually didn't even realize that TR is not saved on vmexit ;-/.
>
> Would switching TR only when we know that we need to enter this
> deprivileged mode help?
This is an absolute must. It is not safe to use syscall/sysexit without
IST in place for NMIs and MCEs.
> Assuming that it is less expensive than copying the stack.
I was referring to the stack overflow issue, and whether it might be
sensible to pro-actively which TR.
~Andrew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-12 13:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-06 16:45 [RFC 0/4] HVM x86 enhancements to run Xen deprivileged mode operations Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 1/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Page allocation helper Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 19:22 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 9:57 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-10 8:50 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10 8:52 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10 8:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-10 10:08 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 2/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Create deprivileged page tables Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 19:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 13:19 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 15:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 3/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Code for switching into/out of deprivileged mode Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 20:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 12:51 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:08 ` David Vrabel
2015-08-07 14:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11 9:45 ` Ian Campbell
2015-08-10 9:49 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-10 10:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11 9:55 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 16:51 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-11 17:05 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 17:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-11 18:29 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2015-08-12 13:29 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-08-12 13:33 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-17 13:53 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 15:07 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-17 15:17 ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-18 10:25 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-18 10:26 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-18 14:22 ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-18 16:55 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-19 10:36 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-12 10:10 ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-12 13:22 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-12 13:26 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-20 14:42 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-11 10:35 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 16:45 ` [RFC 4/4] HVM x86 deprivileged mode: Trap handlers for " Ben Catterall
2015-08-06 21:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 12:32 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-07 13:19 ` Andrew Cooper
2015-08-07 13:26 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-10 10:07 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-11 10:33 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 13:59 ` Ben Catterall
2015-08-17 14:58 ` Tim Deegan
2015-08-17 15:14 ` Jan Beulich
2015-08-12 9:50 ` [RFC 0/4] HVM x86 enhancements to run Xen deprivileged mode operations Jan Beulich
2015-08-12 11:27 ` Ben Catterall
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